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SECTION A: Introduction to the Portfolio 
1 Overview 
Awareness of the psychological effects of traumatic experience has been increasing 
over the last two decades, particularly since the inclusion of posttraumatic stress 
disorder as a diagnostic category in DSM-III for the first time in 1980. The issue of 
trauma is now something that almost all therapeutic practitioners will encounter in the 
course of their work, normally through either of two presentations. Clients may be 
referred for counselling and psychotherapeutic interventions overtly to address issues 
of recent traumatic experience, including road traffic accidents, industrial accidents 
and assault. Alternatively, they may enter therapy to address issues such as 
generalised anxiety or depression and then later on in therapy disclose traumatic past 
experience, often past histories of abuse. 
There is now a variety of evidence-based therapeutic approaches designed to address 
either of these presentations of traumatic experience (for an overview see Hacker 
Hughes and Thompson, 1994). Working with people with histories of past trauma, 
however, frequently poses a number of difficulties for the therapist that are not 
addressed within the models of traumatic stress and the recommended therapeutic 
interventions. For example, while most theories of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) incorporate the symptoms of avoidance and intrusion (for an overview see 
Section B of this thesis) therapies for PTSD rarely suggest interventions to address the 
immediate process of avoidance as it occurs during therapy. Therapists have to deal 
with the frustration and uncertainty of working with clients who, through fear or 
extreme anxiety, are reluctant to address their traumatic memories. Furthermore, 
with the emergence of the false memory debate, therapists may have to deal with their 
own and their client's ambivalence regarding the veracity of accounts of childhood 
sexual abuse. Working with traumatic material, therefore, places a huge burden on 
the therapist, who must learn to cope with his or her own feelings about the emotional 
material and the intense feelings of helplessness, rage, rescue or sadness which may 
be evoked in therapists by traumatised clients. 
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This thesis attempts to address and so illuminate these process issues through a 
variety of media, including an empirical research project. client material, and a review 
of the literature. The thesis, therefore, forms a portfolio of work on the area of 
interpersonal and process issues in therapy for people suffering from the effects of 
traumatic experience. 
2 The research component 
Section B comprises the research component of the thesis and is a two-part empirical 
study of avoidance in therapy for clients with posttraumatic stress disorder, combining 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. In my practice with clients who have 
suffered trauma I have been aware that, while some clients appear to benefit very 
rapidly from therapeutic interventions and experience significant symptom reduction, 
others appear to remain stuck and unable to work through the trauma and do not 
obtain relief from their symptoms. Efficacy studies of therapeutic approaches tend to 
focus on the extent to which clients' symptoms are alleviated by the approach under 
study and rarely address the sizeable proportion of those who do not appear to benefit 
from the interventions. Avoidance is one of the most important process issues 
involved in working with clients who have experienced trauma and, in the current 
study, it is hypothesised that avoidance may be one of the factors hindering progress. 
The purpose of the research, therefore, is to consider the impact of avoidance on the 
progress of a client during the course of therapy, both in terms of avoidant personality 
styles of clients, as in Part 1 of the research, and the process of avoidant discursive 
behaviours between client and therapist, addressed in Part 2. 
The first part of the research uses a quantitative methodology to compare the coping 
styles of monitoring and blunting (Miller, 1980) with symptom severity pre- and post- 
therapy to illuminate the interaction of coping style on symptom reduction over the 
course of therapy. While personality styles have been explored in relation to the 
initial development of the disorder (for an overview see Chapter 1 of Section B of this 
thesis) these factors have not been addressed with regard to their impact upon the 
extent of progress during therapy. If it could be demonstrated that an avoidant, 
blunting coping style is associated with poor response to treatment for PTSD, then 
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this would have implications for the choice of therapy used, in that therapies which 
minimise avoidance may need to be considered with such clients. 
The second part of the study uses discourse analysis of transcribed therapy sessions of 
clients in order to generate some of the discursive practices that function to enable an 
avoidance of painful emotional material. The purpose of the analysis is to identify 
some of the patterns of conversational behaviour that impact upon the therapeutic 
process in such a way as to facilitate or enable an avoidance of emotional material. If 
therapists are more aware of these processes, then they are less likely to blame clients 
for being resistant and instead focus on engendering alternative conversations with 
clients that are more helpful in terms of enabling them to address emotional material 
and reduce avoidance. 
3 The client study component 
Section C of the thesis comprises two accounts of therapeutic interventions with 
clients, "Penny" and "Jonathon" 
The first account details work with "Penny" and demonstrates the use of Imagery 
Rescripting (Smucker, Dancu, Foa and Niederee, 1995) a relatively recent approach to 
working with survivors of childhood sexual abuse suffering from posttraumatic stress. 
The report describes the approach in relation to work with "Penny" and reflects 
critically upon the difficulties of its application. In particular, process issues are 
addressed, including the development of the therapeutic relationship and the client's 
concerns about false memory for abuse. 
The second account describes work with "Jonathon", a client suffering from intrusive 
thoughts and traumatic grief following the death of his father. Despite the intrusive 
thoughts, that are part of the symptom presentation of clients with PTSD, and the fact 
that the client described a history of childhood neglect, he was not found to conform 
to the diagnostic category of PTSD, and so issues of differential diagnosis are 
examined. The development and course of the therapeutic alliance are again explored 
and, in particular, issues of dependency and attraction. 
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4 The literature review 
Section D comprises a literature review of the false memory debate, and is a critical 
review of the research on recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse. All 
practitioners working in the field of trauma need to be aware of the evidence for and 
against the notion that memories of sexual abuse can be forgotten and later recovered. 
As highlighted in the client study of "Penny", this is a debate that, through wide 
coverage in the media, has now reached the awareness of clients as well as therapists, 
and it is vital that therapists are able to speak about this issue with intelligence and 
sensitivity. The importance of therapists having an informed view about this area led 
to the publication of this review in an abridged form in Counselling Psychology 
Quarterly (Farrants, 1998) see Appendix 16. 
5 Personal statement 
This portfolio reflects my academic and professional background as a Chartered 
Counselling Psychologist. My motivation for researching this area comes from my 
experience of working with clients with histories of childhood trauma, and with those 
suffering from PTSD for more recent events. I have experienced first hand the 
dilemmas, difficulties and emotional expenditure of working with severely 
traumatised people and have found the therapeutic approaches for working with 
trauma to fall short of addressing these process issues. I have here attempted, not 
only to reflect upon these processes, but also to provide empirical evidence of their 
impact upon therapy and to suggest implications for further research and practice. If 
we can find ways to improve upon our practice with regard to this client group, then 
we can begin in a small way to relieve the suffering of so many who currently find 
themselves unable to move on from a traumatic past. 
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Abstract 
While the issue of avoidance in PTSD is well-documented in terms of symptom 
presentation, little has been done to address the problem posed to therapists of clients 
engaging in an avoidance of traumatic material within therapy. The current study 
uses a two-part approach, combining quantitative and qualitative methods to address 
avoidance in therapy for PTSD. 
In Part 1, a correlational design is used to compare clients' coping styles of 
"monitoring" and "blunting" (Miller, 1980) with change in symptoms over a course of 
therapy. The results indicate some support for the notion that coping style is relevant 
to symptom change over a course of therapy for PTSD. A blunting coping style was 
found to be significantly negatively correlated with degree of improvement in 
intrusive thoughts and a monitoring coping style significantly positively correlated 
with improvement in avoidance symptoms over the period. However, the possibility 
that these results are a function of significant correlations at the outset of therapy is 
considered. Furthermore, the low response rate resulted in the collection of 
insufficient data to fully test the hypotheses and, as a result, the study was treated as 
an exploratory, preliminary analysis and used to highlight research questions for a 
second phase of the research. 
In Part 2 of the study, a discourse analytic approach was used to generate avoidant 
discursive practices in transcribed material from therapy sessions with clients with 
PTSD. Both clients and therapists were found to use a range of discursive practices 
which resulted in the conversation moving away from expressions of negative affect 
or an exploration of traumatic material. Putative explanations for the observed 
behaviours are discussed and the need for therapists to be aware of these processes 
and their own emotional reactions to client's traumatic memories is emphasised. 
Differences in presentation between clients with histories of sexual abuse and those 
experiencing non-abusive isolated experiences of trauma are raised. The nature of 
avoidance within therapy is discussed and the impact of the overarching discourse of 
the therapeutic setting and the associated roles and power dynamics within the dyad 
are explored. Implications for improving the effectiveness of therapy and suggestions 
for future research in the field of avoidance in PTSD are proposed and, in particular, a 
call made for a more process-focused and "dyad-orientated" approach to practice and 
research in this area. 
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Part 1: 
The relationship between the coping styles of monitoring 
and blunting and the change in symptoms over a course 
of therapy for clients with posttraumatic stress disorder. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
1 Introduction to the area of research 
1.1 Overview of the research 
The aim of the present study is to address the extent to which the coping styles of 
monitoring and blunting are relevant to therapy outcomes of patients with posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) and, particularly, whether an avoidant blunting coping style is 
associated with poorer outcomes following therapy. This chapter develops the rationale 
for the study by demonstrating how the current theoretical models and treatment 
approaches to PTSD, while recognising avoidance as an important part of the symptom 
presentation, fail to adequately address the impact of avoidance on the effectiveness of 
therapy with this client group. 
1.2 Historical context of PTSD 
Despite cases consistent with a diagnosis of Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
recorded as early as 490BC, the term PTSD was not officially recognised until 1980 
when, as Trimble (1981) notes, "post-traumatic stress disorder (sprung) from the pages of 
the DSM-III like some newly found tropical flower" (p 152). Lay-people have long 
known that exposure to overwhelming events can lead to persistent fear, avoidance, 
anxiety and nightmares about the event. However, it was not until the wars earlier last 
century that this notion began to gain credibility amongst the psychiatric profession, 
following Abram Kardiner's (1941) pioneering work on "The Traumatic Neuroses of 
War". 
More recently, over the last decade, cases of PTSD have been widely reported in the 
media following several major tragedies, for example the Hillsborough disaster, the 
sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise and the Jupiter cruise ship disaster. However, 
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with recognition of the disorder still in its infancy, many aspects of its definition remain 
controversial. These include issues concerning the diagnostic features of PTSD. 
problems of its categorisation and the extent to which PTSD "symptoms" can be regarded 
as a normal reaction to an abnormal stressor. Despite a rapidly increasing body of 
knowledge concerning factors influencing individual differences in response to traumatic 
events, it is still not possible to predict who will develop the disorder and who will not 
following exposure. Furthermore, work is still continuing to assess the effectiveness of a 
myriad treatments devised to combat the disorder. Each of these issues will be explored 
here. 
2 Diagnostic features of PTSD 
According to DSM-1 V (APA, 1994) the essential feature of PTSD is the development of 
characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor. This must 
involve direct personal experience of an occurrence of actual or threatened death, serious 
injury or other threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves 
death, injury, violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a 
family member or other close associate. The response to the event for adults must involve 
intense fear, helplessness, or horror. 
The characteristic symptoms resulting from the exposure to the extreme trauma include: 
" persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event, in which the person may have 
recurrent and intrusive recollections or dreams of the event, and may experience these 
in a dissociative state. The person may experience intense psychological distress or 
physiological reactivity when exposed to triggering events that resemble an aspect of 
the traumatic event. 
0 persistent avoidance of activities, situations or people associated with the trauma. 
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This avoidance may include amnesia for important aspects of the event, numbing of 
emotions and reduced responsiveness to or interest in the external world, and a sense 
of a foreshortened future. 
9 persistent symptoms of increased arousal, which may include sleep disturbance due to 
recurrent nightmares, hypervigilance, an exaggerated startle response, irritability. 
anger outbursts or impairment in concentration. 
The full symptom picture must be present for more than one month, and the disturbance 
must cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning. The disorder is regarded as acute when symptom 
duration is less than three months, chronic if three months or longer, and with delayed 
onset if at least six months have passed between the event and symptom onset. 
3 Problems of diagnostic categorisation 
While the introduction of PTSD as a diagnostic category in DSM-III in 1980 has created 
a welcome framework for the scientific study of reaction to trauma, the notion of 
categorising psychological problems has not been without its critics. Categorisation has 
been regarded as encouraging the definition of people's problems as disorders without 
context, largely independent of the personal histories of the patients, their temperaments 
or their environments (van der Kolk and McFarlane, 1996). The issue of context is 
particularly relevant to PTSD because of the nature of the disorder which, as discussed 
below, combines biological, psychological and sociological aspects. 
3.1 Complexity of the disorder 
Nemiah (1995) criticises the current definition of PTSD for being based purely on 
surface manifestations, thus losing the focus on the workings of the mind. Shalev. 
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Canetti and Schreiber (1996) suggest that PTSD differs from other stress disorders in that 
it involves a unique combination of hyperarousal, conditioning, shattered meaning 
propositions and social avoidance, which makes a "biopsychosocial trap" in which one 
level of impairment prevents self-regulatory healing mechanisms from occurring on other 
levels (Shalev and Rogel-Fuchs, 1993; Shalev, Galai and Eth, 1993). For example, 
avoidance of internal cues reminiscent of the trauma may impair effective grief. The 
disorder is, therefore, complex. Listings of symptoms such as in DSM IV does not take 
into account the complexity of interconnections between symptoms, and so does little to 
help explain their maintenance (Shalev, 1996). The interrelation between symptoms is, 
therefore, important in PTSD and is not currently reflected in diagnostic categorisation of 
symptoms. 
3.2 Generalisation 
A further criticism of the DSM-IV definition of PTSD is that of generalisation. There 
appears to be significant variation among individuals, traumatic events and the contexts 
in which events occur, and individuals respond in a variety of ways to extreme stressors. 
It is, therefore dangerous to generalise about PTSD (Blank, 1993) and categorisation may 
cause the variety of traumatic responses to be overlooked, in favour of only those 
symptoms which are necessary criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD (Brett, 1996). 
Furthermore, there is an argument to suggest that diagnostic criteria for PTSD may need 
to be modified to include cases where the precipitating event is less than catastrophic, as 
in the example of Weaver (2000) who describes an adolescent girl who developed PTSD 
following repeated emotional bullying at school. 
3.3 Symptoms as a result of PTSD 
Furthermore, while DSM-IV lists symptoms associated with PTSD, it overlooks the fact 
that many symptoms may arise as a result of recurring traumatic memories. As 
McFarlane (1988) puts it, a patient is victimised by having memories of the event not by 
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the event itself. In fact, Kardiner (1941) postulated a two-stage model of the response to 
trauma, the first stage being what we now regard as the main symptoms of PTSD and the 
second being a manifestation of the person's adaptation to the trauma. It is well 
documented that depression and anxiety disorders, for example, are frequently found to 
be comorbid with PTSD (Barlow, 1993) and could be regarded as the individual's 
response to PTSD symptoms. The whole area of diagnostic classifications loses the 
complexity of these reactions. Approaches based on a counselling model, and the 
welcome recognition of Counselling Psychology as a division of the British 
Psychological Society (BPS) may be useful developments in the treatment of PTSD. 
Such approaches seek to move away from the traditional medical and diagnostic model of 
treatment and aim to work with people in an individual and collaborative way. The 
strength of holistic approaches lies in their emphasis on the individual and their reactions 
to events, rather than on making attempts to classify emotions, thoughts, behaviour and 
physiological reactions in terms of diagnostic categories. 
3.4 Normal and abnormal reactions to extreme stressors 
A further point to note with regard to diagnostic criteria of PTSD is the issue of whether 
observed symptoms can be considered to constitute an abnormal, pathological reaction, or 
merely a normal response to overwhelming events. Solomon, Laror and McFarlane 
(1996) suggest that it is normal to react with such symptoms in the immediate aftermath 
of a traumatic event, such as rape or combat, and that, initially, most people do react with 
intrusive thoughts. A study by Malt et al (1993) found that, immediately following 
railway accidents, over one half of train drivers reported moderate to high levels of 
intrusive memories. Not all went on to develop PTSD, suggesting that these responses 
are normal in the aftermath of a traumatic event, and should not be pathologised. It could 
be argued, therefore, that it is the persistence of these symptoms beyond a few weeks, and 
their intensity, which constitutes an abnormal reaction. Indeed, DSM-IV has provided a 
separate diagnostic category for Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) a short-term severe 
reaction to trauma, distinguished from PTSD in its duration, lasting less than four weeks. 
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It could be argued that, rather than a disorder, this cluster of "symptoms" may constitute a 
normal reaction to an extreme stressor. 
Also, it appears that the relationships among the various symptoms following trauma 
change with the passage of time. It has been suggested that avoidance is not an integral 
part of the original response to a traumatic event, and that avoidance occurs later on only 
after the individual has been unable to work through the intrusive symptoms. For 
example, Shalev (1992) found, in a study of terrorist attack victims, that avoidance was 
not proportional to intrusions in the immediate post-attack period. This is further 
supported by the Malt et al (1993) study of post accident train drivers, in which intrusive 
memories were frequently reported, whereas avoidance was uncommon. 
It would appear, therefore, that initial reaction to a traumatic stressor and initial levels of 
avoidance and intrusion do not predict the onset of PTSD. If this is so, it is likely that 
some other process may be responsible for the development of PTSD symptoms beyond 
the immediate aftermath of the trauma, turning an original normal response into a 
pathological and abnormal reaction. Shalev (1992) suggests that this factor may be the 
destabilisation of the individual's normal pattern of arousal, which may have a feedback 
effect on the processing of thoughts and feelings. McFarlane and Yehuda (1996) go as 
far as to postulate that the current emphasis on a cognitive processing model of PTSD 
may have actually hampered the investigation of what differentiates adaptive from 
maladaptive responses to trauma, and may have diverted attention away from the impact 
of trauma on personality. Theories of PTSD span a range of approaches and models, 
which are outlined below. 
4 Theoretical models of PTSD 
Several models have been proposed in an attempt to explain the aetiology of the disorder 
and to make sense of the development of the PTSD symptom pattern. Prior to official 
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recognition of the disorder and its inclusion in DSM-III, most theories of trauma response 
were psychoanalytical (Barlow, 1993). Freud had observed the characteristics of 
"repetition" and "denial" in veterans of World War I. These concepts were later 
incorporated into Horowitz' (1976) Information Processing Model of response to trauma, 
as "re-experiencing" and "avoidance". The model integrates psychodynamic ideas with 
cognitive-behavioural and information processing theories. According to the model, the 
trauma remains in active memory, but is kept from conscious awareness by the defences 
of denial and emotional numbing. These mechanisms serve to prevent the individual 
from being overwhelmed by the memory. However, intrusive, re-experiencing 
phenomena such as flashbacks and nightmares are repeated as part of an attempt to 
process and integrate the traumatic memories. The individual, therefore, oscillates 
between periods of intrusive thoughts and avoidance, the latter seen as a control process 
aimed at regulating overwhelming affect. 
4.1 Information processing models 
Information processing concepts provide frameworks for understanding PTSD (for 
example: Beck & Emery, 1985; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa, Steketee & Rothbaum, 1989; 
Litz & Keane, 1989). Most such theories involve the notion of a cognitive fear 
structure, which is activated at the time of emotional arousal (Williams, Watts, McLeod 
and Mathews, 1988) and which results in fear responses (Lang, 1977). The existence of a 
fear structure enhances attention and sensitivity to stimuli represented in the structure 
which are then perceived more readily and more resources are allocated to processing 
such information (Williams et al, 1988). Foa et al (1989) suggest that it is necessary in 
therapy to fully activate this fear structure in order for cognitive processing and 
restructuring to take place. While comprehensive, such models fail to account for 
individual differences in response to trauma. 
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4.2 Learnine theory models 
Proposed by Keane, Zimering and Caddell (1985) learning theory models of PTSD 
suggest that a conditioned response to any stimulus reminiscent of the traumatic event, is 
elicited via classical conditioning. Stimuli indirectly related to the trauma can become 
additional sources of anxiety via the processes of generalisation and higher-order 
conditioning. Avoidance behaviours to these stimuli are learned as a means of escape of 
the uncomfortable arousal state and are maintained via negative reinforcement. One 
advantage of this model is that it may account for delayed onset PTSD, the apparent 
delay occurring while ever increasing additional stimuli are added to the initial fear- 
evoking stimuli, and begin to elicit anxiety symptoms themselves until crisis point is 
reached. 
4.3 Cognitive processing models 
Cognitive processing models view emotional processing or integrating of the trauma as 
central to successful recovery, in order to transform fragmented, emotional images and 
sensations into meaningful narrative memories, for example Foa, Steketee and Rothbaum 
(1989). More recently, Creamer, Burgess and Pattison (1992) proposed a five-stage 
cognitive processing model incorporating stages of objective exposure, network 
formation, intrusion, avoidance and outcome and involving feedback loops between the 
stages. Cognitive and behavioural theories take some account of individual differences in 
the development of PTSD in that they highlight the role of subjective perception of the 
trauma, and not just the severity of objective exposure. 
4.4 Biological models 
Recent findings propose physiological evidence for the cognitive processing theories, 
which suggest that trauma memories are fragmented and nonverbal, and need to be 
incorporated into narrative memories in order for recovery to occur. Studies of 
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hippocampal volumes by Bremner, Southwick and Charney (1995); Stein et al (1994): 
and Gurvitz, Shenton and Pitman (1995) indicate that PTSD patients' difficulties putting 
feelings into words are reflected in actual changes in brain activity. Rauch et al (in press) 
found that, during the provocation of traumatic memories, there is a decrease in activation 
of Broca's area, the part of the brain most centrally involved in the transformation of 
subjective experience into speech. Simultaneously, the areas in the right hemisphere 
which are thought to process intense emotions and visual images show significantly 
increased activation. This may give rise to the "speechless terror" experienced by PTSD 
patients, as Broca's area is "turned off' while right hemisphere activity is heightened. 
This indicates that, in contrast to the way in which people seem to process ordinary 
information, traumatic memories are initially imprinted as sensations or feeling states, 
and are not collated and transcribed into personal narratives. Van der Kolk (1996) posits, 
therefore, that the very nature of a traumatic memory is to be dissociated and stored 
initially as sensory fragments which have no linguistic components. These findings are a 
very important recent development in the field of PTSD in that they provide evidence of 
biological mechanisms to explain the symptoms observed in the development of PTSD. 
They do not account, however, for individual differences in the development of PTSD, 
nor explain how mediating factors, such as social support, may influence the course of 
the disorder. 
5 Individual differences in reaction to extreme stressors 
Despite the range of theoretical models of PTSD, and despite the considerable work 
currently being undertaken to establish the mechanisms underlying PTSD, few theories 
provide comprehensive explanations to account for the very apparent individual reactions 
to traumatic events which, as has been discussed, cannot easily be predicted. Cases of 
PTSD have demonstrated very clearly the fact that, despite being exposed to the same 
traumatic event, individuals may react in a variety of ways, some going on to develop 
symptoms of PTSD and others remaining relatively psychologically unscathed. It is, 
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therefore, considered that mediating variables play their part in the onset of the disorder. 
Most traumatologists now agree that response to trauma is multiply determined (Figley, 
1986; Gleser, Green and Winget, 1981; Green, Lindy and Grace, 1985; Raphael. 1986) 
and that the type of trauma experienced is less important than the trauma severity and 
individual reactions and vulnerabilities (Barlow, 1993). There is now an increasing body 
of evidence concerning the roles that objective and subjective factors play in the 
development of PTSD (Davidson and Foa, 1991). 
Much of the research into the disorder, since its relatively recent recognition, therefore, 
has attempted to document the nature of these differences in response to trauma and to 
identify the nature of predisposing factors. While several determinants have been 
identified as predictive of PTSD, it is not possible to predict who will go on to develop 
the disorder, nor what constitutes a traumatic event. Exploration of individual differences 
between trauma survivors, has yielded a wealth of both situational, attributional and 
personality differences between those who develop post-trauma symptoms and those who 
do not. 
5.1 Situational factors 
Situational factors have been categorised as prestressors, peritraumatic factors and post- 
stressor factors (Amir, Kaplan, Efroni, Levine, Benjamin, and Kotler, 1997). Amir et al 
(1997) found that situational factors in the development of PTSD may include 
prestressors, such as family psychiatric or violent history, social support, education and 
age (Bremner, Southwich and Charney, 1995). Peritraumatic factors influencing the 
development of the disorder include the nature of the event, seeing a close friend killed 
(Solkoff, Gray and Keill, 1986; Chemtob, Bauer and Neller, 1990) the level of exposure 
to combat stress (Boyle, Decoufle and O'Brien, 1989; Kulka et al. 1990) the severity of 
the stressor (March, 1993) or violent and injurious trauma characteristics (Bownes, 
O'Gorman and Sayers. 1991; Green, Grace and Gleser, 1985) with sexual assault being 
associated with a worse prognosis than other types of crime (Kilpatrick. Saunders, 
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Amick-McMullan, Best, Veronen, and Resnick, 1989; Resick. 1988), fear of being 
injured or killed and actual injury (Resick, 1986). Post-stressor factors in the 
development of PTSD include being unmarried (Card, 1983), lack of social support (for 
example: Frank and Anderson, 1987; Kulka et al 1990) and alcohol and substance abuse 
(Foy and Card, 1987). Posttrauma variables found to negatively affect recovery include 
early post-victimisation reactions, such as high level of distress and immediate PTSD 
symptoms (Rothbaum, Foa, Murdock, Riggs and Walsh, 1990). Similarly, in studies of 
Vietnam veterans, Kolb (1987) and Ursano, Boydstun and Wheatley (1981) found being 
well-educated and having experience of coping with life stressors to aid in readjustment 
following trauma exposure. While much of the research focuses on war veterans, civilian 
studies have found reaction to trauma to be compounded by compensation issues, for 
example in survivors of motor vehicle accidents (Culpan and Taylor, 1973). 
5.2 Personality factors 
In addition to exploring relevant situational variables, the notion that an individual's 
personality and style of coping may be relevant to the development and the course of 
PTSD, and indeed may moderate between exposure to trauma and consequent mental 
health, needs to be explored. The research has drawn upon both personality theory, 
health psychology and attribution theory in its search for the factors predisposing 
individuals to PTSD. 
McFarlane (1988) found premorbid personality to be an important factor in the 
development of PTSD. He found that a pattern of persistently chronic morbidity could be 
predicted when individuals displayed a pattern of adversity before the event, neuroticism, 
treated past psychiatric disorder, and a tendency to avoid thinking about problems. He 
found individuals without PTSD to have a greater tendency to forget about injuries 
sustained during the trauma than did those who developed PTSD. Bryant, Marosszeky, 
Crooks, Baguley and Gurka (2000) found avoidant coping style, behavioural coping style 
and a history of prior unemployment to be significant predictors of PTSD severit`- in a 
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sample of traumatically brain-injured patients with PTSD. Davis and Breslau (1994) 
found individuals prone to anxiety and/or depression, family history of psychiatric 
difficulties with behaviour problems of childhood, or other negative personality factors to 
have increased risk for PTSD. 
In addition to examining individual differences in symptoms in response to trauma, it is 
useful to study those who remain well following a traumatic experience. Benezra (1996) 
assessed the personality factors of forty respondents who coped successfully with 
traumatic experiences without planned psychotherapeutic intervention. The recurrent 
themes included a healthy, secure upbringing, supportive relationships, a hardworking 
and productive life-style, self-determination, the ability to learn from the experience, 
personal faith, and not feeling embittered. This is reminiscent of work in the field of 
health psychology, for example Kobasa's (1979) model of the "hardy" personality, 
comprising a sense of control, commitment and meaningfulness in life. Bartone et al 
(1989) found individuals high in "hardiness" had better outcomes after exposure to 
disaster stress. A useful question is whether hardy individuals would have a better 
outcome following therapy, and whether hardiness characteristics could then be trained. 
Bronisch (1997) found a genetic disposition, familial psychopathology and premorbid 
personality traits as background variables seem to have an influence on the development 
of PTSD, whereas coping strategies, as well as social support, modify the course of the 
disease. So it appears that, while some factors may predispose an individual to the 
development of PTSD, other factors may influence the progression of the disorder. 
5.2.1 Attributions 
The extent to which the individual takes responsibility or blame for what happened, and 
how far they regard the event as within their control may be a mediating factor in the 
development of PTSD symptoms. Attribution theorists in the field of PTSD, for example 
Brewin (1988) have found the nature of a person's construal of events to have 
consequences for how he or she will respond to that event. 
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Traditional theories have tended to focus on attributions and depression. There are 
several models which link negative construal of events with depression, for example the 
cognitive theories of Beck (1967) and Ellis (1962) and the learned helplessness models of 
Seligman (1974) and Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978). More recently, work has 
been undertaken to identify the particular attributions which are involved in PTSD. For 
example, negative cognitive appraisals, and causal attributions which are associated with 
learned helplessness, have been found to affect recovery, (Gold, 1986). 
In a study of survivors of the Herald of Free Enterprise, Joseph, Brewin, Yule and 
Williams (1991) investigated the evidence for the contribution of causal attribution and 
attributional style in the development of PTSD. Joseph et al (1991) found more internal 
and controllable attributions of experience to be related to intrusive thoughts, depression 
and anxiety at eight and nineteen months following the disaster. These findings are 
consistent with Weiner's (1986) cognitive theory of emotions which suggests that internal 
and controllable causal attributions for negative outcomes are related to feelings of guilt 
which in turn, it was suggested, may exacerbate symptoms. This finding is also 
consistent with Foa, Steketee and Rothbaum's (1989) assertion that symptoms of PTSD 
are enhanced by the perception of unexercised control. Similarly, Joseph, Yule and 
Williams (1993), in a study of the survivors of the Jupiter cruise ship disaster, found 
internal attributions to be related to greater depression and intrusive thoughts one year 
later. These two studies suggest that causal attributions for disaster-related events may be 
important in understanding individual differences in the severity and chronicity of 
symptoms. It is suggested that attributional style may be one cause of such differences. 
Similarly, McCormick, Taber and Kruedelbach (1989) found the development of PTSD 
to be significantly related to a more internal, global and stable attributional style for 
negative events, and a less internal, stable and global attributional style for positive 
events. As has been discussed, current treatments for PTSD usually include a cognitive 
restructuring element which serves the function of enabling individuals to make more 
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accurate and realistic attributions concerning the event. The reported success of such 
treatments (for example, Smucker, Dancu, Foa and Niederee, 1995) supports the notion 
that attributions are a relevant factor in PTSD. 
It is clear, therefore, that the severity of the stressor itself is not the only predictor of the 
development of PTSD, for the way in which the event is construed and attributions made 
by the individual concerning the part they played in it, are likely to influence subsequent 
symptom development. Individual differences in the way in which a traumatic stressor is 
perceived are an important factor in the development of the disorder, and Foa, Steketee 
and Rothbaum (1989) argue, therefore, that perceived threat is a better predictor of PTSD 
than actual threat. Similarly, subjective responses to trauma such as perception of 
trauma severity and level of threat are major determinants of PTSD (Green, Lindy and 
Grace, 1985; Kilpatrick, Saunders, Amick-McMullan, Best, Veronen and Resnick, 1989) 
Reaction to trauma, therefore, is mediated by individual differences in perception of the 
trauma (Horesh, Rolnick, lancu, Dannon, Lepkifker, Apter and Kotler, 1996). However, 
as Bryant and Harvey (1995a) observe, many studies rely on self-report measures of 
trauma severity. In their studies of the survivors of motor vehicle accidents, Bryant and 
Harvey (1995b) found that, while it is clear that trauma severity was not linearly related 
to stress response, self-report measures of trauma severity may be a function of 
attributions which are influenced by posttraumatic symptomology and Feinstein and 
Dolan (1991), in a study of 48 accident patients, found that perceived severity of the 
accident did not relate to onset of PTSD. This raises the issue of how far personality 
factors are the cause or a result of PTSD symptoms, that is whether individuals' 
attributions precede the traumatic event, or are altered by the experience. 
5.2.2 Locus of control 
A notion related to attribution theory is that of locus of control (Rotter, 1966). There is 
some evidence for the fact that higher externality is associated with greater depression 
and is a possible vulnerability factor in adjustment to adverse life-events (Lefcourt, 
Martin, and Saleh, 1984; Benassi, Sweeney and Dufour, 1988). Attempts have been 
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made to apply the theory to PTSD. Vinokur, Caplan and Williams (1987) found external 
locus of control to be a personality factor relevant to the development of PTSD. In 
studies by Orr et al (1990) Vietnam veterans with PTSD displayed a trend towards a more 
external locus of control. These results are in accordance with attributional style research 
which shows greater externality for positive outcomes to be associated with PTSD 
(McCormick et al, 1989; Mikulincer and Solomon, 1988). 
5.3 Coping styles 
In addition to perceptions and attributions concerning the event, another area of 
personality research has focused on the extent to which individual differences in coping 
styles among those exposed to trauma are predictive of the development of PTSD 
following a traumatic experience (Amir et al, 1997). The coping styles of dissociation, 
suppression and avoidance have been found to be associated with PTSD. 
5.3.1 Dissociation 
Studies of a variety of traumatised populations have shown dissociation during the 
trauma to be a significant predictor of the subsequent development of PTSD (Holen, 
1993; Koopman, Classen and Spiegal, 1994; Shalev, Peri, Canetti and Schreiber, 1996). 
Van der Kolk (1996) states that much of patients' symptomology can be explained as 
manifestations of adaptations to traumatic experiences appropriate to the developmental 
level at which the trauma occurred, such as splitting or dissociating. People who have 
earlier learned to use dissociative states to cope with threat seem vulnerable to using it 
again during acute distress (van der Kolk, 1996). This is particularly evident in cases of 
adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse. Dissociation is frequently the only means at a 
child's disposal with which to cope with the traumatic event. Indeed, while dissociation 
is commonly regarded as a maladaptive response to a stressor, it could be argued that 
different styles of coping can be useful under different conditions. For example, 
assertiveness may be dangerous in situations of torture, sexual abuse or witnessing 
violence. Passive coping is not always maladaptive and sometimes dissociating or 
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disengaging may aid survival. 
Childhood sexual abuse seems to result in the highest degree of total amnesia prior to 
memory retrieval, with figures ranging from 19% (Loftus, Polenski and Fullilove. 1994) 
to 38% (Williams, 1994). Amnesias for emotional and cognitive material are related to 
age and duration 
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the younger a person at the time of trauma and the more prolonged the 
trauma, the greater the likelihood of significant amnesia (Briere and Conte. 1993: 
Herman and Shatzow, 1987; van der Kolk, 1996). It is possible that amnesia may relate 
to the extent to which an individual dissociated at the time of the trauma and, as has been 
discussed, young children who are physically or sexually abused may be likely to use 
dissociation as a coping strategy. 
5.3.2 Suppression 
Amir et al (1997) investigated the different coping styles of patients diagnosed with 
PTSD, comparing them with a healthy control and a non-PTSD anxiety disorders group. 
Furthermore, they assessed the relationship between coping styles and intrusion and 
avoidance, the core symptoms of PTSD. They found the PTSD patients to score 
significantly higher than both groups on the coping style of "suppression", via which 
individuals tend to avoid the problem or situation. Of eight coping styles categories, as 
identified using Plutchik's (1989) Coping Styles Questionnaire, Amir et al (1997) found 
only "suppression" to be significantly positively correlated with both intrusion and 
avoidance scores, from Horowitz, Wilner and Alvarez, Impact of Events Scale (1979). 
Amir et al concluded that the coping style of suppression plays a pivotal role in the 
psychological profile of PTSD patients, distinguishing such patients from those 
diagnosed with general anxiety disorders. Furthermore, the more the patient attempts to 
suppress the impact of the traumatic event, the more s/he suffers the symptoms of 
intrusion and avoidance. Work on attentional bias and anxiety has demonstrated that 
thought suppression leads paradoxically to preoccupation with the thought (Lave and van 
den Hout 1990: Wegner et al, 1987) and so enhances anxiety rather then reduces it (Lave 
and van den Hout, 1994). This supports the traditional conceptualisation of PTSD as a 
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manifestation of the failure to cope with the traumatic thoughts and memories via an 
inefficient avoidant coping style. 
6 Avoidance 
While suppression may sometimes provide an appropriate and effective approach to 
minor or short-term problems, the evidence suggests that it is an inefficient way in which 
to deal with PTSD. The area of avoidance and its relationship with PTSD symptoms 
needs to be fully explored. 
6.1 Avoidance and the onset of PTSD 
Research with combat veterans has suggested that avoidant coping styles may influence 
the development of PTSD symptoms following exposure to combat-related events. It has 
been found that greater PTSD severity is associated with more frequent use of escape- 
avoidance styles in coping with war memories (Solomon, Mikulincer and Arad, 1991; 
Wolfe, Keane, Kaloupek, Mora and Wine, 1993). In a study of older Vietnam combat 
veterans, Hyer and Boyd (1996) found those with a diagnosis of chronic PTSD to be most 
likely to use emotion-focused and avoidance coping strategies to cope with reactivated 
trauma memories in the present. From the fact that symptoms persisted, it is clear that 
these coping strategies were not effective in this context, and so proved an inefficient way 
of dealing with the trauma. It appears, therefore, that an avoidant coping style is related 
to PTSD symptoms in combat veterans. However war veterans are a specific and 
possibly atypical group, whose training may have had an impact on the coping strategies 
of preference, for example confrontative strategies being reinforced by exposure to 
combat, and so studies of civilian traumas also need to be taken into account. 
Bryant and Harvey (1995b) investigated the factors that predict post-traumatic stress 
intrusions in civilians, following motor vehicle accidents (MVAs) and found an avoidant 
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coping style and compensation to be the best predictors of intrusion scores on the Impact 
of Events Scale (Horowitz et al, 1979), accounting for 41% of the variance, supporting 
the notion that an avoidant coping style is important in the development of negative 
emotional response to trauma (Schwartz and Kowalski, 1992; Solomon, Mikulincer and 
Flum, 1988). In a later study of burns patients, Bryant (1996) found concern over 
scarring and an avoidant coping style accounted for 61 per cent of the variance in post- 
traumatic stress symptomatology, reinforcing the importance of avoidance. 
So studies on both combat and civilian trauma survivors highlight avoidance as an 
important factor mediating symptoms. It could even be argued that avoidance rates are 
higher than those reported, in that many studies rely on a self-selected sample and it is 
likely that those choosing not to respond to a survey may represent a greater proportion of 
avoiders than those responding. Avoidance is, therefore, clearly a large problem in 
relation to PTSD symptoms, as it may serve to inhibit recovery. 
Attempts have been made to understand why it is that avoidance may mediate negative 
adjustment following trauma. Cognitive models of PTSD propose that avoidance 
behaviour is a primary reaction to intrusive thoughts and contributes to the persistence of 
intrusions (Creamer, Burgess and Pattison, 1992). It has been suggested that this is 
because, in the case of chronic PTSD, distressing and intrusive recollections of the 
traumatic event continue "to live on in the active memory of the survivor, posing an 
ongoing, chronic stressor which must be coped with in the present", (Green, Lindy and 
Grace, 1988, p 400). Suppression in PTSD is, therefore, regarded as a way of not 
dealing with the stressor and of, therefore, not coping appropriately with it, leading to the 
maintenance of symptoms. 
Foa et al (1989) describe a "fear network" and found strong response elements in 
structure may promote avoidance and lead to short inadequate activation of structure, 
preventing the opportunity for incorporation of new meanings and modification. "The 
'super-axvoiders' more successfully prevent activation of the fear structure and, therefore, 
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would be expected to show chronic PTSD symptoms. " (p168). In cognitive processing 
theory terms, it is possible that avoidance will interfere with processing, in that avoidance 
may lead to the fear network not being sufficiently activated, so that recovery does not 
occur. Indeed it has been suggested that poor memory results from cognitive avoidance 
of threat-relevant material (Foa and Kozak, 1986; Mathews and McLeod, 1987) so that 
cognitive avoidance serves the function of aborting further processing of threatening 
material (Williams, 1988). Foa et al (1989) found degree of avoidance to discriminate 
acute from chronic cases of PTSD. Avoidance may be manifested by not talking about 
the event or avoiding reminders of it. Other avoidance tactics include depersonalisation, 
emotional numbness, distractibility and memory loss. These are not adaptive as they do 
not allow emotional processing to take place. If an emotional disturbance is not 
'absorbed satisfactorily' some symptoms become evident, Rachman (1980). Immediate 
avoidance behaviour may serve an adaptive function in the immediate aftermath of a 
trauma. Further research is required that investigates adaptive and maladaptive use of 
avoidance in post-trauma response, and the utility of appropriate reduction of avoidance 
to facilitate positive adjustment. 
Horowitz (1986) observed that post trauma adjustment is facilitated by habituation and so 
reducing avoidance behaviour may aid habituation and so reduce intrusive symptoms. It 
could be argued, therefore, that coping style is particularly of relevance to the field of 
PTSD, perhaps more so than in other disorders, as PTSD symptoms appear to be 
maintained by the extent to which the individual attempts to suppress disturbing and 
intrusive thoughts of the event. It could be argued that individuals with a generally 
avoidant coping style may be more at risk for chronic PTSD. If it could be found that 
some people have a premorbid avoidant coping style that interferes with cognitive 
processing of the event, this could perhaps be addressed before therapy takes place. 
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6.2 Avoidance leading to underreporting 
So, avoidance may serve to prevent the event being processed in any meaningful or 
narrative way, thus precluding the opportunity for cognitive restructuring and altering of 
faulty attributions and cognitions. However, not only may avoidance interfere with 
cognitive processing of trauma, and so serve to maintain symptoms, but it has also been 
suggested that avoidance may prevent patients being recognised as having the disorder in 
the first place, so that avoidant symptoms of PTSD can interfere with diagnosis. 
Epstein (1993) suggests that the "self-cloaking" nature of avoidant symptoms such as 
psychogenic amnesia and unconscious defensiveness could lead to a significant number 
of false negatives in the diagnosis of PTSD. In a study of accident injury patients, 
Epstein (1993) found some patients to deny any problematic psychological effects soon 
after injury, but to develop PTSD symptoms later on. He concluded that, without the 
process of psychiatric interviews at nine to ten week intervals, the diagnosis of PTSD 
might have been easily missed in two of the six cases studied, as the avoidant symptoms 
of PTSD can serve as a "self-cloaking" device that may hinder or prevent timely 
diagnosis. PTSD sufferers are naturally reluctant to recount their traumas, after all 
numbing and avoidance are key symptoms of the disorder. Weisaeth's (1989a; 1989b) 
study of a factory explosion found those with most severe posttraumatic reactions were 
the most reluctant to engage in treatment and to attend routine health checks. Sparr, 
Moffitt and Ward (1993) found PTSD and/or substance misuse clients in a psychiatric 
outpatient unit to be the most likely to miss appointments. Highly avoidant patients may 
need the support of more frequent contact and expression of interest on the part of an 
interviewer in order to overcome the painful affects that are aroused by thinking or 
talking about a highly traumatic event. The Impact of Events Scale (IES) is a useful 
screening instrument for detecting later outcome (Feinstein and Dolan, 1991). Bryant 
(1996), in a study of burns patients, observed that only half of the patients reporting 
PTSD had sought professional assistance and, more generally, that avoidance is 
associated with poor help-seeking behaviour (Schwartz and Kowalski, 1992). 
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Malt (1988) carried out the first longitudinal study of civilian accident victims, and 
concluded that PTSD seldom occurred after accidental injuries. However, approximately 
14% of his patients had an avoidant subscale score of greater than 20 on the IES (Zilberg, 
Weiss and Horowitz, 1982) on initial examination and at follow-up. This suggests that 
avoidance may have led some of these patients to decline from discussing the full range 
of their symptomology. However, Shalev et al (1996) explained similar findings in their 
study by citing dissociation as the cause of underreporting of symptoms or affect. 
An avoidant personality style, therefore, can be seen as an important personality factor in 
the maintenance of PTSD as it is associated with poor help-seeking behaviour. 
Diagnostic categories and theoretical models are, by their nature, generalised and so do 
not take account of individual differences in the symptom presentation, development or 
maintenance of the disorder. It is important that the findings from the research into such 
factors are considered and incorporated into the models, in order to provide a clearer and 
more complete picture of the nature and course of the disorder. This will aid the 
development of more precise treatments for the various and complex symptom 
presentations of PTSD. Accordingly, alongside attempts to establish the myriad factors 
underlying development of PTSD, a range of therapeutic interventions have been 
proposed to help those who suffer from the disorder. 
7 Treatment approaches 
Since the relatively recent recognition of the disorder, treatments for PTSD have included 
behavioural and cognitive-behavioural interventions, constructivist and systemic 
approaches, psychodynamic psychotherapy, pharmacological treatments and debriefing 
programmes. 
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7.1 Cognitive and behavioural therapies for PTSD 
Cognitive theories propose that PTSD occurs because of a person's inability to process a 
traumatic experience adequately (Foa, Steketee and Rothbaum, 1989). If PTSD 
symptoms are a result of inadequate emotional processing, then therapy. aiming at the 
reduction of these symptoms, can be perceived as facilitating such processing (Rothbaum 
and Foa, 1996). A variety of cognitive-behavioural techniques have been used in the 
treatment of PTSD, including Prolonged Exposure (Foa et al, 1991), Stress Inoculation 
Training (Kilpatrick et al, 1982), Systematic Desensitisation (Wolpe, 1958) and 
Cognitive Processing Therapy (Resick and Schnicke, 1992). For an overview see Hacker 
Hughes and Thompson (1994). Other more recent cognitive-behavioural approaches 
include Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) (Shapiro, 1989), 
Imagery Rescripting (Smucker et al, 1995) and Psychophysiology (Rothschild, 2000). 
Each shall be outlined here. 
7.1.1 Prolonged exposure (PE) 
PE (Foa et al, 1991) involves repeated reliving of the trauma in imagination, the aim 
being to promote the processing of the traumatic memory. Foa and Riggs (1993) found 
PE in a study of 96 rape victims to promote successful processing of the traumatic 
memory and to lead to a reduction in PTSD symptoms, especially those of intrusion and 
avoidance. Following treatment, Foa and Riggs reported that only 32% still had full 
PTSD. 
1.2 Stress inoculation training (SIT) 
SIT (Kilpatrick et al, 1982) teaches ways of coping with anxiety, which improves the 
individual's sense of control and of being an adequate coper. However, SIT does not 
directly address the processing of the trauma memory, unlike PE. An approach that 
integrates SIT and PE approaches, therefore, is more likely to address both the trauma 
memory and provide coping strategies to deal with the symptoms. 
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7.1.3 Systematic desensitisation (SD) 
Originally proposed by Wolpe (1958) for use with anxiety disorders, SD has been used in 
the treatment of trauma. The successful outcome of SD, in which clients are exposed to 
fearful imagery in a state of relaxation, has been reported in two studies with war 
veterans (Peniston, 1986; Bowen and Lambert, 1986) however, the severity of PTSD and 
related pathology was not assessed, and so conclusions drawn can be only limited. Direct 
evidence for the success of SD in reducing PTSD symptoms comes from studies by Muse 
(1986) and Brom, Kleber and Defares (1989) who found SD more effective than for 
untreated controls. While several studies of the effectiveness of SD have shown 
beneficial results, lack of methodological rigour and the absence of PTSD diagnosis and 
measures in most of the studies limit the conclusions which can be drawn from them. 
Evidence for the inferiority of SD to flooding in complex anxiety disorders (Marks, 
Boulougouris and Marset, 1971) has resulted in SD for PTSD being abandoned in favour 
of other more reliable treatments. 
7.1.4 Cognitive processing therapy (CPT) 
Devised by Resick and Schnicke (1992), CPT is a therapy specifically for the treatment 
of PTSD in sexual assault survivors. A twelve session structured therapy programme, it 
combines exposure therapy with cognitive restructuring. In efficacy studies, clients 
improved significantly from pre- to post-treatment on PTSD and depression ratings, and 
maintained improvement throughout the six month follow-up period. A waiting list 
control group showed no significant improvement over the period (Resick and Schnicke, 
1992). 
7.1.5 Eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) 
EMDR (Shapiro, 1989) is a form of imaginal exposure in which patients track the 
therapist's finger from side to side during imaginal exposure. According to Shapiro 
(1991) EMDR has had more published case reports to support it than either SD or 
flooding in the treatment of PTSD during a comparable time period. Silver, Brooks and 
Obenchain (1995) found that results show EMDR to be an effective technique in the 
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treatment of PTSD, producing positive incremental change in the PTSD programme for 
nightmares, intrusive thoughts, flashbacks, anxiety, anger, depression, and relationship 
problems. Boudewyns et al (1993) did not find differences on PTSD measures between 
EMDR and an eyes fixed exposure control. EMDR is surrounded by controversy, as 
there has, as yet, been no conclusive explanation as to the nature of the process or the 
mechanisms involved. Rothbaum and Foa (1996) have concluded from the outcome 
research to date that the efficacy of EMDR is equivocal. More recently, Shepherd, Stein 
and Milne (2000) summarised the results of 16 published randomised controlled trials 
assessing the efficacy of EMDR and found that, in most cases, EMDR was shown to be 
effective at reducing symptoms up to three months after treatment. 
7.1.6 Imagery rescripting 
Pioneered by Smucker, Dancu, Foa and Niederee (1995) as a "new treatment for 
survivors of childhood sexual abuse suffering from posttraumatic stress" (p3), imagery 
rescripting constitutes a nine-session programme combining imaginal exposure, mastery 
imagery and cognitive restructuring of the trauma. The advantage of this approach is that 
it goes beyond merely exposing the patient to the traumatic memory, but additionally 
attempts to restructure and reframe the meaning of the event in order to help the person 
not only process the memory, but process it with a more appropriate and realistic 
meaning. Exploring the details of the trauma allows the survivor to confront not just the 
emotion but also the meaning of the trauma. The therapist actively encourages a 
reframing of the trauma, especially in regard to such issues as apparent choice and 
subsequent guilt reactions. This cognitive element is likely to be at least as important as 
direct exposure in overall symptom reduction. 
Indeed, Echeburua, Corral, Sarasua and Zubizaretta (1996) found cognitive restructuring 
with specific coping skills training to be superior in effectiveness to progressive 
relaxation training in victims of sexual aggression. This contradicts the conclusion 
reached in prior studies (for example: Foa, Rothbaum and Steketee, 1993) suggesting that 
there is no advantage of any one behavioural treatment over another. Echeburua et al 
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(1996) regarded cognitive restructuring to be useful in that it enables the individual to 
alter inappropriate and maladaptive attributions of guilt. However, therapies that involve 
reprocessing of earlier sexual abuse are subject to the criticism that they may promote 
false recall. For an overview of the "false memory" debate see Farrants (1998). 
7.1.7 Psychophysiology 
Recent approaches to working with trauma survivors are increasingly addressing the 
integration of treatment for the physical sequelae of the trauma with the psychological 
symptoms. Rothschild (2000) proposes a psychophysiological approach to trauma 
treatment, incorporating theories built upon neurobiology. The therapy she proposes 
attempts to bridge the gap between the increasing body of knowledge regarding the 
neurobiology of PTSD sufferers and the clinical practice of therapists. Founded on van 
der Kolk's (1994) article "The Body Keeps the Score", which presents a neurological, 
theoretical basis for understanding the mind-body connection, Rothschild (2000) 
proposes that trauma be regarded as a psychophysical experience. Treatment, therefore, 
involves addressing an understanding of the physical effects of trauma and their 
interaction with psychological symptoms. Due to the recency of this approach, no 
outcome studies are yet available. 
7.2 Constructivist Approaches 
Constructivist approaches to the treatment of trauma are concerned with bringing the 
trauma experience within the range of convenience of one's construct system (Sewell, 
1996). Therapy, therefore, focuses on assisting the individual to understand trauma 
events by applying pre-existing constructs or developing new constructs with which they 
may understand the trauma and other events in their life (Cross and Watts, 1997). Klion 
and Henninger (1996) outline a three phase model of therapy for combat veterans. 
involving the development of the therapeutic alliance; interweaving the past, present and 
the future and active role reconstruction, including generating alternative life patterns. 
Ronan (1996) has developed the approach into a cognitive-constructivist model for use 
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with traumatised children and Viney (1996) has developed a personal model of crisis 
intervention counselling with adults. However, while constructivist approaches provide a 
useful way of conceptualising trauma responses and treatment, research into the 
effectiveness of constructivist approaches to trauma is in its infancy and both Ronan and 
Viney call for further controlled studies to develop the area. 
7.3 Systemic approaches 
Recent approaches to working with trauma include addressing the client's issues from a 
systemic perspective (West, 2000). In systemic therapy for PTSD, relevant relationships 
are explored. Firstly, the therapy involves broadening the perspective of who might 
reasonably be expected to be adversely affected by the traumatic event, other than the 
individual receiving the diagnosis, and thus who might fall within the treatment remit. 
Treatment, therefore, may involve families, couples or others affected by the event. 
Secondly, a broadening of the relationship between the protagonist of the precipitating 
event and the person expressing the disorder is advocated, so that therapy also addresses 
the dynamic between the client and the perpetrator of the event. 
7.4 Psychoanal. is s_ychotherapy 
Psychoanalytic therapy uses interpretations to elucidate the client's particular anxieties, 
and uses the nature of the therapeutic relationship, transference and countertransference 
to help the person come to terms with the trauma, Lindy (1996). Psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy aims to help the patient come to terms with the personal meaning of the 
event and the reasons for its psychological impact. While a useful way in which to 
consider trauma treatment, there is no evidence of controlled studies into the efficacy of 
psychoanalysis for the treatment of PTSD. 
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7.5 Pharmacological treatments 
Medication has been used mainly to reduce anxiety symptoms in PTSD, and is usually 
used as an adjunct to psychotherapeutic approaches (Turnbull and McFarlane, 1996). 
Davidson and van der Kolk (1996) suggest that acute trauma is best treated with any of 
the drugs that reduce autonomic arousal, such as benzodiazepines or clonidine. They 
recommend prescription of either an SSRI or tricyclic antidepressant on initial diagnosis, 
to be followed with either an anticonvulsant, mood stabilizer or a benzodiazepine if the 
response to the initial treatment is only partial. Studies have shown that effective drug 
therapies, whilst not curing PTSD, can provide symptom relief enabling patients to move 
forward and to participate more effectively in other forms of therapy (Davidson and van 
der Kolk (1996). Drug treatments may also cut down on some of the attendant 
morbidity, and possibly mortality of PTSD. 
7.6 Debriefing 
Each of the above therapies are administered once a person has been diagnosed as 
suffering from PTSD. However, therapies have also been used to attempt to prevent the 
development of PTSD shortly after a traumatic event has occurred. For example, 
"debriefing" shortly after a disaster has been recognised by many as a way to alter faulty 
and unhelpful attributions and perceptions early on and to provide the opportunity for the 
individual to express their experience in narrative form (for example Tehrani, 1995). 
This, it is argued, may help buffer the individual from going on to develop the disorder 
and, until relatively recently, was assumed to be useful. However, the few controlled 
studies that examined the effect of debriefing immediately following exposure to trauma 
indicate a poorer outcome following debriefing than for no intervention (McFarlane, 
1994). More recently, Bisson, Jenkins, Alexander and Bannister (1997) found bums 
victims who were debriefed to have more symptoms of PTSD at follow up than a non- 
debriefed control group. One possible reason for these surprising findings may be that, as 
discussed earlier, PTSD type symptoms may be initially a normal and natural part of the 
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aftermath of traumatic events, so that treatment is unnecessary at this stage, and may even 
interfere with the organism's natural processing of the trauma. 
Hytten and Hasle (1989) report on the effects of debriefing on a group of fire-fighters 
who had dealt with a hotel fire. Of 39 participants, 38 stated that debriefing had been 
helpful, however there was no significant difference in scores on the Impact of Events 
Scale (Horowitz et al, 1979) between those receiving formal debriefing and those who 
only talked with colleagues. Morbidity levels were present for some of the sample, so it 
would appear that merely talking through processes, as in debriefing, was not sufficient to 
prevent them. Van der Kolk, McFarlane and van der Hart (1996) posit that merely 
allowing the person to put their thoughts and feelings about the event into words is not 
sufficient to deal with the symptoms, hence Foa et al's (1989) emphasis on cognitively 
restructuring the trauma meaning. Reiker and Carmen (1986) state that, "After abuse, the 
victim's view of self and world can never be the same again: it must be reconstructed to 
incorporate the abuse experience. " (p367). 
This may be why supportive counselling alone has not been found to be effective, and 
perhaps may explain some of the negative findings concerning debriefing, if debriefing 
has simply been enabling people to recount events without refraining them. For this 
reason, Raphael, Wilson, Meldrum and McFarlane (1996) state that it is necessary first to 
define the value of preventative interventions for individuals who are at high risk of 
developing chronic PTSD, in contrast to victims with a normative stress response for 
whom no benefit or even negative effects may be apparent, Raphael (1980). 
It could be argued that personnel in occupations with a high risk of exposure to traumatic 
stressors, for example the emergency services, could be targeted with training to enhance 
their coping strategies. Carlier, Lamberts and Gersons (1997) suggest possible 
occupational health interventions for police officers, and Tehrani (1995) outlines a 
programme for Post Office workers, which begins with an introductory stage, involved in 
the selection and education of the workforce. However, such employee programmes do 
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not help the majority of people who may develop PTSD following traffic accidents or 
natural disasters. The fact remains that, despite understanding many of the factors 
predisposing individuals to PTSD following traumatic events, there is very little that can 
be done preventatively to avoid the diagnosis. A more productive way forward is to 
explore and increase the range of therapies that may help such individuals. 
8 Issues for consideration in therapy 
As with most descriptions of psychological therapies, individual differences in response 
to therapies and difficulties or resistance encountered are rarely mentioned. Therapies are 
frequently described as if they run according to a strict text-book pattern, for example the 
case study "scripts" of Barlow (1993). The reality is that it is not just the content of the 
treatment plan which is of interest, but rather that a variety of process factors concerning 
the individual client, and the therapeutic relationship frequently need to be addressed. 
This is especially true of those suffering from PTSD because PTSD has many different 
presentations, with people suffering from different symptoms (McFarlane and van der 
Kolk, 1996). These different presentations require different treatment approaches and 
sensitivity to individuals' interpretations of the event. and so should not be treated in text 
book fashion. Additional considerations may influence response to trauma and its 
treatment such as cultural and legal issues. For example, people from certain cultures 
may fear expressing "negative" emotions or crying in front of the therapist. Ongoing 
compensation claims may provide secondary gains to resisting recovery, and patients are 
also at risk of becoming retraumatised by the legal process. Such issues also form part of 
the work that has to be done within the therapeutic alliance. 
8.1 The therapeutic relationship 
Highly traumatised patients frequently evoke a variety of responses from potential 
caregivers. Survivors of sexual abuse, in particular, often re-enact their traumas during 
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therapy, putting the therapist in the role of abuser, and are most at risk of being abused by 
their therapist or the medical profession (Herman, 1992). Guilt and shame are frequently 
encountered in trauma survivors and, given the prominent role of such emotions and 
attributions, it is imperative to develop and evaluate techniques for guilt reduction. There 
is no evidence to suggest that exposure alone can deal with such attributions, and 
cognitive restructuring may be necessary to deal with this. The process occurring 
between the therapist and the client needs to be continually addressed. As Turner, 
McFarlane and van der Kolk (1996) point out, what occurs between a patient and a 
therapist is a function not only of the particular diagnosis of the patient but also of the 
unique and personal relationship between patient and therapist, factors which cannot be 
easily quantified, nor subjected to scientific study. If such process issues are not 
addressed, drop out rates can be high. If, for example, the therapist operates in a 
dogmatic or controlling manner, or persists inappropriately with any particular treatment 
method, abused clients may feel threatened, and regard therapy as a repeat of earlier 
trauma. 
Clients may also express extreme anger, a symptom of the disorder, and Stevenson and 
Chemtob (2000) describe a client with combat-related posttraumatic stress disorder who 
directed his anger at the therapist during the course of treatment, which compromised the 
therapeutic alliance and resulted in premature termination of treatment. Stevenson and 
Chemtob conclude that including the spouse and other family members in the treatment 
engagement process may have prevented early termination. It is important that clinicians 
are reflective of their practice in this way, and they need to be open to examining the 
results of their interventions and adjust their methods without becoming paralysed by 
therapeutic nihilism. Furthermore, according to Turner, McFarlane and van der Kolk 
(1996) treatment success depends also upon the patient's ability to tolerate intimacy, and 
to trust another with their own helplessness and pain. There are individual differences in 
such tolerance of intimacy, which, they posit, is an important determinant of the success 
of treatment as well as the individual's initial reaction to the trauma, "Therapists who treat 
traumatised individuals need to have a range of therapeutic options at their disposal, and 
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to be able to tailor these to the needs of individual patients" (Turner et al, 1996, p545) 
Approaches that place emphasis on the therapeutic alliance and on tailored and 
integrative approaches to individuals may be useful in addressing these process issues. 
8.2 Avoidance 
One of the most important process variables in the treatment of PTSD is that of 
avoidance. Avoidance is an integral part of PTSD, and patients are frequently reluctant 
to relive the trauma in the consulting room. Avoidance is, therefore, an issue which 
needs to be dealt with in therapy with understanding and sensitivity, and should not be 
regarded merely as an interference to "off the peg" treatments. McFarlane (1988) pointed 
out that it is the intrusive reliving of the trauma, not the event itself, which is responsible 
for PTSD symptoms, and that people's lives become organised around attempting to 
avoid the reliving experiences. This may include alcohol, other drugs or avoidance of 
therapy, "Avoidance should be understood as a legitimate choice of the survivor, but also 
as a form of adaptation with potentially long-term negative consequences. " (Turner, 
McFarlane and van der Kolk, 1996, p545). 
Unless a rationale is provided for asking the client to relive the trauma in therapy, and 
unless it is explained that short-term distress will lead to long-term benefit, drop out is 
likely to occur. Even with the rationale explained, some clients are still reluctant to relive 
the trauma, especially if dissociation is a problem (Rothbaum and Foa, 1996). Several 
sessions of anxiety management may help this reluctance, giving the client the coping 
measures to deal with the stress of reliving the trauma, and providing the time for the 
client to become acclimatised to the therapist and the surroundings. Patients with PTSD 
first need to be stabilised (Herman, 1992) in terms of anxiety reduction, sleeping, eating 
and social support before they can tolerate the extremes of anxiety caused by working 
through the trauma memories. Perhaps this initial stabilisation may reduce avoidance. It 
is necessary not to rush clients, and to allow them to gradually relate what they feel ready 
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to. Relaxation techniques may serve the dual purpose of relaxing the client and enabling 
them to visualise the trauma more effectively, as in Imagery Rescripting, (Smucker et al. 
1995). 
Rothbaum and Foa (1996) state that prolonged exposure treatment helps patients who 
exhibit pervasive anxiety and avoidance, however, for therapy to occur the avoidance has 
to be, in some part, overcome. Some patients may be so avoidant that they refuse to 
engage in exposure therapy in any meaningful way. Rothbaum and Foa recognise that, 
without emotional engagement, patients are less likely to improve, but also that the 
patient overwhelmed by anxiety will not process the memory properly. It is possible that 
lack of emotional engagement is related to avoidant styles, and that it is these avoidant 
individuals who do not respond so well to therapy. If a way could be found of identifying 
individuals with avoidant coping styles at the start of therapy, then outcome studies of 
therapy could compare the reduction of symptoms in avoidant individuals with those of 
others. So, one way forward in terms of research in this area would be to assess whether 
those who did not benefit from the treatment had a more avoidant coping style than those 
who engaged in treatment. 
While research into the efficacy of treatments aids understanding about the disorder and 
the treatment approaches that are helpful in relieving symptoms, most of the research 
focuses on the proportion of patients who benefit from the treatment in question, and pay 
scant attention to the sizeable minority whose symptoms do not improve. Furthermore, 
throughout the research there is a tendency to treat PTSD sufferers as one generic group, 
despite evidence, as has been discussed, that this client group varies considerably in many 
respects, including response to therapy and levels of cognitive avoidance and intrusion. 
Indeed scales have been devised to measure both avoidance and intrusive thoughts, for 
example Horowitz' Impact of Events Scale (1979). It could, therefore, be argued that it is 
inappropriate to treat patients with a diagnosis of PTSD as one generic group. While 
individual differences in response to traumatic events have been the subject of 
considerable research projects, individual difference in response to therapy for PTSD has 
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not. It is well documented that the existing therapies for PTSD patients are not successful 
in all cases, for example Foa and Riggs (1993) described 32% of rape victims in their 
study to retain a diagnosis of PTSD following treatment. While they regarded the 
treatment as a success, as a majority clearly improved, those who did not improve form a 
sizeable minority. Research needs to evaluate the reasons for the failure of treatment in 
so many cases and to devise alternative ways in which to help such patients. The move 
toward working more holistically and individually with the process issues of therapy 
would be a step further in addressing this. 
Some attempt has been made to tailor approaches to individuals. Falsetti (1997) presents 
a decision-making process for choosing treatment components that best match each 
patient's needs in civilian trauma-related PTSD. Falsetti attempts to address the fact that 
very few empirical studies have investigated matching clients' problems to treatments, 
particularly with regard to treatment of PTSD. However, Falsetti accepts that her 
approach involves assessing individual differences in symptom presentation, rather than 
matching therapy approach to other client variables. For example, Falsetti suggests that, 
if a patient is finding it difficult to talk about the trauma or is highly anxious, then an 
initial approach may be to teach the client coping skills rather than attempt exposure 
treatment at this stage. Falsetti, however, does not directly address the issue of the 
personality of the client or the preferred therapy approach, but rather advocates the use of 
an integrated approach to therapy, depending upon which symptoms are most prevalent at 
any given time. This is consistent with a Counselling Psychology approach that seeks to 
address the individual needs of the client in a tailored way, working integratively and 
holistically with clients. 
So, the research has demonstrated a range of situational, attributional, personality and 
coping style factors predisposing an individual to the development of PTSD, which goes 
some way to accounting for individual differences in response to a traumatic event. 
Furthermore. for those individuals who do go on to develop PTSD after such an event, 
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these same factors may emerge as potential barriers to effective therapy. particularly that 
of avoidance. It is vital that the ongoing quest for effective therapies takes full account of 
the process issues which may prevent successful therapy outcome. The issue of 
avoidance is, arguably, the most prevalent process factor in PTSD treatment and, as such, 
should be given consideration in the development of new therapies. 
Despite this, there is a dearth of process studies in the literature that address avoidance in 
treatment for PTSD. If an association could be found between individuals with avoidant 
personality styles and poor outcome in therapy for PTSD, relative to those with less 
avoidant coping styles, then this would have implications for the choice and 
implementation of treatments. Although no such studies are available for therapy for 
PTSD, research in this area has been undertaken with individuals suffering from simple 
phobias. The research focuses on the relationship between therapy outcome and coping 
styles, and utilises a valuable tool for the categorisation of individuals in terms of 
avoidance, the Monitoring-Blunting Style Scale (MBSS; Miller, 1987) which classifies 
individuals as either "monitors" or "blunters". These coping styles will be discussed, 
and this will be followed by an exploration of the application of the MBSS to therapy for 
phobic clients. A case will be made that these findings are of relevance to research in the 
field of PTSD. 
9 The coning styles of monitoring and bluntin 
Monitoring and blunting refer to coping styles that can be observed in individuals who 
are confronted with threatening events. Monitoring is characterised by the tendency to 
seek out threat-relevant information, whereas blunting is characterised by avoiding threat- 
relevant cues (Miller, 1980). The devising of these coping styles originates 
predominantly from Miller's work with women in medical settings, in which she termed 
as blunters those whom she found to avoid information about their health-related 
problems, and monitors who sought out additional information concerning medical 
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procedures, (for example, Miller and Mangan, 1983). Miller et al (1996) found that, 
when threatened with an aversive event, some individuals typically monitor for 
information about it and amplify the threats cognitively and emotionally, whereas others 
avoid and psychologically blunt such cues (for example; Miller, 1990; 1992; 1995). 
Miller found monitors to look for threats externally but also to attend more to their own 
bodily cues and to amplify them, (Miller, Brody and Summerton, 1988). Despite 
information seeking, they did not use this instrumentally, instead seeking a more passive 
role in decision making. (Miller et al, 1988) and did not take control. Carver, Scheier and 
Weintraub (1989) found monitors to try to elicit advice from others, or turn to religion, 
thus seeking information but using it to put themselves in the presence of safety signals. 
Monitors are more likely to engage in worry than blunters (Davey, 1993) and the 
relationship between monitoring and worry is found, independent of levels of trait 
anxiety. 
Miller (1987) devised a self-report inventory, the Monitoring-Blunting Style Scale 
(MBSS) which measures these coping styles. Miller has largely used the scale in studies 
with people undergoing medical procedures (for example: Miller, 1995; Miller, Rodoletz, 
Shroeder, Mangan, and Sedlacek, 1996). For example, in a study of people facing 
medical threats, such as HIV (Miller et al, 1996) high monitors were found to be 
characterised by elevated levels of intrusive ideation in comparison with low monitors, 
with respect to their disease status. This increase in intrusive ideation indicates that high 
monitors are more likely to think about their disease status when they do not mean to, 
tend to dream about it, to have trouble falling asleep because of it, to be reminded of it, 
and to have strong feelings about it. 
Miller found blunting and monitoring styles to be both stable and enduring personality 
characteristics (Miller, 1987). The MBSS has been found to be a reliable and valid 
measure of premorbid coping styles, in that coping style scores accurately predicted the 
informational strategy used in a performance task in which participants were invited 
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during the task to look at a light which indicated the level of their performance, (Miller, 
1987). While there has been a suggestion that therapy itself may alter coping styles, 
Muris, Merckelback and de Jong (1995) found that MBSS scores did not differ 
significantly after a two year follow up period following exposure therapy. supporting 
Miller's (1987) assertion that the MBSS is a stable and reliable measure of coping style 
and that coping style is a trait rather than state variable. 
The categorisation of individuals in terms of monitoring and blunting can be regarded as 
a useful solution to the problem of identifying those individuals who may have a 
tendency to avoid addressing threatening emotional material during therapy. The MBSS 
is therefore, potentially, a useful tool in research into the interaction between the 
effectiveness of therapy for PTSD and individual differences in terms of clients' 
avoidance. As has been discussed earlier, an important factor which is likely to maintain 
PTSD symptoms is the use of inappropriate avoidant coping mechanisms which prevent 
the activation of the fear network necessary for the trauma to be processed, (Foa and 
Kozak, 1986). The avoidant strategy of blunting can, therefore, be hypothesised to 
enable the individual to avoid meaningfully processing the traumatic event and so result 
in poor therapy outcomes. 
While the MBSS has not yet been used with PTSD patients, there are significant points to 
be drawn from its use in the research into the relationship between individual differences 
in coping style and therapy outcome in animal phobics. A useful way forward for 
research into avoidance in PTSD is to begin by exploring the findings from the phobia 
research into these coping styles. 
9.1 Monitoring and blunting in phobia outcome studies 
Firstly, a study by Steketee, Bransfield, Miller and Foa (1989) tested the hypothesised 
relationship between coping style, type of information received prior to treatment and 
treatment outcome in a range of animal phobics. This was an attempt to replicate the 
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findings of Miller and Mangan (1983) who found monitors who received minimal 
information about a medical procedure, as well as blunters who were given detailed 
information, showed greater arousal, more pain and slower recovery than informed 
monitors and uninformed blunters. Twenty-seven animal phobics, recruited from 
advertisements in a local newspaper and who scored highly on measures of fear relevant 
to their phobia (fear of either snakes, cats, birds, spiders or dogs) were divided into 
monitors and blunters, on the basis of a median split on their scores on the MBSS. (The 
scoring version used in the study involved summing the number of monitoring items 
selected and the number of blunting items selected). Monitors and blunters were 
randomly assigned to two conditions regarding the type of information they received 
prior to treatment, namely highly relevant or irrelevant information regarding the 
procedures. No evidence was found of a relationship between coping style and type of 
information received, although evidence was found that monitors improved more on 
some outcome measures than blunters following two sessions of exposure therapy. 
Steketee et al concluded that monitoring or blunting coping style is an important 
moderating factor in determining exposure treatment outcome, but that there is no 
relationship between treatment outcome, coping style and the type of information 
received. They explained these findings by suggesting that monitors were more attentive 
to threat-relevant cues during exposure treatment and so processed more fully corrective 
information. According to Foa and Kozak's (1986) fear network theory, activation of the 
fear network is a prerequisite for the extinction of phobic fear, and so it could be reasoned 
that a habitual monitoring style would be likely to result in a stronger fear network 
activation than the blunting style, and that monitoring should be positively related to 
therapy outcome. However, Muris et al (1993a) criticise this study for the fact that 
results were based entirely on heart rate data obtained during therapy sessions, which has 
not been demonstrated to be predictive of longer term therapy outcome. 
Muris et al (1993a). therefore, replicated Steketee et al's study with 40 female spider 
phobics who had applied for treatment at a university spider phobia project and met the 
DSM- III-R criteria for simple phobia. Using just one session of exposure therapy, they 
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extended the study to examine the relationship between monitoring and blunting coping 
styles and long-term treatment outcome, rather than just the short-term measures taken in 
the Steketee study. Rather than rely on heart-rate data, outcome measures included 
improvements in assessment of spider phobia and in avoidant behaviour. Muris et al 
hypothesised that therapy success would be better consolidated in monitors than blunters, 
as they considered monitors to be more likely to continue to attend to rather than avoid 
the phobic stimulus beyond therapy, thus reinforcing the effects of the earlier exposure 
therapy. Eighteen months after treatment, participants were administered a five-point 
version of the MBSS, in which participants indicate the extent to which each item is 
applicable to him or her on a scale of one to five. The results did not support their 
hypothesis and Muris et al (1993a) found coping style to have no influence on short-term 
nor long-term therapy outcome. These findings may be explained by the fact that 
successful therapy may influence reported coping style, particularly as the measures were 
taken only after treatment. However, as Muris et al observe, monitoring and blunting are 
considered to be trait variables, (for example: Miller, 1987) and furthermore, a later study 
by the same authors (Muris et al, 1995) found that coping style did not change 
significantly over a two-year period, before and after therapy. Muris et al conclude that 
their study did not confirm the suggestion of Steketee et al (1989) that 
monitoring/blunting coping style is an important factor affecting exposure treatment 
outcome, although they suggest that it is possible that different results may be obtained 
for individuals with other types of phobia. 
However, it could be argued that rather than the type of phobia being of relevance, a more 
pertinent issue might be the type of therapy offered, and that different therapies may 
produce different results. For example, both the Steketee et al and the Muris et al study 
used in vivo exposure treatment. The very nature of exposure therapy is to confront the 
patient with the phobic object in a way that limits avoidance. Blunting may, therefore, 
be less of an option in exposure therapy than in cognitive treatments involving imaginal 
exposure, in which the patient can more readily choose to block thoughts and images. As 
Steketee et al (1989) observe, with continued exposure, cognitive avoidance may become 
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increasingly difficult. It could be argued that this may result in the behaviour of monitors 
and blunters converging and masking any habitual differences in avoidant behaviour 
between the two groups. It is possible, therefore, that the use of imaginal exposure 
treatments may produce more variability in blunting and monitoring behaviour by 
enabling individuals to respond to therapy in a way which is more consistent with their 
habitual coping style. If this is the case, then future studies using imaginal exposure may 
yield more significant differences in outcome between the two groups than those using in 
vivo exposure treatments. Such studies are relevant to treatment for PTSD as, although 
some treatments might involve the client being exposed to the site of the traumatic event, 
PTSD therapy normally involves an element of imaginal exposure away from the site of 
the trauma. 
Muris et al (1993b) conducted a second study with spider phobics, this time finding, 
contrary to their hypothesis, monitoring to be significantly related to a less favourable 
treatment outcome. They explained these findings by suggesting that the in vivo 
exposure treatment may have produced anxiety in monitors to such an extent that this 
interfered with their ability to process corrective information. However, it is unclear why 
these results were not found in Muris et al's first study. One difference involved the point 
at which the MBSS was administered. In the first study (Muris et al, 1993a) the MBSS 
was completed only at the eighteen month follow-up, whereas in the second study (Muris 
et al, 1993b) the MBSS was completed prior to treatment. While MBSS scores are found 
to have good test-retest reliability (Miller, 1987) and so can be regarded as stable 
personality characteristics, it is conceivable that a radical life event, such as one-session 
treatment in the case of a phobic, alters coping style. Muris et al conducted a further 
follow-up study (Muris, Merckelback and de Jong, 1995) in which the stability of coping 
style was assessed and the relationship between monitoring, blunting and therapy 
outcome was examined in more detail. Participants from the 1993b study were contacted 
and asked to complete a follow-up measurement of spider fear and MBSS two years after 
treatment. Once again they found a monitoring style to be associated with a less 
favourable therapy outcome. and this time they found a blunting style to be related to 
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better treatment results. They also found no significant change in MBSS scores over the 
period. These findings run counter to the expectations of Steketee et al (1989) and to Foa 
and Kozak's (1986) fear network theory. 
To explain these findings, Muris et al cite the information processing theory of Williams, 
Watts, McLeod and Mathews (1988) which has produced studies showing phobic 
subjects to exhibit an attentional bias towards threatening information. Several studies 
have shown that successful behavioural treatments reduce attentional bias (Watts, 
McKenna, Sharrock and Tresize, 1986; Lavy, van den Hout and Arntz, 1993). It has 
been speculated that individuals with an intensive and resistant attentional bias towards 
threatening information display more severe symptoms and/or recover less after therapy 
(Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck and Mathews, 1987; Mineka and Sutton, 1992). As the 
concept of monitoring strongly resembles attentional bias, information processing theory 
is consistent with Muris et al's suggestion that extremes of anxiety may be elicited in 
monitors, more so than in blunters, in in vivo exposure situations. This may explain the 
current findings, but does not account for the fact that blunting seemed to be associated 
with positive outcomes. The findings that blunting is associated with improved treatment 
outcomes runs contrary to the theories of Williams et al (1988) who state that cognitive 
avoidance may disrupt the beneficial effects of exposure treatments, especially long-term 
benefit. Evidence is accumulating that distraction strategies interfere with the efficacy of 
exposure treatments, whereas instructing patients to give more detailed attention to the 
stimulus improves it. (for example, Watts 1974). However, perhaps blunting simply 
refers to the absence of attentional bias. The marginally significant negative relationship 
between monitoring and blunting at pre-treatment in this study may support this. Further 
studies are called for to investigate the effects of monitoring and blunting on exposure 
therapy outcome, and to assess whether monitoring and blunting are, indeed, related to 
attentional bias. 
So, the findings with regard to the specific effects of different coping styles on therapy 
outcome are, therefore, inconsistent. However, there is enough evidence from the field of 
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phobia treatment to suggest that the hypothesised relationship between coping style and 
progress in therapy may be a useful area of exploration in therapy for PTSD. In 
particular, the MBSS has been demonstrated to be a useful and reliable tool for the 
measurement of an information avoiding coping style, "blunting" and so is an important 
resource in research to explore avoidance in therapy for PTSD. 
10 Summary of the literature 
In summary, the work on PTSD has focused largely on individual differences in the 
development and maintenance of symptoms of the disorder, and on the efficacy of 
therapies in reducing symptoms. So far, little has been done to assess individual 
differences in PTSD patients' responses to therapy, despite the fact that many patients do 
not improve in therapy. There is a large body of evidence to suggest that one of the most 
important factors influencing the treatment of PTSD is the extent to which individuals 
avoid addressing traumatic material. This suggests that it is important to understand 
more about the nature of such avoidance in order to consider how it can be worked with 
within the therapy in order to improve therapy outcomes. 
One possibility is that the tendency to avoid threatening material is a predispositional 
trait, and that some individuals tend to avoid threatening material, whereas others tend to 
seek out information and attend to threat, as suggested by the studies of the coping styles 
of monitoring and blunting in treatment for phobia. If individuals with PTSD, for whom 
therapy has been of limited effectiveness were found to have a predisposition to a 
blunting coping style, consistent with Foa and Kozak's (1986) fear network theory, then 
this would have implications for the choice of therapy used. If it could be demonstrated 
that an avoidant, blunting coping style is associated with poor response to treatment for 
PTSD, therapies that minimise avoidance may need to be considered with such clients. 
For example, it might be the case that, for blunters, in vivo exposure treatments are more 
successful than imaginal exposure, as they limit the capacity for cognitive avoidance. 
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11 The rationale for the present study 
The present study, therefore, aims to address the extent to which monitoring and blunting 
coping styles are relevant to therapy outcomes in patients with PTSD, and particularly 
whether a blunting coping style is associated with poorer outcomes following therapy. 
Participants were tested for the coping styles of monitoring and blunting before treatment 
and measures of PTSD symptoms, and comorbid depression and anxiety were taken 
before and after therapy. 
An attempt was made to correlate symptom reduction with levels of monitoring and 
blunting. It was hypothesised that (a) a significant negative correlation would be found 
between a blunting coping style and improvement following therapy, that is that the 
higher the score for blunting, the smaller the reduction of symptoms following therapy; 
and that (b) a significant positive correlation would be found between a monitoring 
coping style and improvement following therapy, that is that a high monitoring score 
would be associated with greater improvement in therapy. 
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Chapter 2: Method 
1 Design 
A correlational design was used, the independent variables being coping style. measured 
in terms of participants' scores on "blunting" and "monitoring" from the Monitoring- 
Blunting Style Scale (MBSS). The dependent variables were means of change in 
symptoms following a course of therapy for PTSD. These include change in anxiety and 
depression symptoms measured by the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS); 
levels of intrusive and avoidant symptoms from the Impact of Events Scale (IES); and 
levels of a variety of PTSD symptoms, measured by the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale 
(PDS). It was predicted that: 
Hypothesis 1: A significant negative correlation would be found between a blunting 
coping style and improvement following therapy, that is that a high blunting score would 
be associated with a smaller reduction of symptoms following therapy. 
Hypothesis 2: A significant positive correlation would be found between monitoring 
coping style and improvement following therapy, that is that a high monitoring score 
would be associated with greater improvement in therapy. 
2 Participants 
All participants were mental health patients who had been referred for treatment within 
the NHS and who met DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. 
Psychologists working with clients with PTSD were recruited personally by the 
researcher, who contacted specialist PTSD units and generic mental health services 
around the London and Essex areas to request their assistance with the study. Fifteen 
psychologists agreed to recruit participants for the study and all worked for the National 
Health Service in either Primary or Secondary care. A total of 63 questionnaire packs, 
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including researchers' instructions on how to take part in the study (see Appendix 1) was 
distributed to these psychologists for administration to their clients. Completed 
questionnaire packs from 9 clients were returned by the psychologists (a return rate of 
14.3%). The return rate was disappointingly low, resulting in a very small sample size. 
However, a decision was made to report the results here due to the large, significant 
correlations observed, justifying exploration and explanation. Three participants were 
female and 6 were male. The participants varied in age from 28 to 61, with a mean of 
46.33 years. 
3 PsvcholoLyical Variables 
3.1 The Monitoring-Bluntiniz Stvle Scale (MBSS: Miller. 1987 
The MBSS (see Appendix 2) is a self-report scale designed to assess individual 
differences in monitoring and blunting processing styles (Miller, 1995,1996). 
Specifically, the scale asks individuals to imagine four hypothetical stress-evoking scenes 
of a largely uncontrollable nature (for example: "Imagine that you are afraid of flying and 
you have to go somewhere by plane"). Each scene is followed by eight statements that 
represent different attentional strategies for dealing with the stressful event. Four 
statements following each scene are of a monitoring or information-seeking variety (for 
example: "I would read and reread the safety instruction booklet") and four are of a 
blunting or distracting variety (for example: "I would watch the in-flight film, even if I 
had seen it before"). Two scores are derived from this scale: (a) the total monitoring 
score, which is obtained by summing the number of monitoring options endorsed across 
the four situations (higher score equals more monitoring) and (b) the total blunting score, 
which is obtained by summing the number of blunting options endorsed across the four 
situations (higher score equals more blunting). The range of possible scores for blunting, 
therefore, is 0- 16, and for monitoring is 0- 16. Test-retest analyses with a sample of 
110 subjects show the MBSS subscales to be highly stable over a four month period: for 
the monitoring subscale, r(98) = 
. 
72, p< 
. 
01; for the blunting subscale, r(98) = 
. 
75, p< 
68 
. 
01 (Miller and Mischel, 1986). 
The version of the MBSS provided for the current study by the scale's author was that 
used in the Steketee et al (1989) study in which the number of blunting and monitoring 
items selected were each summed to produce a total monitoring score and a total blunting 
score. This is distinct from the version used in the Muris et al studies in which a five- 
point Likert type scale was used. Each participant yielded one score for monitoring and 
one score for blunting. A decision was made not to re-administer the MBSS after 
treatment because, on the basis of the previous research findings, it was regarded as a 
reliable measurement of traits, and it was felt that its unnecessary inclusion would 
significantly add to the time taken to complete the post-treatment measures and so might 
reduce participants' co-operation with the study. 
3.2 The Impact of Events Scale (IES; Horowitz et al. 1979 
The IES (see Appendix 3) is a 15-item self-report scale that measures two of the cardinal 
symptoms of PTSD; intrusive and avoidant threat-related ideation (Horowitz et al, 1979). 
Respondents are asked to rate the extent to which a list of 15 items had applied to them 
over the course of the previous seven days, on a four column Likert scale; "Not at all" 
(0); "Rarely" (1); "Sometimes" (2); "Often" (3). Two scores are derived from the scale: 
(a) the total intrusion score, which is obtained by summing the scores on each of the 7 
intrusive ideation subset items, and (b) the total avoidance score, which is obtained by 
summing the scores on each of the 8 avoidance subset items. The range of possible 
scores are, therefore 0- 21 on the intrusive ideation subset and 0- 24 on the avoidance 
subset (higher scores equal more intrusive ideation and more avoidance, respectively. 
Test re-test analyses with a sample of 25 subjects show the IES subsets to be highly 
stable over a two week period; for the intrusion subset r= 
. 
89; for the avoidance subset r 
= 
. 
79 and for the total stress score overall, r= 
. 
87. (Horowitz, 1979). The correlation 
between the Intrusion and Avoidance subscales (. 42; Horowitz et al, 1979) indicates that 
the two factors are strongly associated but do not measure identical constructs. Internal 
consistency of the Intrusion and Avoidance subscales. using Cronbach's alpha, has been 
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shown to be 
. 
78 for Intrusion and 
. 
82 for Avoidance (Horowitz et al, 1979). Some 
researchers have used the total score on the IES to define significant posttraumatic stress. 
for example McFarlane (1988) and Bryant and Harvey (1995) who defined significant 
posttraumatic stress as a total IES score of greater than or equal to 30. 
3.3 The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 1985) 
The PDS (see Appendix 4) is a 49 item screening and diagnostic instrument that helps 
assess the presence and symptom severity of posttraumatic stress disorder. It parallels 
DSM-IV criteria for a PTSD diagnosis and may be administered repeatedly over time to 
monitor changes in symptoms. It is divided into four parts, measuring the nature of the 
traumatic event(s) experienced (Part 1 and Part 2); symptoms experienced (Part 3) and 
impairment in functioning following the trauma (Part 4). The scoring is somewhat 
complex and is outlined below. See also see the PDS Hand Scoring Directions 
(Appendix 5). 
Parts 1 and 2 consist of 21 items about the nature of the client's experience of the event 
and the onset of symptoms. The individual is required to check any of the 21 options 
which relate to their experience (items 1-21) and this is scored by comparing the 
responses with those required for a diagnosis of PTSD. Part 3 (Items 22-38) requires 
respondents to complete a 4-point Likert scale (range 0- 3) of the frequency of their 
experience of a list of 17 symptoms. Items 39 and 40 relate to the duration and onset of 
the symptoms, respectively, and the respondent is invited to check one of a list of 3 
options for item 39 and one of two options for item 40. Part 3 is scored by summing the 
responses to items 22-38 (range 0-51) and checking the responses to items 39-40 against 
diagnostic criteria. Part 4 offers up to 9 options (items 41-49) of areas of life affected 
since the trauma, and this is scored by totalling the number of areas affected (range 0-9). 
The scores are further organised into six sub-scales, labelled A to F as follows: A) 
exposure to traumatic event (items 16-21); B) re-experiencing (items 22-26); C) 
avoidance (items 27-3 3); D) arousal (items 34-38); E) symptom duration/ delayed onset 
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(items 39-40); F) significant distress or impairment in daily functioning (items 41 
- 
49). 
Each sub-scale score is compared with a score required for a diagnosis of PTSD to be 
met, and an overall level of impairment in functioning, total number of symptoms 
endorsed, symptom severity score and symptom severity rating are calculated. 
Foa (1985) measured test-retest reliability using kappa, a chance-corrected measure of 
agreement, and a kappa of 
. 
74 was obtained, indicating good agreement. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient between Symptom Severity Scores for the two administrations was 
. 
83. A Cronbach alpha of 
. 
92 was calculated for the 17 items (Items 22-3 8) on which the 
Symptoms Severity Score is based, indicating that the Symptom Severity Score is 
internally consistent. The diagnostic performance of the PDS was assessed by comparing 
a PDS diagnosis with a diagnosis from the PTSD module of the SCID (Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R, Williams et al, 1992). A kappa of 
. 
59 between the 
PDS and the SCID was obtained with 79.4% agreement between the two measures. The 
sensitivity of the PDS was 82% and its specificity was 76.7%. These results suggest that 
the PDS has a good overall level of diagnostic agreement with the SCID. In the absence 
of any other published self-report tests of PTSD, measures of convergent validity were 
taken by comparing the PDS Symptom Severity Score with other scales associated with 
the symptoms of PTSD. Higher PDS scale scores were associated with greater 
depression on the BDI, higher state and trait anxiety on the STAI, and higher scores on 
the IES intrusion and avoidance scales (all p< 
. 
001). Pearsons correlations are as 
follows: BDI. 79; 
, 
STAI-S. 73; STAI-T. 74; IES-I. 80; IES-A. 66. (Foa, 1985). 
3.4 The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) 
The HADS (see Appendix 6) is a 14 item instrument for screening for clinically 
significant anxiety and depression, and is also a measure of severity of these mood 
disorders. Respondents are asked to rate the extent to which a list of 14 items had applied 
to them over the course of the previous seven days, on a four option Likert scale, for 
example; "Not at all" (0); "Not often" (1); "Sometimes" (2); "Most of the time" (3). Two 
scores are derived from the scale: (a) the total anxiety score, which is obtained by 
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summing the scores on each of the 7 anxiety subscale items, and (b) the total depression 
score, which is obtained by summing the scores on each of the 7 depression subscale 
items. The range of scores, therefore, is from 0- 21 for each subscale (higher scores 
equal more anxiety and more depression respectively). In a sample of 50 patients, 
subscale scores were significantly correlated with psychiatric ratings; for depression, r= 
. 
70 (p < 
. 
00 1) and for anxiety, r= 
. 
74 (p < 
. 
0001). 
4 Assessment and procedure 
Participants for the study were recruited at initial assessment by the psychologist who 
was to carry out their therapy. The psychologist was provided with a set of instructions 
(see Appendix 1) and a pack of the above psychological tests to administer to their client. 
Before treatment began, patients who had been referred for treatment for PTSD were 
invited, by the psychologist due to carry out their therapy, to take part in the study. 
Clients were provided with a Participant Consent Form (see Appendix 7) outlining the 
purpose of the study, the way in which the information gathered would be used, and 
assuring the participant of anonymity and of their right to withdraw from the study at any 
time. Once signed consent had been obtained, participants were asked to record their 
symptoms and coping style before the start of therapy by completing the following four 
psychological tests: 
0 Posttraumatic-stress Diagnostic Scale; (PDS) (Foa, 1995) 
" 
Impact of Events Scale; (IES) (Horowitz, 1979) 
" Monitor-Blunter Style Scale; (MBSS) (Miller, 1987) 
" 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; (HADS) (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) 
At the end of treatment or following eight sessions. whichever was the sooner, 
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participants again recorded their symptoms by completing the PDS, IES and HADS. 
Therapists were asked to record on the Patient Details and Researcher Observations Sheet 
(see Appendix 8) details of the participants' age, gender, number of therapy sessions and 
duration of therapy and, for the purposes of triangulation, their overall impression 
concerning the extent to which they regarded the client as having engaged in the therapy, 
and their view concerning the extent of her/his improvement over the period. 
The completed pack of information, including questionnaire responses before and after 
therapy, were returned to the researcher by hand or by post. Where appropriate, 
respondents were debriefed, their comments noted and any outstanding questions 
answered. 
7-3 
Chapter 3: Results 
1 Treatment of the data 
Of the 15 psychologists who agreed to participate, completed questionnaire packs 
were returned from only 4 of them, comprising 4 packs from one therapist, 1 from 
another and 2 each from the other 2. Data was, therefore, gathered from a total of 9 
participants, and formed only 14.3 % of the total packs distributed. This was 
considered to be too few for a full analysis to be undertaken and so the study at this 
stage was regarded as a preliminary analysis, potentially useful in terms of 
highlighting areas of interest for a further research project. 
The data collected from the 9 participants consisted of quantitative data from each 
respondent from each of the four questionnaires administered, together with personal 
covariates such as age and gender, and information about the therapy period and 
number of sessions. See Appendix 9 for a list of variables used in the analysis and 
Appendix 10 for the raw quantitative data from the questionnaires. In addition, a 
small amount of qualitative data was gathered in the form of a brief outline of the 
therapist's perception of the progress of therapy with the client. The completed 
questionnaire packs have not been included in the appendices and are available from 
the researcher on request. 
All questionnaires were scored. Scoring of the PDS enabled the researcher to assess 
whether the participant met 
. 
the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD, as those without such 
a diagnosis were to be excluded from the study. All 9 participants were found to fulfil 
the criteria for such a diagnosis, so all were included in the analysis. 
Although therapists had been asked to take the second measure of symptoms 
following the end of therapy or after 8 sessions, whichever was the sooner, one 
participant had received 12 sessions of therapy at the time of the second measurement 
and another had received 9 sessions. A decision was made to include these cases in 
the analysis on the basis that the initial specification of 8 sessions had been an 
arbitrary figure. It was considered that these cases may help provide useful 
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information at this preliminary stage of analysis, regardless of the number of therapy 
sessions between the two measures taken. 
The statistical package SPSS for Windows, Version 8 was used throughout the 
analysis. 
2 Screening and cleaning data 
2.1 Accuracy of the data 
A preliminary "eyeball" check of the data ensured that discrete variables were 
appropriately coded and that each value and the means and standard deviations were 
within range. 
2.2 Missiniz data 
Of the nine completed questionnaire packs returned, one pack (case number 5) 
contained missing data on one of the post-therapy measures, namely the two subscales 
of the IES. The missing data was regarded as random with no systematic bias in that 
it comprised data from only one participant from only one questionnaire. The data 
was treated according to the SPSS default for missing data, that is that the case was 
omitted from all analyses involving the variable in question. There were no spoils. 
Data from 9 participants was, therefore, used in the analysis. 
2.3 Outliers 
Box plots were generated for each variable to detect univariate outliers. Of the 41 
variables, 8 were found to have outliers on at least one case. Of these 8,4 cases 
comprised scores on discrete variables, with ranges of either 0-1 or 1-3 and had 
been classified as outliers because each was the only case to achieve a value at either 
end of the scale. As these detected outliers were within the appropriate range and the 
sample size small, a decision was made not to treat these as extreme cases. 
Of the remaining four cases, three were from variables with a low range and the 
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extreme values identified reflected the small sample size. For example, the variable 
recording the number of re-experiencing symptoms (pdsrexna) had a value of 5 for all 
but one of the total nine cases, with a value of 4 for the remaining case, which had 
been detected as an outlier. A decision was made not to regard such instances as 
extreme cases. 
The remaining outlier was the variable showing the number of days over which 
therapy had taken place (period). Case 9 recorded a total of 264 days, the range for 
the remaining eight cases for this variable being 56-126. This case was regarded as an 
outlier and treated as follows: 
Once all inferential statistics had been conducted on the data, the value for this case 
was reduced to a non-extreme case by adopting the value of the next highest case + 1, 
that is 127, and the intercorrelational analysis re-run. An eyeball check of the two 
outputs was made to identify any differences before and after this value change. No 
differences in significance levels were found and, therefore, it was concluded that the 
significance levels obtained in the original analysis had not been unduly influenced by 
this extreme case. 
2.4 Normality, Linearity and Homoscedascity 
Due to the small sample size it was not considered appropriate to ensure that each 
variable was normally distributed, linearly related nor homoscedastic. The parametric 
statistical tests used were considered to be sufficiently robust for the analysis of data 
that departed from these assumptions. 
3 Descriptive statistics 
See Appendix 10 for raw questionnaire scores from each participant. Summary 
details of participants and therapy received are as follows: 
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Table 3.1 Participant and therapy details 
Case Ref Age Gender Period of 
therapy (days) 
Number of 
therapy sessions 
1 R003 42 M 96 8 
2 R014 50 M 264 8 
3 R016 61 F 126 8 
4 R028 32 M 91 7 
5 R031 44 M 68 8 
6 R036 50 M 63 8 
7 R037 58 F 71 8 
8 R041 28 M 56 9 
9 R042 52 F 102 12 
Means 46.33 104.11 8.44 
With regard to the traumatic event cited, 4 participants reported accidents, including 
road traffic accidents, 2 had been subject to a non-sexual assault by a stranger, 2 had 
witnessed a traumatic death and I had been the victim of torture. The two coping 
styles of monitoring and blunting, for N=9, were comprised as follows: 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics for the blunting and monitoring variables 
Variable Mean Median Mode Range Standard Variance 
deviation 
blunting 3.89 4 5 3 1.27 1.61 
monitoring 9.22 9 11 12 3.73 13.94 
From the table, it would appear that the two coping styles of monitoring and blunting, 
with which the study is concerned, vary considerably in terms of measures of central 
tendency and measures of dispersion, with monitoring scores being on average higher 
with a broader distribution than blunting scores. 
3. I Computation of variables 
Further variables were computed by subtracting the "after" scores from the "before" 
scores on all measures. in order to evaluate the change in symptoms over the period of 
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therapy. In addition, the blunting score (mbssb) from the MBSS scale was subtracted 
from the monitoring score (mbssm) to produce an overall MBSS score (mbssdifq in 
accordance with data treatment in earlier studies (see Steketee, Bransfield, Miller and 
Foa, 1989). See Appendix 11 for the data from the computed variables. 
4 Quantitative data analysis 
- 
inferential statistics 
4.1 Intercorrelations 
Firstly, bivariate, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated for the monitoring 
and blunting variables (mbssm, mbssb and mbssdiff) and all computed change 
variables, together with the covariates of age, gender, number of sessions and period 
of therapy. See Appendix 12 for intercorrelations. The purpose of this was to assess 
the extent to which blunting and monitoring were associated with reduction in 
symptoms, in accordance with the hypotheses for the study. Furthermore, the extent 
to which other variables were correlated with each other was explored. 
Significant correlations were found between several symptoms within the same scale, 
for example several of the variables from the PDS scale were correlated with one 
another. This was to be expected as some subscales of this test are scored by 
combining some of the others, and because symptoms within such scales are known to 
be associated. The anxiety subscale of the HADS correlated with the depression 
subscale, a well-documented finding, and also with several of the symptom measures 
from the PDS. The change in the depression subscale of the HADS correlated 
positively with the change in chronicity of symptoms from the PDS. Additional 
intercorrelations are summarised in table 3.3 and the means of the changes in these 
variables before and after therapy are summarised in table 3.4. 
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Table 3.3 Summary of significant correlations 
Variable gender 
(coded male = 1, 
female 
= 2) 
sessions monitoring 
Age 
. 
724* 
change in intrusion (IES) 
. 
746* 
change in avoidance (IES) 
. 
722* 
change in no. arousal symptoms (PDS) 
. 
871 ** 
change in impairment in functioning (PDS) 
. 
756* 
change in no. symptoms (PDS) 
. 
848** 
change in PTSD diagnosis (PDS) 
. 
936** 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 3.4 Means of changes in significant variables before and after therapy 
before therapy after therapy change 
intrusion (IES) 16.13 11.00 5.13 
avoidance (IES) 14.88 10.00 4.88 
arousal (PDS) 4.33 3.78 0.55 
Impairment in functioning (PDS) 4.00 3.78 0.22 
number of symptoms (PDS) 15.11 13.44 1.67 
PTSD diagnosis (PDS) 1.00 0.89 0.11 
4.2 Testing Hypothesis 1 
-x. 2.1 Correlations between blunting and change in symptoms 
Blunting (mbssb) was not significantly correlated with any change variables. 
Therefore, at this stage of the analysis, no support was found for hypothesis 1 which 
predicted a blunting coping style to be significantly negatively correlated with degree 
of improvement in symptoms over the course of therapy. 
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The possibility that restriction of range of the blunting variable (mbssb) (scores 
ranging from 2 to 5) may be responsible for this finding was considered. In order to 
test this, a further correlational analysis was performed, this time including some 
variables from the "before" measures instead of the measures of change, as follows: 
4.2.2 Intercorrelations between symptom measures taken before therapy and 
participant characteristics. 
Blunting (mbssb) was found to be significantly negatively correlated with intrusion 
scores before therapy from the IES (iesintra) p<0.05, suggesting that a blunting 
coping style is associated with low levels of intrusive thoughts before therapy. See 
table 3.5: 
Table 3.5: Correlations between blunting and intrusion symptoms before therapy. 
pre-therapy intrusion (IES) 
blunting Pearson Correlation 
-0.772 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.015 
N 9 
The fact that a strong correlation was found suggests that restriction of range was not 
responsible for the lack of significant correlations found between blunting and the 
change variables. Alternative reasons for these findings were therefore considered, 
including the fact that gender, which was significantly correlated with change in 
intrusive thoughts from the IES (iesintrc) may be acting as a suppressor variable, 
masking any relationship between change in intrusive thoughts (iesintrc) and blunting 
(mbssb). (The correlation between gender and the change in levels of intrusion is 
fully addressed in the Section 4.4 Other Relevant Correlations). Partial correlation 
coefficients were, therefore, calculated for the above "before" and "after" variables, 
this time controlling for the variable, gender, see Appendix 13. 
4.2.3 Partial correlation coefficients, controlling, for gender 
When gender was controlled for, blunting was still found to be significantly 
negatively correlated with intrusion scores before therapy from the IES (iestintra) 
p<0.05, but, in addition, was very highly negatively correlated with change in 
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intrusion scores from the IES (iesintrc), see table 3.6: 
Table 3.6: Correlations between blunting and intrusion symptoms before therapy. and 
change in intrusion symptoms, when controlled for gender. 
pre-therapy change in 
intrusion (IES) intrusion (IES) 
blunting Pearson Correlation 
-0.8126 -0.8914 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.026 0.007 
N 9 8 
These findings suggest that the reason that no association was found initially between 
blunting and change in intrusive thoughts was that gender was acting as a suppressor 
variable. This provides support for Hypothesis 1 in that a blunting coping style is 
strongly associated with low improvement in levels of intrusive thoughts over the 
course of therapy. However, the fact that a negative correlation was also found 
between blunting and intrusion scores at the start of therapy suggests that the 
correlation between blunting and change in intrusion may simply reflect the initial 
correlation, rather than a relationship between blunting and change per se. 
4.3 Testing Hypothesis 2 
4.3.1 Correlations between monitoring and change in symptoms 
Monitoring (mbssm) was found to be significantly positively correlated with change 
in avoidance symptoms from the IES (iesavc), p<0.05, see table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Correlations between monitoring and change in avoidance symptoms 
change in avoidance (IES) 
monitoring Pearson Correlation 0.772 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.025 
N 8 
An association. therefore. was found, between a monitoring coping style and reduced 
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avoidance symptoms over the course of therapy. This supports Hypothesis 2 in that 
monitoring is associated with greater improvement in some symptoms following 
therapy. 
4.4 Other relevant correlations: 
Gender and number of sessions were found to be significantly correlated with several 
of the change variables, as follows: 
4.4.1 Gender 
The covariate gender was found to be significantly positively correlated with change 
in intrusion from the IES (iesintrc), p<0.05, and with change in impairment of 
functioning from the PDS (pdsimpc), p<0.05, suggesting that, in this sample, women 
were more likely than men to have reduced levels of intrusive thoughts and overall 
improvement in functioning over the course of therapy. Gender was also significantly 
positively correlated with age, p<0.05, indicating that the women in the sample were 
on average older than the men, see Table 3.8: 
Table 3.8: Correlations between gender and age, change in intrusion levels and 
overall change in impairment in functioning. 
age change in change in 
intrusion impairment 
IES in function IES 
gender Pearson Correlation 0.724 0.746 0.756 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.027 0.034 0.018 
N 9 8 9 
-4.4.2 Number of Sessions 
The number of therapy sessions was very highly positively correlated with change in 
number of arousal symptoms from the PDS (pdsarnc), p<0.01, change in overall 
number of symptoms endorsed from the PDS (pdssynoc), p<0.01, and change in a 
diagnosis of PTSD from the PDS (pdsdiagc), p<0.0l. See table 3.9: 
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Table 3.9: Correlations between number of sessions and change in number of arousal 
symptoms, change in overall number of symptoms and change in a full diagnosis of 
PTSD. 
change in no. change in no. change in 
arousal symptoms diagnosis 
symptoms (IES) (I ES) of PTSD (IES) 
sessions Pearson Corr. 0.871 0.848 0.936 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.004 0.001 
N 9 9 9 
No association was found between the period over which therapy occurred and any 
change in symptoms. 
4.5 Summary of the quantitative results 
In summary, despite the small sample, some significant results were obtained. The 
preliminary study indicated some support for both hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 was 
supported in that a blunting coping style was found to be significantly negatively 
correlated with degree of improvement in intrusive thoughts following therapy. 
Hypothesis 2 was supported in that a monitoring coping style was found to be 
significantly positively correlated with the degree of improvement in avoidance 
symptoms over the period. Furthermore, it would appear that there is an initial 
association between a blunting coping style and degree of intrusive thoughts before 
therapy, not predicted by the hypotheses. 
In addition, other significant correlations were found, which had not been predicted 
by either hypothesis, namely the impact of gender and the number of therapy sessions 
on the degree of change in symptoms over the course of treatment. However, with 
such a small sample, care needs to be taken with regard to the interpretation of non- 
significant correlations. 
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5 Qualitative data analysis 
Following the end of treatment, or eight sessions, whichever was the sooner, 
therapists were asked to note their overall impression concerning the extent to which 
they regarded the client as having engaged in the therapy, and their view concerning 
the extent of her/his improvement over the period. There was one case of missing 
data, for case number 2, with 8 of the 9 therapists completing this part of the study. A 
full transcript of the therapists' comments are available on request. While the 
comments provided only a very brief and general resume of the clients' response to 
therapy, the data can be regarded as covering three main themes: 
The attitude of the client to the therapy, including issues of trust or initial 
scepticism about the process. 
The extent of engagement or avoidance during the course of therapy. 
The response to therapy and the degree of symptom change over the period. 
A majority of the sample, both men and women, were reported to have engaged well 
in the therapy, and to have experienced some improvement in their symptoms. 
However, 3 men and no women were described as being initially sceptical about the 
extent to which they believed that therapy could help them, and 2 men and no women 
were described as avoidant. This indicates an interesting gender difference in attitude 
to therapy, with men being reported as less ready to engage in the process of 
psychological treatment than women, in this small sample. This is consistent with the 
quantitative findings which also indicated gender differences (see above) in that 
intrusive thoughts in women reduced significantly over the course of therapy and that 
their overall functioning significantly improved over the course of therapy, whereas 
this was not the case for the men in the study. 
The findings from both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the study are 
explored further in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
1 Summary of the results 
Insufficient data was gathered to fully test the hypotheses of the study. Inspection of 
the 9 data sets collected, therefore, formed an exploratory, preliminary analysis. and 
was used to highlight research questions for a second phase of the research. The 
findings from the preliminary study indicate some support for the fact that coping 
style is relevant to symptom change over a course of therapy for PTSD. A monitoring 
coping style was found to be significantly positively correlated with improvement in 
avoidance symptoms over the period, supporting Hypothesis 2 which states that a 
higher monitoring score would be associated with greater improvement in therapy. A 
blunting coping style was found to be significantly negatively correlated with degree 
of improvement in intrusive thoughts, supporting Hypothesis 1 which states that a 
significant negative correlation would be found between a blunting coping style and 
improvement following therapy, that is that the higher the score for blunting, the 
smaller the reduction of symptoms following therapy. However, the observed 
correlation may simply be a function of the correlation found between blunting and 
intrusive thoughts at the start of therapy, so it is not possible to regard these findings 
as unequivocally supporting Hypothesis 1. 
In addition, the impact of gender on attitude to therapy, engagement in the process 
and improvement of symptoms over the course of treatment was in evidence. The 
number of therapy sessions was found to be associated with improvement in some 
symptoms, and the period over which therapy took place was not associated with such 
changes. However, any findings must be considered within the context of the small 
sample size from which they arose, and it is important that these are not overstated 
nor over-interpreted. 
85 
2 The Relationships between Coping Style, Intrusion and Avoidance 
2.1 The relationship between blunting and intrusive thoughts. 
A blunting coping style was found to be significantly negatively correlated with 
degree of intrusive thought before therapy (see Table 3.5) and, when gender was 
controlled for, blunting was found also to be very highly negatively correlated with 
the degree of change in intrusive thoughts by the end of therapy (see Table 3.6). 
While the latter finding appears to support the hypothesis that blunting is related to 
low improvement in symptoms over the course of therapy, it is possible that this 
finding is a function of the negative correlation before therapy, with low blunters 
having higher levels of intrusion. So, while this provides support for the notion that 
blunting is related to low levels of intrusive thoughts, this is only in relation to the 
affect of blunting on the pre-therapy state rather than during the progress of therapy, 
and so does not provide evidence of avoidance during therapy. 
2.2 The relationship between blunting and avoidance 
The above arguments are based on the assumption that blunting is akin to avoidance 
and that blunting is an avoidant coping style. However, the current findings raise the 
question of how far it is appropriate to view blunting as an avoidant strategy. If 
blunting is akin to avoidance, a significant positive correlation would be expected 
between blunting and the measures of avoidance from the other scales, namely the 
PDS and IES. However, no such correlations were found, with no avoidance 
measures from either the PDS or the IES being significantly correlated with blunting, 
either at the start of therapy or with their change over the period. This is contrary to 
the rationale of the study, which regards blunting as an avoidant coping style, which 
would be expected to be associated with other avoidance measures. However, the 
absence of such a correlation must be understood within the context of the small 
sample size and so must be treated with caution. 
86 
2.3 The relationship between monitorine and avoidance. 
Interestingly, although no relationship was found between avoidance and blunting, 
monitoring was significantly positively correlated with change in avoidance, with a 
monitoring coping style being associated with a reduction in avoidance symptoms 
over the course of therapy (see Table 3.7). Monitoring, however, was not found to be 
associated with avoidance levels at the start of therapy. This suggests that high 
monitors became less avoidant over the course of therapy than low monitors, 
regardless of their avoidance levels at the start, and that monitoring influences 
development of avoidance during therapy. This supports the findings of Steketee, 
Bransfield, Miller and Foa (1989) who found that monitors improved more than 
blunters following two sessions of exposure therapy for animal phobia. 
2.4 A comparison of outcomes between blunters and monitors 
Several studies showed monitors to have better outcomes than blunters (Steketee et al 
1989). This is consistent with the current study in which monitoring was associated 
with reduction in avoidance levels and, therefore, with better outcomes. However, 
earlier research is inconclusive. Muris et al (1993b; 1995) found a positive effect of a 
premorbid blunting coping style in comparison with a monitoring style. They 
suggested that this was consistent with Williams et al's (1988) information processing 
model, in that too much attentional bias leads to extremes of anxiety which interferes 
with cognitive processing and so is detrimental to effectiveness of treatment. The 
information processing model, therefore, regards the reduction of extremes of 
attentional bias to aid therapy. If blunters are those with low levels of attentional bias, 
then the fact that they improved less in therapy than the monitors is not consistent 
with this model. However, the model also proposes that distraction disrupts the 
benefits of exposure treatment, and that a certain amount of attention to the stimulus 
is necessary for phobic extinction to occur. According to the model, therefore, neither 
extreme monitors nor extreme blunters would be expected to do as well in therapy as 
those with more moderate scores on each measure. Further studies might aim to test 
this. 
One difference between the present study and the earlier phobia studies is that the 
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therapy used in the current study involved imaginal exposure to the traumatic event. 
whereas the earlier studies used in vivo exposure techniques. As has been observed 
earlier, the extent to which one's natural tendency to blunt a stimulus may vary 
according to whether it is being imagined or is physically present in the room. so 
cannot be avoided or blunted. It would be interesting to assess whether different 
results would be obtained for in vivo exposure therapy for PTSD. 
In summary, a wealth of questions are raised by the results of the preliminary study, 
concerning the extent to which monitoring and blunting coping styles are related to 
avoidance and intrusive thoughts. However, in addition to these areas which test the 
two hypotheses, correlations were found with variables other than blunting and 
monitoring, upon which attention will now be focused, beginning with the relevance 
of gender to PTSD outcomes. 
3 The Relationshin between Gender and Theranv Outcome 
The women in the sample were, on average, older than the men, and women were 
found to be more likely than men to have reduced levels of intrusive thoughts and 
increased overall improvement in functioning over the course of therapy (see Table 
3.8). 
This suggests that the women's response to the therapy exceeded that of the men in 
the sample. Most current treatments for PTSD involve the client speaking in detail 
about the traumatic event that they experienced, regardless of the therapeutic 
approach taken. These findings would suggest that women were able to engage more 
fully in the process of speaking meaningfully about the event and their feelings about 
it, and so benefit from the process of therapy. This is supported by the qualitative 
information provided by therapists at the follow up measurement. The three female 
clients who took part in the study were all described by their therapists as engaging 
well in the process. whereas all the male clients reported on (5 of a total of 6 male 
clients, 1 having missing data on this measure) were described by their therapists 
either as sceptical of therapy, avoidant, slow to engage or trust, or changing little 
throughout the course of therapy. 
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Matching of clients with therapists, for example in terms of gender. may be relevant 
to engagement in therapy and therapeutic outcome. due to rapport and trust being 
more easily built. (Fenton et al, 1987; Jones et al. 1987). If the clients who were 
reported to engage, that is the female clients, were receiving therapy from female 
therapists, and those who were reported not to engage, that is the male therapists. 
were receiving therapy from female therapists, then it may be the gender of the client- 
therapist pair which is responsible for the engagement rather than the gender of the 
client per se. However, on examining the data, there is no systematic bias in the 
gender of the therapist, both male and female clients working with same and different 
gender therapists. 
This raises the issue of whether this sample is typical of a population of clients 
seeking therapy for PTSD in that men are more avoidant than women and engage less 
easily in the therapy. Alternatively it may be that this sample is typical of a 
population of clients using the mental health service in general, regardless of their 
particular diagnosis. This would support the stereotypical view of women being more 
able to talk about their feelings than men, and comes at a time when male suicides 
have been found to have increased by 60%, having now overtaken the suicide rate for 
women (Samaritans, 1999). Further research might focus on whether women with 
PTSD fare better following therapy than men with PTSD, and whether there is a 
difference between the outcomes of men and women in general, that is those 
presenting to the mental health service with a range of disorders. 
The degree of improvement in the levels of intrusive thought was significantly greater 
for the women in the sample than for the men. No gender differences were found 
between the levels of intrusive thought, nor any other symptoms, before therapy, 
which suggests that the women began from the same start point as the men, but 
progressed in therapy differently to and more effectively than the men. Similarly, no 
gender differences were found for coping style, indicating that coping style is relevant 
to symptom change. regardless of gender. 
One possible explanation for these findings is that these apparent gender-specific 
responses to therapy for PTSD reflect differences in the type of traumatic event 
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experienced. For example, more men than women are likely to have experienced 
combat trauma and more women than men are more likely to have experienced rape 
or sexual assault. However, in the current sample, there was no systematic bias in the 
range of traumatic events experienced, with men and women being randomly spread 
across the four events cited, namely non-sexual assault, witnessing a traumatic death, 
involvement in an accident and being the subject of torture. 
Further research might consider the possible explanations for the apparent gender 
differences in PTSD outcomes and the extent to which they are consistent with a 
population of mental health service users as a whole, or are specific to those with 
PTSD. 
4 The Relationship between Number of Therapy Sessions and Outcome 
The number of therapy sessions was very highly positively correlated with several 
measures of symptom change from the PDS, namely change in number of arousal 
symptoms, change in overall number of symptoms reported and overall change in 
diagnosis of PTSD (from Yes to No) (see Table 3.9) although no association was 
found between the period over which therapy occurred and any change in symptoms. 
This indicates the effectiveness of therapy for PTSD, as symptom reduction can be 
attributed to the therapy as opposed to being merely a function of the passage of time 
since the traumatic event. However, there are methodological limitations in the 
current study which need to be considered when interpreting any of the above 
findings. 
5 Limitations of the study 
5 
.1 
Inconsistencies in the measurement of monitoring and blunting coping styles. 
Miller's original concept of monitoring and blunting has been criticised for its 
inconsistencies and shortcomings (Muris et al, 1994). One problem is that of defining 
monitors and blunters. with different studies measuring these styles in different ways. 
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Originally, the MBSS employed a dichotomous format, as in the current study. in 
which participants are asked to mark the options which are applicable to them of a 
range of possible responses to each scenario (Miller, 1987). More recent studies, 
however, have used a 5-point format on which the participants indicate to what extent 
each option is applicable (for example: Muris, van Zuuren and Merckelbach. 1993). 
The new measurement has arisen due to a weakness in the research pertaining to the 
internal consistency of the dichotomous scale. For a discussion on this topic, see 
Parker and Endler (1992). The dichotomous scale was used in the current study, 
because this was the format of the questionnaire with which its author provided the 
researcher, and for which permission was granted for usage. 
Furthermore, some of the earlier research has treated the data from the monitoring and 
blunting subscales by subtracting one subscale score from the other to derive one 
overall score for each person, and categorising them as either a monitor or a blunter 
on the basis of a median split, for example, Miller (1987). One problem with this is 
that some individuals may not fall very easily into either category, having similar 
scores on each of the subscales, and so may render comparisons between the two 
"types" of people less relevant. In the present study each participant has one score for 
monitoring and one for blunting, so that it was possible for one person to score 
equally high or equally low on both measures. People were, therefore, not categorised 
either as monitors or blunters, both styles being recognised within each person. It 
could be argued that this is a more appropriate way in which to treat such data, rather 
than to divide individuals into discrete groups, reflecting the complexity and variety 
of coping resources that each individual may use concurrently. Treating monitoring 
and blunting as two continuous variables, as in the present study, enables this 
complexity to be incorporated in the data analysis. This attitude to coping styles is 
more consistent with modern views of personality and counselling theories, which 
regard people as individuals rather than a cluster of diagnostic labels or categories. 
Caution should, therefore, be exercised when interpreting the results of the current 
study and it should be noted that, whenever monitoring and blunting is referred to, 
this relates to the scores of individuals on either of the subscales and not to a 
classification of an individual as either a monitor or a blunter, as may be the case in 
some of the other studies which used a median split. 
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Furthermore, the variety of ways in which MBSS scores are treated throughout the 
coping styles research renders comparisons between studies problematic and may 
partly account for some of the apparently conflicting results in the literature on 
monitoring and blunting. For example, the Muris et al studies used a5 point Likert 
scale as opposed to the current dichotomous scale. In another study, Miller (1987) 
identified four coping styles, namely high monitor / high blunter; high monitor / low 
blunter; high blunter / low monitor and low blunter / low monitor. It would be 
interesting, in future research, to consider how far these four coping styles might be 
predictive of therapy outcome in PTSD. However, it was not possible to group the 
data in this way in the present study, again due to the limited number of participants. 
The low response rate is an issue of interest in itself. 
5.2 The low response rate 
One limitation of the study is the small amount of data, due to the low response rate. 
Initially, many of the organisations and individuals who were approached to take part 
in the study declined, on the grounds that they did not have the time, that they rarely 
saw clients with PTSD or that they considered their clients to be already "over- 
researched". Of the 15 psychologists who agreed to participate, completed 
questionnaire packs were returned from only 4 of them, comprising 4 packs from one 
therapist, 1 from another and 2 each from the other 2. Data collected formed only 
14.3 % of the total packs distributed. 
Therapists cited a variety of reasons for the lack of response: 
" clients had dropped out of therapy, and so follow-up data could not be gathered. 
" therapists forgot about the study 
0a lack of referrals of clients with PTSD 
0 therapists' discomfort with researching clients in distress. 
This last reason is significant and requires further exploration. Some therapists did 
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not feel comfortable recruiting to the study clients whom they felt were in 
considerable distress, or for whom they felt trust in the therapist may be an issue. 
Gathering data for research from clients may be seen to conflict with the tasks of 
therapy, and may be seen as a barrier to the therapeutic relationship (Barker, Pistrang 
and Elliott, 1996). It is important when gathering data to be sensitive to the needs of 
the client, in preference to the demands of the research. Although the client's signed, 
informed consent is established before any of the study procedures are administered, 
it could be argued that the power imbalance inherent in the therapeutic relationship, 
particularly initially, before a working alliance has been established, may be sufficient 
to leave the client feeling pressurised or obliged to take part. Some therapists may be 
very sensitive to this and so be reluctant to ask the client to take part in the study. 
This is consistent with Barker et al's (1996) nine reasons for clinical and counselling 
psychologists sometimes failing to become involved in research, namely the issue of 
"intrusiveness", in which therapists regard the intrusion of research procedures into 
the therapeutic relationship to be damaging to the relationship. Studying the client 
may be considered to distort the psychological atmosphere, for example by making 
the client anxious about confidentiality. 
It is possible that reasons other than those cited by the therapists may also be 
responsible for the lack of response from those initially agreeing to take part. Barker 
et al (1996) suggest that research is time consuming and often takes a low priority 
compared to service demands, and is not often supported or valued by managers or 
colleagues. Furthermore, it may be that, due to the "before and after" nature of the 
study, some therapists may have felt that their therapeutic competence and 
effectiveness with clients was being measured, and so may have found the study 
threatening. Barker et al (1996) suggest that research may produce findings that lead 
to a painful re-examination of one's ideas and challenge one's assumptions and ways 
of working. This, they suggest, may lead to therapists feeling threatened, and so 
citing other reasons for not being able to carry out the research, for example time 
pressures. 
Feelings of threat, therefore, coupled with the pressure of work traditionally 
associated with professionals working within the NHS, may have produced a 
reluctance to engage in any procedure that involved additional time, thought or 
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perceived pressure or anxiety. This has highlighted the difficulties inherent in relying 
on busy professionals to help gather data from their clients. 
5.3 The disadvantages associated with self-report methods 
A further limitation of the study is that it relies almost entirely on clients' self- 
reporting of their symptoms, feelings and behaviour. It is the clients, themselves, 
who completed the questionnaires and, as with all self-report measures, this provides 
a subjective view of the person, from the client's own perspective. In current 
psychological practices, this may be considered an advantage. Many psychologists, 
for example Harre (1974) and Kelly (1955) have argued that researchers should ask 
the participant for his or her own view unless there are compelling reasons not to do 
so. Humanistic counselling approaches are based on the philosophy that the client's 
perceptions of themselves and their world are paramount and that it is important to 
enter and remain within the client's frame of reference in order to begin to fully 
empathise with their experience and so facilitate their progress (see for example, 
Rogers, 1951). Furthermore, the recent rise in Counselling Psychology in the UK has 
led to a "growing acceptance of the humanistic value system... reflected in reactions 
against the medical model of professional-client relationships" (Woolfe, 1996, p5). 
The self-report methods used in the current research, therefore, can be said to be 
consistent with modern counselling and Counselling Psychology philosophy. 
The disadvantage of self-report methods, however, is that respondents are not always 
truthful, they may deceive themselves or others due to the denying of the problem to 
themselves, or because they do not want others to know about certain of their 
thoughts, feelings or behaviour for fear of judgement or ridicule. 
In the present study, the self-report measures were supplemented by a small amount 
of information from the therapist. The study, therefore, is not entirely dependent upon 
the clients' own perception of their symptoms. As seen earlier, in the discussion of 
the gender of the participants, the qualitative information provided by therapists at the 
follow up measurement ý, N as consistent with the quantitative outcome measures taken, 
in that the female clients were reported to have engaged well, whereas the male 
clients were described as more sceptical. This suggests that the therapists' 
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observations of the level of improvement in symptoms over the course of therapy was 
consistent with the quantitative outcome measures taken, and so goes some «-ay- to 
address the potential validity problems often associated with self-report measures. 
The gathering of further qualitative data to investigate some of the issues raised by 
this preliminary study would not only help to triangulate the current research findings, 
but also go some way toward exploring and clarifying in greater depth some of the 
processes involved in the symptom profile of those with PTSD. 
6 Concluding Remarks and further research 
The data from this preliminary study are not sufficient for firm conclusions to be 
drawn in relation to the hypotheses put forward due to the small return rate of 
completed questionnaires, however they highlight several interesting areas for further 
exploration of avoidance in PTSD. The fact that the information-avoidant coping 
style of blunting was found to be associated with symptoms of intrusion suggests that 
avoidance may play a role in PTSD presentation, although it is less certain whether it 
influences the course of therapy. 
However, focusing on the issue of personality and coping styles is only one of many 
ways of addressing the problem of avoidance. Considering avoidance in therapy 
solely in terms of personality and coping styles may be regarded as over-simplistic in 
that there may be many factors associated with clients not addressing emotional 
material in therapy other than trait components. For example, situational variables 
may be as important as individual differences in avoidance in therapy. In view of the 
increasing body of research that shows one of the most overriding and influential 
factors in the outcome of psychological therapy to be the relationship between 
therapist and client (Frank, 1979) one area of importance in avoidance research is to 
consider avoidance in terms of the interaction between client and therapist. The 
ongoing quest for effective therapies needs to take full account of such situational and 
process issues that may prevent successful therapy outcome. 
A second study. therefore, was conducted in order to build on the findings of the first 
study and to consider the ways in which avoidance manifests within the therapy 
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session itself, exploring the dialogue within the therapeutic dyad. 
7 Rationale for Part 2 of the study 
Part 2 of the study used a qualitative approach to further explore the process of 
avoidance. The overall result is a two-part study using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods to explore the problem of avoidance in PTSD. Research which 
combines both quantitative and qualitative methods can provide a useful way forward 
in terms of examining a research question (Barker et al, 1996) and the two approaches 
can often complement each other. The rationale for combining the two approaches in 
the current study is in order to use qualitative data to elucidate and explore the 
quantitative findings and as an adjunct to and a follow-up investigation of a primarily 
quantitative study (Barker et al, 1996). If the nature of avoidance within the 
therapeutic dyad can be better understood, then strategies to overcome it could be 
recommended. 
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Section B: Research 
The discursive practices facilitating an avoidance of 
emotional material in therapy for clients with 
posttraumatic stress disorder. 
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Chapter 5: Method 
1 Research design 
Discourse analysis, a qualitative approach for the study of written and spoken text (Billig, 
1992; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter and Wetherell, 1987) 
was used. It is a method increasingly deployed in the field of psychology and 
psychotherapy, as it enables communications to be analysed in detail in terms of their 
social functioning. In the current study, the method is applied to written text in the form 
of transcriptions of therapy sessions with clients with PTSD, in order to generate some of 
the discursive practices which function to enable an avoidance of the expression of 
negative affect. The purpose of the analysis is to identify some of the patterns of 
conversational behaviour which impact upon the therapeutic process in such a way as to 
facilitate or enable an avoidance of the expression of emotional material. 
1.1 Choice of methodolo 
A qualitative method was chosen because it enables closer contact with the clinical 
material, consistent with its increasing use in the field of applied social sciences, (Barker 
et al, 1996). Using a qualitative method enables the subject of avoidance to be studied in 
depth and detail, avoiding the simplifications imposed by the quantification associated 
with quantitative methods, and providing a useful alternative and augmentation to the 
quantitative design in Part 1 of the study. Furthermore, such designs have the practical 
advantage of requiring fewer participants than quantitative designs, addressing the 
problems of data collection experienced in Part 1, and the data collected is very rich, 
providing a wide scope for qualitative analysis, consistent with current philosophy on 
therapeutic research in the field of Counselling Psychology. 
An exploration of the ways in which avoidance is manifest within therapeutic 
conversation requires an analysis at the level of the dialogue used. A discourse analysis 
methodology was chosen as it lends itself to an exploration of therapeutic dialogue in that 
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it is concerned with the study of written and spoken text (Potter and Wetherell. 1987). Its 
applicability to research on process with clients in therapeutic situations has been 
demonstrated (e. g. Dimity, 2000; Harper, 1995) and so it is regarded as the most 
appropriate method for illuminating the complex process of avoidance in therapy for 
PTSD. Alternative qualitative methodologies, such as phenomenological methods. 
grounded theory and narrative approaches were considered, however such approaches 
rely on an exploration of the subjective meaning of utterances and focus on the content of 
the text. The purpose of the current research was more to explore the process of the 
therapeutic conversation, rather address the content of utterances. Discourse analysis, 
being concerned with meaning in terms of the social function of utterances rather than in 
terms of their content, lends itself more readily to the subject under investigation. 
1.2 Research Method 
There is very little agreement as to the usage of the term "discourse analysis" and there 
are many variants of the approach (Robson, 1993). The method considered most 
appropriate for the current study is social-psychological and is concerned with text and 
talk in social practices. (Billig, 1992; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Gilbert and Mulkay, 
1984; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). This approach takes a functional perspective on 
language, focusing on the way in which language is used to do things such as describe, 
persuade or blame (Madill and Barkham, 1997). The current study is concerned with the 
way in which language is used to avoid and specifically the way in which it enables an 
avoidance of the expression of negative affect or an exploration of painful emotional 
material in therapy for PTSD. Descriptions are treated as constructed versions of reality, 
rather than as neutral accounts of states of affairs or as a medium for accessing 
underlying attitudes or beliefs. The focus of the analysis is the impact upon the 
therapeutic process of the various discursive patterns generated rather than an 
interpretative account of any underlying motivations of the participants. 
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2 Data collection 
2.1 The data 
Data comprised six transcripts of sections of therapy sessions. Four transcripts were 
transcribed by the researcher from audio tapes. Of these, two were from the researcher's 
own work with clients and two were from the work of one other therapist. The two 
remaining transcripts were from two other therapists and were presented to the researcher 
in transcribed form, comprising part of the assessed written process report component of 
a course of postgraduate study in Counselling Psychology. In summary, the transcribed 
materials comprised the work of four therapists and six clients, with two of the four 
therapists providing material from two clients each, and the remaining two therapists 
producing material from one client each. 
2.2 Recruitment of participants 
A mailshot was sent to all postgraduate Counselling Psychology students at a major 
university in London, requesting transcribed material of therapy sessions with clients 
with PTSD (see Appendix 14). Three students responded, two of whom each provided a 
ten-minute transcript that they had submitted as part of the assessed written process report 
component of their course of study. The third student provided two 40 minute audio 
tapes of work with two different clients. The researcher provided two transcripts of her 
own work with two different clients of 45 minutes each. 
2.3 Inclusion criteria 
Only transcripts or tapes from therapy sessions with clients who were suffering from 
PTSD were included. A client was regarded as suffering from PTSD if, in the 
professional opinion of the therapist providing the transcript, he or she met the criteria for 
this diagnosis. This inclusion criterion was stated in the mailshot, thus selecting out 
transcripts of those whom the therapists deemed as not suffering from PTSD. Therapists 
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demonstrated, within accompanying case study work or case note material and 
subsequent conversations with the researcher, that DSM-IV criteria for PTSD had been 
met. The researcher was satisfied that the therapists' accounts of clients' symptoms 
broadly satisfied the DSM-IV criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD in each case. All data 
provided met these inclusion criteria, and no data was excluded. 
Due to the archive nature of the material, it was not possible to require each therapist to 
apply the same therapeutic tool for the measurement of PTSD, unlike the previous 
quantitative part of the study. It must, therefore, be accepted that, despite the steps taken 
to standardise inclusion criteria and ensure that only clients with symptoms consistent 
with the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD be included in the study, there will inevitably be 
some subjectivity in the diagnosis applied. The negligible risk of including material from 
those not conforming to all the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD was balanced against the 
usefulness of including material from clients who had in common, at the very least, that 
they were all receiving therapy for the psychological effects of a traumatic experience. 
This was considered sufficient for the exploration of the process of avoidance in 
traumatised individuals, and is consistent with a social constructivist perspective with 
regard to the inevitability of subjectivity in research (Gergen, 1985). More specifically, it 
is consistent with calls for a more discursive approach to diagnosis in preference to the 
cognitive model, currently dominating approaches to diagnosis (Edwards, 1991). 
2.4 Participants 
One therapist was male and three were female and one client was male and five were 
female. Three clients were survivors of childhood sexual abuse, one was the survivor of 
a sexual assault in adulthood, one had survived an industrial accident and the other had 
witnessed a road traffic accident and had issues of traumatic grief following the death of a 
relative. Three were receiving therapy within NHS agencies and three were attending 
voluntary counselling services. The therapist who is also the researcher is denoted as 
"A". the therapist who provided the two tapes as "B" and the therapists who provided the 
transcribed material as "C" and "D". The distribution of these variables is summarised in 
101 
table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 The distribution of clients across therapists 
Client Client's Therapist Therapist's Nature of Session Agency Transcript 
ref. gender gender trauma number time (mins) 
AD M A F Industrial I NHS CMHT 45 
accident 
HP F A F Bereavement / I NHS CMHT 45 
witness 
accident 
NL F B M Childhood 48 Voluntary 40 
sexual abuse sector alcohol 
service 
RH F B M Childhood 28 Voluntary 40 
sexual abuse sector alcohol 
service 
RW F C F Childhood 12 Voluntary 10 
sexual abuse sector rape 
service 
HG F D F Sexual assault 5 Trauma 10 
service 
2.5 Sample size 
Because the researcher is interested in language use rather than the people generating the 
language and because a large number of linguistic patterns were expected to emerge from 
a few people, the sample size was considered adequate for investigating the current 
research question. The area of interest with which the study was concerned was the ways 
in which avoidance is used within therapy for PTSD. This is distinct from the type of 
research which explores incidents of a specific event that may occur on only a few 
occasions within each transcript, in which case a larger number of transcripts might be 
required in order to encompass sufficient of these events to provide a reliable analysis 
(Perakyla 1997). The current research was concerned with the avoidant processes 
occurring within the transcripts, rather than focusing on a specific predefined event and 
so the number of transcripts was considered appropriate for this purpose. 
The possibility of using a single text to explore this question was considered, and indeed 
there are many precedents for using a single text to demonstrate how certain effects can 
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be achieved (e. g. Dimity, 2000; Potter et al, 1984; Woolgar, 1980). However, it was 
hypothesised that analysing a selection of transcripts might elicit a broader range of 
avoidant strategies, and so better illuminate the process of avoidance in therapy for 
clients with PTSD. 
3 Ethical considerations 
3.1 Consent 
Written permission was obtained from all clients for the taping of therapy sessions and 
their subsequent use by the university of the transcribed material. In addition, for the four 
clients whose tapes were used by the researcher (as opposed to just the transcribed 
material without the tapes) additional consent was obtained for the use of the tapes for 
research purposes. The signed taping consent forms are not included in the appendices 
for reasons of confidentiality, but are available from the researcher on request. Clients 
were informed of the purpose of the study, the way in which the information gathered 
would be used, and assured of anonymity and of their right to withdraw from the study at 
any time. 
3.2 Confidentialit 
For reasons of anonymity, a minimum amount of background information about each 
client is included. Within the written transcripts themselves, all identifiers, including the 
names of people and places have been omitted. The tapes, which may contain such 
identifiers, have been kept separate from the transcripts and stored securely. 
Following analysis of the transcripts, one therapist requested that the transcribed material 
not be directly quoted from, because of concerns for the anonymity of the client. This 
transcript was one of the two that had been submitted without the tape (HG) and was the 
property of the university. However, following discussion with the university, a decision 
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was made to comply with the request and only refer to the contents of the transcript in 
general terms without directly quoting from it. 
Each transcript is identified by a two letter reference code that was generated randomly 
and does not relate to the initials of any of the participants. The sections of transcripts 
cited in the Analysis Section as examples are each labelled with an identifier made up of 
this two letter code and a number denoting the lines of transcript from which the 
quotation is drawn, for example "RW54-9". 
4 Transcription 
4.1 Transcription process 
Four of the taped therapy sessions were transcribed by the researcher, and two were 
provided already transcribed by the therapists who provided them. As the material was 
transcribed by different people, variability is expected in terms both of what information 
is included and in the notation used. However, such subjectivity is an accepted part of 
discourse analysis and, indeed, it is accepted that it is not possible in transcription to 
reach complete "accuracy" of what was said. "Transcription is a constructive and 
conventional activity" (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p165). The transcriber is struggling 
to make clear decisions about what exactly is said, and then to represent those words in a 
conventional orthographic system (Stubbs, 1983). While some variability has to be 
accepted and worked with, attempts were made as far as possible to standardise the 
notation and produce "truthful" accounts of what was said, by adopting the following 
procedures: 
For the four tapes that were transcribed by the researcher, once the tape had been initially 
transcribed, it was played through again and the transcription checked and alterations 
made. This procedure was repeated until the transcription was considered to be as fair a 
representation of the taped material as practically possible. However, the inevitability of 
subjectivity in the process is acknowledged, and it is recognised that the dialogue is 
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transcribed through the medium of the researcher and can never be regarded as the only 
true interpretation of the taped material. 
The researcher chose to record a variety of paralinguistic features in the transcripts. 
namely pausing, lowered voice, overlapping speech, emphasis and non-verbal noises such 
as coughing, sniffing and sighing. Pauses of less than three seconds' duration occurred 
extremely frequently in the dialogue and their transcription was regarded as onerous and 
potentially interfering with the readability of the transcript. Following the 
recommendations of Potter and Wetherell (1987), consideration was given as to whether 
this information was necessary in terms of the level at which the analysis would proceed. 
As short pauses were not considered to add anything potentially useful to the analysis. a 
decision was made to include only those pauses of 3 seconds or more. Furthermore, 
where pauses occurred between the turns, it is arbitrary whether the pause should be 
attributed to the turn of the therapist or client, regarded by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 
(1974) as a "gap" which belongs to no-one. These gaps were recorded as pauses and, for 
the purpose of the consistency of the transcription, always arbitrarily attributed to the 
person who spoke following the pause. 
Attention was paid to adding punctuation in a way that was as faithful as practical to the 
delivery of the dialogue and that maintained the speaker's expression or enhanced 
readability. All turns were prefixed with C or T to denote the speaker, client and therapist 
respectively, and each line of the transcript was numbered for ease of reference. 
The remaining two transcripts which were provided already transcribed by the therapists 
were re-typed in order to include them in the researcher's computer files, for ease of 
analysis, and were modified by the researcher in two ways. Firstly the turns were 
prefixed with C or T to indicate the speaker, and the lines numbered for ease of reference. 
Secondly, where pauses had been indicated by the word "pause" or by dotted lines, this 
was replaced by a full-stop in brackets () to indicate an untimed pause. This was 
considered to aid readability and to make the notation consistent with the standard 
notation used in the other transcripts. These two transcripts payed little attention to 
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pause-length, hesitations, overlapping speech, lowered voice or emphasis. It is not 
possible to conclude that these paralinguistic features were not present in the original 
tapes, but only that any that were present were not transcribed. The six transcripts, 
labelled AD, HG, HP, NL, RH and RW respectively are available on request, in disk 
form or in hard copy. 
4.2 Technical quality of recordings 
Reliability was enhanced by paying attention to the technical quality of the recordings. 
For the two transcripts that had been recorded by the researcher, herself, the quality of the 
tapes was maximised by paying attention to the quality of the recording equipment, the 
setting in which the recording took place, the arrangement of the seating and the 
positioning of the microphone. Despite this, there remained some utterances which were 
unintelligible on transcription, denoted "(inaudible)" in the transcripts. 
The remaining four transcripts had been recorded by others. Although the researcher, 
therefore, had no control over the quality of these recordings, the two tapes received were 
considered to be of high technical quality. The final two transcripts were received 
already transcribed without the tapes. However, the tapes had previously been deemed of 
adequate quality and audibility for assessment purposes by the university, and so were 
considered to meet the technical quality requirements for the research. 
4.3 Transcription Adequacy 
Reliability was enhanced by paying attention to the adequacy of the transcription. The 
form of notation throughout the transcripts is based on that developed by Gail Jefferson 
as described in Potter and Wetherell (1987). Due to limitations of the computer word- 
processing package used for the transcription, some of Jefferson's symbols have been 
replaced with others. For example overlapping speech is indicated by a square bracket 
before each line of overlapping speech, as used by Wood and Kroger (2000) and not by 
one square bracket bridging the two lines as suggested by Potter and Wetherell (1987). 
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A rich transcript is a resource of analysis and at the time of transcribing. the researcher 
cannot know which of the details will turn out to be important for the analysis (Perakvla 
1997) and so an attempt was made to record as many aspects of vocal interaction as 
practicable. The transcription conventions used emphasise readability at some expense of 
detailed nuances of stress, pronunciation and timing. See Appendix 15 for the 
transcription notation convention used. 
Furthermore, it is recognised that transcriptions of audio recordings may entail a loss of 
some aspects of social interaction (Perakyla, 1997), for example non-verbal behaviour 
and temporal processes. However, the purpose of the present study is not to provide an 
all-encompassing account of the social behaviour of clients and therapists over a 
protracted period of time, but rather to consider verbal behaviour within a section of the 
specific time-limited context of the therapy session. As Perakyla (1997) observes, 
analyses of discourse, amongst other methods, do not aim at describing all aspects of 
social organisation. It is the organisation of verbal interaction in conversations which is 
the particular domain of such analysis, whereas other methods may be more suitable for 
focusing on other aspects of social organisation. 
5 Coding and Analysis 
The transcribed materials were approached using a systematic analysis of discourse 
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987). This was made up of two stages: coding and analysis. 
5.1 Coding 
The discursive practices used by the speakers were explored in detail and utterances were 
grouped to generate a list of discursive practices used. An understanding of the 
discursive practices observed developed with the analysis of each transcript. Each 
transcript was, therefore, returned to for analysis several times and reassessed and 
recoded in the light of the discursive practices that had been generated by the other 
107 
transcripts. At this stage an attempt was made to produce a body of instances of each 
discursive practice generated. The coding stage did not restrict itself to practices in 
which avoidance was hypothesised as, at this pre-analysis stage, no definition of what 
constituted avoidant discursive practices had been constructed. This is consistent with a 
qualitative approach in that data collection should not be constrained by pre-existing 
hypotheses (Barker et al, 1994). 
5.2 Analysis 
Analysis was concerned with the function and consequence of each of the discursive 
practices that had been generated at the coding stage. The effects on the conversation of 
the clients' accounts, including paralinguistic features of talk, were examined in detail and 
each piece of talk was considered with regard to the way in which it influenced the 
process of the therapy session. 
It was observed, at this stage, that certain of the discursive practices resulted in the 
conversation moving away from emotional descriptions of the trauma or from 
expressions of affect. This observation provided a working definition of avoidance and, 
for the purposes of the analysis, discursive practices that resulted in the conversation 
moving away from an exploration of emotional material were regarded as constituting 
avoidance. It should be noted that the use of this term does not imply interpretations of 
any underlying motivation of the participants but rather the social effect of these practices 
in terms of the process of the dialogue. This approach is consistent with the discourse 
analytic framework in which individuals' utterances are regarded not as an indication of 
underlying attitudes or beliefs as in quantitative research, but rather as phenomena in 
their own right (Schegloff, 1992). Each discursive practice was, therefore, considered in 
the light of how it functioned to influence the process of the therapy session with regard 
to the extent to which it enabled the conversation to move away from expressions of 
emotional material. 
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5.3 Enhancing validity 
The emerging patterns and proposed functions of the various utterances were subject to 
review by the researcher's research supervisor. Regular discussion and feedback took 
place between the researcher and supervisor, resulting in revisions to the hypotheses. 
Further measures were taken to enhance the validity of claims, using criteria developed 
by Potter and Wetherell (1987) specifically for discourse-analytic research, together with 
those used in related methods such as conversation analysis that Perakyla (1997) suggests 
may also be adapted for the purpose. Accordingly, the current analysis concerns itself 
with validation through "next turn", deviant case analysis, transparency of analytic 
claims, new problems and fruitfulness. 
5.3.1 Validation through "next turn" 
The examples cited in the current study are concerned with the responses of each of the 
dyads to each other's utterances and so in each case the next turn is available for 
inspection. The researcher's hypotheses can, therefore, each be subjected to the "proof 
procedure" (Sacks et al, 1974) that is that the next turn will show whether the interactants 
themselves treat the utterance in ways that are in accordance with the analyst's 
interpretation. Potter and Wetherell (1987) refer to this as "participants' orientation" and, 
in the current study, an attempt has been made to demonstrate how the responses provide 
support for the function of the preceding discursive practice. 
5.3.2 Deviant case analysis 
Deviant cases refer to those cases for which things go differently and do not immediately 
fit the pattern or support the emerging hypothesis. The meticulous analysis of deviant 
cases, sometimes referred to as "coherence" (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), gives impetus, 
strength and rigour to the development of the analytic arguments (Perakyla, 1997) and so, 
having established patterns of interaction, the researcher took pains to search for and 
examine any apparently deviant cases. 
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Each of these cases was dealt with according to the three steps proposed by Clayman and 
Maynard (1994). Firstly the deviant case was examined to see whether the participants, 
themselves, treated it as deviant, in which case the example would be regarded as 
providing additional support for the pattern. If there was no evidence for the participants 
treating the case in this way, a consideration was given to the appropriateness of 
reconceptualising the pattern to incorporate the deviant case. If there was no justification 
for either of these approaches, then an explanation was sought from the individual 
contingencies of the case, and an examination made of the ways in which the particular 
circumstances of the case differed to the ones that fit the pattern. If none of the three 
above criteria applied, the pattern was regarded as invalid and either discarded or 
reworked. The same process for the analysis of deviant cases was then applied to the new 
pattern. 
5.3.3 Transparency of analytic claims 
An attempt was made to ensure the adequacy, relevance and comprehensiveness of the 
sections of the transcripts cited. In this way the reader was provided with sufficient and 
persuasive evidence for the hypotheses and arguments proposed in order to make a 
judgement with regard to "apparent validity" (Kirk and Miller, 1986), the notion that once 
you have read the results of good analysis, you are convinced they are transparently true. 
5.3.4 New problems 
Inconsistencies in clients' accounts or new problems where they occurred were 
highlighted and explored within the context of the hypothesis proposed. Such incidents 
were used to provide further confirmation that discursive devices were being used as 
hypothesised (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) and the ways in which the clients sought to 
reconcile inconsistencies used to validate the hypothesis with regard to their function. An 
example of this in the current study is the ways in which disagreement between client and 
therapist is managed (see Chapter 6, Section 5.1). 
5.3.5 Fruitfiiliwss 
The current study sets out to achieve a novel way of exploring and analysing avoidance in 
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therapy for those with PTSD and so fulfils the criteria of fruitfulness in terms of 
providing a new way of looking at a subject and increasing understanding of the subject 
matter (Madill and Barkham, 1997). Its fruitfulness in terms of its capacity to make sense 
of new kinds of discourse and to generate novel explanations (Potter and Wetherell. 
1987) will be argued in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 6: Analysis 
1 Overview of findings 
The analysis of the transcripts elicited three important findings that can be 
summarised as follows: 
9 therapists, as well as clients, avoid addressing emotional material in therapy. 
" clients and therapists use different strategies from each other to achieve 
avoidance, and these are a function of the disparate roles and expectations within 
the therapeutic dyad. 
" the ways in which avoidance is achieved are mediated by the power dynamics 
associated with the therapeutic context. 
The analysis will focus firstly on those discursive practices used by clients and then 
move on to consider those used by therapists. Clients' responses to therapists' 
avoidant practices will be used to illuminate the extent to which avoidant strategies 
are a function of the disparate roles and expectations within the therapeutic dyad. 
Finally, the mediating factor of the therapeutic setting will be demonstrated through a 
consideration of the ways in which disagreement is managed. Examples of each of 
these areas will be presented and, in each case, an argument will be put forward that 
each discursive practice serves an avoidant function, that is that the utterance results 
in the conversation moving away from expressions of negative affect or painful 
emotional material. Validation of the claims will include issues of transparency, 
fruitfulness, deviant case and next turn analysis. 
2 Avoidant discursive practices used by clients 
There is evidence that clients avoid an exploration of painful emotional material in 
therapy by speaking about difficult events or feelings in such a , x-aN- as to present them 
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as of little impact or consequence. Clients construct traumatic events and feelings as 
of minor importance and so reduce the affect expressed in the therapy session. This is 
achieved through three main discursive practices: understatement, normalising 
discursive constructions, and paralinguistic devices. Examples of each will be 
presented and a case made that each discursive practice serves an avoidant function. 
2.1 Understatement 
The first way in which clients attempt to reduce an expression of the affect associated 
with their symptoms is by using low-impact words or descriptions of their experience. 
Consider the following examples in which clients "correct" the therapist's use of 
stronger adjectives: 
Example AD790-5 
790 T. And, did you feel terrified ? 
791 C. Don't know if terrified is the right word 
792 T. Erm, what would be ? 
793 C: erm (10.4) uneasy I think would be more, more descriptive of how I felt 
794 really. I wasn't terrified. I was just, like, when I realised that I could have 
795 died, it was just like I, you know, stepped back 
Example AD518-20 
518 T. 
- 
So you don't [feel quite as safe as 
519 C. [comfortable 
520 T. [might have been used to feel 
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Example RW148-56 
148 T: You can feel the pressure of him () of his knees or (. ) 
149 C. Of just being ()of just the sensation of O of O sort of being O like locked 
150 T: Mmhm mmhm 
151 C. My legs not being able to move () but that' no () (inaudible) 
152T. (inaudible) Where are you knees () are they sort ()jammed together, or are they 
153 jammed apart? 
154 C. No they're sort of apart, cos he's gone like that 
155 T: He's got his knees in between yours 
156 C. Don't know () um () 
In each of these examples, the clients react as if the therapist has overstated their 
experience, in the first two examples in terms of the client's feelings and in the second 
with regard to the level of violence of the rape, with the client rejecting words with 
the connotation of force. This results in a negotiation of the words appropriate to the 
situation, and so the meaning of the experience. In the following two examples, the 
client uses low-key descriptors of thoughts and feelings: 
Example AD386-8 
386 C: and I, lour know, that, that gives me a little reminder of you know what 
38 happened, but apart from that I just, I say I just, trl and get on with it and 
JSS T: 
k i/1'C'.... 
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389 C. I just get a little bit nervous cos they come in on the lorry and you have to 
390 pick them up on the crane 
391 T. Um 
Example AD246-8 
246 T. How did you feel when you went out ? 
247 C. (3.0) Uncomfortable 
248 T: Um-hum 
So the ways in which clients use and negotiate the language of their feelings enables 
them to construct their experience as less than traumatic. As seen from the above 
examples, in each case the therapist accepts these constructions and responds by not 
challenging them and so tacitly accepts the less affect-laden language. Use of 
understatement can, therefore, be regarded as a successful strategy by which clients 
move the therapeutic conversation away from an exploration of distressing feelings, 
thus constituting what is described here as an avoidant strategy. 
2.2 Normalising discursive constructions 
Normalising discursive constructions refer to particular constructions of events in 
which clients seek to position their behaviour or reaction to events as normal, thus 
avoiding an expression of the affect associated with construing their behaviour in 
terms of the pathological sequelae of traumatic events. Clients sought to normalise 
through any of three normalising constructions, those of "luck", "caution" and "being 
glad". Two examples of each of the first two constructions are given here. The third, 
"being glad" construction pertains to the transcript of HG (from which direct 
quotations from this transcript are not included due to issues of confidentiality - see 
Chapter 5). 
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In the construction of "caution", the client describes his slower and more tentative 
behaviour at work since his industrial accident as an appropriate and sensible 
precaution: 
Example AD395-400 
395 C. And when it gets to that part I'm like, OK, be really careful here and it's like 
396 it's, it's I don't suppose it's a bad thing that I'm more careful now because the 
397 way I was before, I was like, I suppose you'd say I was quite blase about the 
398 job I'm doing 
399 T. " Um 
400 C: But after an accident I suppose it's the way you are, you're twice as careful 
Example AD438-441 
438 C: Well at work it's like, oh come on give us a lift with this and like come on, 
439 you know, you're taking too long, get over here 
440 T. 
- 
Um 
4--11 C: and it's like I'm being that little bit extra careful 
In the above examples, the client positions himself as a safe and cautious worker since 
the accident, rather than as nervous or fearful. Similarly, in his lucky" construction, 
the client describes himself as "lucky" with regard to the accident he experienced. 
Using this "lucky" construction, the client positions himself as a person who has 
experienced extreme luck, rather than someone who has undergone a terrifying and 
traumatic ordeal. This construction is used when he is speaking of his close shave 
with death, as in the following two examples: 
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Example AD318-21 
318 C. And it was, it was lucky that I was holding the steel frame that had mesh on 
319 it, really otherwise I'd have, you know 
320 T: That protected you from a lot of it 
321 C. Yeah. Yeah, otherwise I don't think I would have been here, but 
Example AD78-85 
78 C: I enjoy the work I do, 
79 T: Um 
80 C: Otherwise I, I wouldn't still be there. It's, I mean, day to day you're reminded 
81 of how lucky I was, working with the heavy weights that I am it's, so day to 
82 day, I'm, like I'm, you know, just glad I'm here really. It's er, but it's er, some 
83 days are better than others. It's, you do get days when you think why am I 
84 here, cos, you know no-one seems to care what happened to you. It's like you 
85 should be doing this easily and it's, it's not like that, it's, I dunno, I suppose 
86 they don't really know what it's like, 
The constructions of luck and caution each enable the client to construct realities in 
which he positions himself as both lucky with regard to the outcome of the traumatic 
incident and appropriately cautious with regard to his changed behaviour following 
the event. These constructions serve to normalise his behaviour and feelings 
following the traumatic event and so reduce the expression of affect associated with 
memories of it. While these two constructions were particular to one client, a second 
client HG also deployed a similar "glad" discursive construction in which negative 
events and feelings were construed positively, normalising distressing events and 
feelings and so serving the same function, namely that of reducing the expression of 
negative affect. 
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The validity of the claim that these normalising constructions serve an avoidant 
function can be tested by "validation through next turn". In each of these cases the 
therapist becomes engaged in the clients' positioning. This is illustrated in the 
following example of the therapist's response to the construction of luck. in which the 
therapist reinforces the client's normalising of his injuries and close brush with death: 
Example AD320 
320 T. That protected you from a lot of it 
and in the following examples of the therapist's responses to the discourse of caution: 
Example AD401 
401 T. Sure, and there's nothing wrong with being careful of course 
Example AD445-8 
445 T: So it sounds like you're telling me look, obviously it's difficult for you being 
-1-46 at work because of what happened 
447 C: Um 
448 T. and one way you deal with it is just to be a bit careful now, 
Example AD552-4 
552 T You're taking the precautions that you need 
553 C: Um 
554 T: to be able to cope with being there 
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The above examples demonstrate the effectiveness of these constructions in engaging 
the therapist in normalising the clients' experience. The therapists respond by 
reinforcing the constructions rather than pursuing any feelings of distress. The 
conversation is, therefore, diverted away from painful emotional material, and so this 
process provides support for the fact that the clients' normalising discursive 
constructions constitute an avoidant strategy. 
However, there are some occasions on which the therapist does not respond by 
engaging in the construction and it is important to consider these deviant cases, which 
at first appear to disconfirm the claim. Consider the following two examples in 
which, in response to the client's introduction of the construction of luck, the therapist, 
rather than engaging in the discourse, instead focuses on painful thoughts and 
feelings: 
Example AD777-81 
777 C. Before the accident, no. When I, while I was in hospital and when I saw 
778 myself I, I realised how lucky I was and I could have 
779 T: There was, there was a point at which you realised 
780 C: Yeah 
781 T. your life had been in danger if you like 
Example AD 148-56 
148 C: (3.2) 1 have, have feelings like I'm, I'm so lucky because when I went back to 
149 work they they (laughs) they still had where I was crushed chalked on the 
150 floor because they had, they had to have an investigation team 
151 T: U in, [(inaudible) 
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152 C: [so when I walked in I came and I see on the floor, and it 1vas like, and 
153 when I see what fell on me as well, I was just amazed that I'm still here really, 
154 it's just, um 
155 T: What did you feel, physically, when you saw that, you know, chalk mark on 
156 the floor? 
In each of the above examples, the therapist focuses on the client's feelings or 
thoughts which may "lie behind" the normalising. So, in these cases, the discourses 
are not effective in engaging the therapist in a normalising of the experience and a 
moving away from expressions of affect. This initially appears to provide 
disconfirmatory evidence that the normalising constructions serve an avoidant 
function. However, the above two examples differ from the earlier examples in one 
main respect. There is evidence that, in these examples, "luck" is being used 
specifically as a euphemism for the way the client felt at particularly distressing 
points after the accident, namely when confronted with his mortality and his closeness 
to death. In the above examples, the client's descriptions of his realisation of how 
lucky he had been to survive the accident occur at the points at which he might be 
expected to be experiencing fear or distress. As it is used at these particular points in 
his account, it is possible that "luck" is used to describe a sense of distress at the 
realisation of his proximity to death. This results in the therapist attempting to reflect 
the painful feelings behind the euphemism, as illustrated in the following example: 
Example AD163-7 
163 T: So a mixture of feelings. Feeling relieved that, you know, you're here 
164 C. That's right 
165 T: But also, that horrible feeling "oh my god, I could have died" 
166 C. Um (3.4) and what if I wasn't there I'd be my normal self and, you know, it's a 
16- lot of thins 
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In the other examples the client is using the normalising constructions in a more 
general manner at various points in the account, which may more easily engage the 
therapist, whereas in the above examples the client is referring to his feelings at 
particular points of realisation which may alert the therapist to the possibility that it is 
used as a euphemism, hence the reflection of affect. 
Clients, therefore, use normalising constructions to avoid exploration of painful 
emotional material and are effective in engaging the therapist in these discursive 
practices until they use them more specifically, as a euphemism for painful feelings 
relating to specific events, in which case the therapist addresses the feelings behind 
the euphemism. 
2.3 Paralinguistic devices 
The third way in which clients seek to "lighten" their experience is by their use of 
laughter, overlapping speech and lowered voice utterances. 
2.3.1 Use of laughter 
Laughter is used at points of the expression of painful emotional material to reduce 
the expression of affect and so move away from a conversation about the painful 
emotions. Consider the following examples in which clients laugh when they are 
speaking of distressing past experiences. 
Example RW54-9 
54 C. He's ()sort of like getting on the bed ()sort of like mmm sort of getting over me 
55 sort of 
56 T. mmmm 
57C. () but again, again not threatening there's no () there's no threat 
58 T: nnmhmm 
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59 C: () It's bizarre (laughter) arr 
Example HP653-5 
653 C: so my girlfriends go up and down that road all the time. When they saw that, 
65 4 they hadn't heard about the accident, they thought something had happened 
655 (laughs) to my dad. It was just all a nightmare. 
Example AD288-9 
288 C: and my face was just a mess really, you know it's, it's, it wasn't me, it's, and 
289 my mum said how much of a mess I looked (laughs) I looked and er, 
Example AD774-5 
774 T: Did you think that your life was in danger ? 
775 C. (laughs) What, before the accident or 
In each of the above examples, the laughter occurs at the specific points at which 
clients refer to difficult and distressing events associated with their traumatic 
experiences, including death, injury and abuse. It can be assumed, due to the nature 
of the events described, that the explanation for laughter at these points is not a result 
of the client finding amusement in the subject under discussion. This suggests that 
the laughter is a device by which clients seek to "lighten" the discussion and avoid 
exploration of "heavier" distressing feelings, albeit spontaneous rather than 
considered. 
?. 3.2 Overlapping, speech 
Overlapping speech is used to mask words related to the trauma. For example. clients 
1?? 
interrupt the therapist when the issue of death or life-threatening illness is raised: 
Example HP838-42 
838 T. " Yes. So she may have found out quite late in the day. Um, how long before 
839 she died did they make the diagnosis that [(inaudible) 
840 C: [Well, they couldn't find the 
841 diagnosis. She'd been for months and months. In the end they had to give her 
842 a biopsy, 
Example HP480-1 
480 T. So you got the phone call did you, telling you [(inaudible) 
481 C: [From my dad 
In the above examples, the clients talk over the therapist as he or she begins to 
mention distressing events. This has two effects. Firstly, the therapists' words 
become inaudible, enabling the client to avoid hearing the words associated with 
death. Secondly the therapist stops talking while the client takes over the dialogue. 
The interruption, therefore, gives the control of the conversation back to the client, 
who can then proceed at his or her own pace and choice of language and agenda. 
2.3.3 Lowered voiced utterances 
Similarly, clients lower their voice (denoted by speech contained within 00) when 
referring to death or serious illness: 
Example HP455-8 
45 5 C: And I just, leel that you know like you get phone calls about death or 
456 whatever. um you hear on the telephone or something, "oh so and so's died 
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457 or whatever, I'm just always in the front, in the front line of everything 
458 happening. 
Example HP511-3 
511 C: here, we've only just got to be with [name of GP], we changed and er, he'd 
512 been gone, evidently he'd been going to the doctors saying 'I've had these chest 
513 pains really bad and um they were doing all the tests" 
Example HP515-8 
515 C. "said there's nothing wrong with him" 
516 T: Um 
517 C. 'And then he had a heart attack. Everything (inaudible) he went there six 
518 times" 
In the above examples, the clients lower their voice when speaking of death and 
serious illness. Although they do not, in these instances, entirely avoid speaking of 
the painful material, they refer to it in such a way as to keep it "low key", a sort of 
"half saying", and so a way of avoiding expressing fully the memories and associated 
feelings of distress, through lack of emphasis. 
However, it could be argued that lowering the voice in this way draws attention to 
what is being said, as in the commonly used dramatic device of lowering the voice to 
command an audience's attention. It is possible that clients are seeking to ensure the 
attention of the listener. However, if this were the case, it would be expected that 
clients would lower their voice at various points throughout the transcript and not 
only when speaking of death or illness. A more likely explanation is that the clients 
speak of these distressing incidents more quietly than normal in order to soften and so 
minimise their impact on the conversation. 
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So, although the devices of laughter, overlapping speech and lowered voice utterances 
may not always directly constitute complete avoidance of painful material, they may 
enable the client to "soften" or reduce the expression of affect associated with the 
traumatic experience and so enable the client to gain some control over the pace of the 
conversation and the direction of the agenda. The use of overlapping speech and 
lowered voice utterances is summarised in the following example in which the client 
uses both in combination in response to the therapist's introduction of the subject of 
self-harm: 
Example NL419-24 
419 T: So you didn't have a temper before, all you used to do was 
420 C: [(coughs) 
421 T. [Hurt yourself 
422 C: (sniffs) "Cut' 
423 T. Cut yourself 
42-I C: "Yeah" 
The client effectively controls the pace of the conversation through a combination of 
interruption and lowered voice utterances. 
3 Avoidant discursive practices used by therapists 
So far, the discussion has centred on the strategies adopted by clients that result in an 
avoidance of an exploration of painful material. However. what is of particular 
interest is that there are numerous occasions on which it is the therapist who seeks to 
reduce the negative affect expressed. In fact, many of the avoidant discursive 
I2 
practices identified pertained to the ways in which the therapist moves the 
conversation away from the clients' emotional material. These include negotiating the 
language of traumatic experience, changing the subject away from feelings, oblique 
reference to trauma and focusing on the positive, including solicitation of expressions 
of the effectiveness of therapy. 
3.1 Negotiating the language of traumatic experience 
There are occasions on which the therapist uses less powerful descriptions of feelings 
than those of the client, and the client reacts as if the therapist has understated his or 
her feelings. Consider the following examples: 
Example HP557-9 
557 C: Ahh, just all nerves, everything was just [everything 
558 T. [Really jittery 
559 C. Ahh, more than that 
Example HP302-10 
3 02 C. [I had 
303 continuous heart-rate, a terrible heart-rate. Um, it felt like my body was going 
30-1 all day long with heart. What is that, I don't know. 
305 T: Erm yes (inaudible) like your heart was fluttering 
306 C: Not fluttering, it was just moving too fast, you know like you've just done a 
307 mad run 
308 T (inaudible) just pounding 
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309 C: All the time. Never calm down in the day. I was laying on the settee, please 
310 try and relax. Relaxing's worse for it. 
In the above examples, the clients respond with stronger descriptions of symptoms 
than those used by the therapist, substituting more graphic accounts for the therapists' 
words and so reacting as if the therapist has understated their experience. In this way. 
the level of affect expressed is regulated via the construction of the language and the 
descriptors used with regard to the client's experience. 
One explanation for this process is that the therapist has genuinely underestimated the 
extent of the client's distress, rather than is seeking to minimise it. However, even if 
this is the case, it is clear that the therapist uses language that has lower impact than 
that of the client. It is, therefore, the therapist who is moving away from an 
expression of strong emotions, with the client responding with stronger descriptions 
of negative feelings and so this can be regarded as an avoidant strategy on the part of 
the therapist, albeit unwitting. However, this practice was observed only on these 
two occasions, with clients' understatement occurring more frequently. Therapists' 
avoidance tended to involve alternative discursive practices as follows: 
3.2 Changing the subject away from feelings 
Another way in which the therapist attempts to move the conversation away from the 
client's emotion is by changing the subject when the client expresses distress, as 
illustrated in the following examples: 
Example RH 17-23 
17 C. Um he spoke to [name of Social Worker] when I was on the phone to her, erm 
18 snatched the phone, pushed me off the bed, um and yeah I just had to call the 
19 police cos he was going to kill me. 
20 T. So this is [name of Social 1W'orker] your social worker 
21 C: Yeah, she is now, cos she wasn't before. She 'vas just somebody that tiw'as. I 
127 
22 could talk to 
23T: Um 
Example RH237-44 
237 C: Um (5.7) these last few weeks have just been pure hell really 
238 T. 
- 
So are you saying the [client's name] of, of the past would have wanted to go 
239 out, would want to do things, would want to socialise, 
240 C: Um 
241 T: be with people 
242 C. Um 
243 T: And now it's different 
24-I C. Um (5.7) yeah 
Examtile RH263-6 
263 C. [Um. (5.7) 1 don't know, [therapist's name], perhaps I'm just going mad 
26-4 (inaudible) 
265 T Um, voll mention there about feeling safe 
266 C: Um 
In each of the above examples, the therapist responds to expressions of the clients' 
distress by focusing on some other aspect of the situation and so moving away from 
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the distress, avoiding the clients' affect-laden material. The therapist's changing of the 
subject functions to enable him or her to avoid dealing with the client's distressing 
accounts and serves to reduce the affect expressed in the session. In terms of 
"validation through next turn", the fact that the clients respond monosyllabically, not 
actively engaging in the therapists' discourse, provides evidence for the fact that the 
clients' agenda has been moved away from. Clients may also respond to the 
therapists' change of subject by reasserting their distress, resulting in resuming control 
of the agenda, as in the following example: 
Example RH37-42 
37 C. Yeah and um he was going to prepared to do, to do life for me, which I have 
38 heard before 
3 9T Um 
40 C: but he was, no I don't know whether he'd been drinking. What I know is that it 
41 was awful, it was really awful and [Social Worker], well she just couldn't 
42 believe what I have been subjected to. She's had first hand from my mum, 
The responses of the clients to the therapists' change of subject provides support for 
the notion that the function of the therapists' discursive behaviour is to move away 
from the clients' affect-laden material. 
However, there is one occasion on which the therapist changes the subject after 
having actively elicited an emotional response from the client. This would seem to 
contradict the claim that therapists are avoiding addressing the clients' emotion: 
Example AD298-308 
298 T: So your e saying that one of the things that's been most difficult for you is 
299 actually that period in hospital where you saw the damage that had been 
300 C: Um 
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301 T done to your face and it felt well that's not me, it felt 
302 C: Um 
303 T strange 
304 C: Yeah 
305 T. So can you tell me, I know you've described this probably a million times for 
306 the insurance people and everything. 
307 C: Um 
308 T. Can you tell me what actually happened in the accident ? 
The fact that the therapist has attempted to initiate an exploration of feelings about the 
client's facial injuries, suggests that she is not attempting to avoid expressions of 
affect and this is inconsistent with her moving away from subject subsequently. 
While this may seem an apparently deviant case, the fact that the client responds 
monosyllabically to the therapist's attempted exploration supports the notion that the 
therapist has introduced an area which the client is unwilling to explore and so the 
therapist's change of subject can be understood as a response to the client's lack of 
engagement. Evidence for this process is provided by the client's comments 
immediately prior to the above passage: 
Example AD291-7 
291 C: [No, that's right and er, I'm glad they didn't, cos they was 
292 going to take photos for the, um, for the um insurance and 
293 T.: Yes, ryes 
294 C: And I'm glad they didn't in the end because. I think I would have been 
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295 tempted to look at them and I think that would have made it worse actually 
296 T. 
" Um 
297 C. looking back at er what I looked like but 
The client describes his desire at the time not to think about how his face looked after 
the accident, and this is consistent with his lack of elaboration about it when the 
therapist attempts to pursue his past injuries. The client is, therefore, avoiding 
exploring this area, and the therapist's change of subject may be seen as a sensitive 
reaction to this. This initially apparently deviant case can, therefore, be incorporated 
into a revised hypothesis that the therapist changes the subject to avoid affect when it 
is the client who has introduced the emotional material. 
3.3 Oblique reference to trauma 
A process was identified in which both the client and therapist engaged together in an 
avoidance of the traumatic material. Several occasions were identified in which 
clients and therapists refer obliquely to the trauma and the clients' traumatic 
memories, without mentioning them directly, hinting at underlying worries or 
concerns, as follows. 
Example RH 187-97 
18 7 C: I could be anywhere I could now be anywhere and something will come back 
188 to me 
189 T: (9.1) And this is a memory that you haven't 
190 C: Um, these are, these are things that I have remembered but then I remember 
191 something that goes with it 
192 T: Right 
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193 C: or it could be something new or, I know, I know it's not in my mind, 
194 T: Um 
195 C: um 
196 T. (6.7) So it's like the memory comes back, or a more de', more detail of a 
197 memory and then because of that coming back it's so distressing you start crying. 
Example NL 140-9 
140 C: Well blotting, erm blotting everything out again, that's all I can make of it 
141 anyway (sniffs) 
142 T: So when you say blotting it all out again it's almost as if you're saying well 
143 that's why I first started drinking six years ago 
14-1 C: (sniffs) Yeah 
1-15 T: To blot things out 
1-16 C: Yeah 
147 T. 
- 
Right (3.6) So the the alcohol serves that purpose of blotting out 
148 C: Yeah everything 
149 T: Right 
Example RH290-9 
290 C: (3.5) I don't know, um (4.? ). It tit"as like having a friend there realhv I 
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291 suppose, it was a painkiller 
292 T. Yes 
293 C. Cos er it was oblivion I suppose, it's a way of er shutting everything off 
294 T. Right 
295 C: Which is what I was doing, shutting everything away 
296 T. It's almost as if, today you're talking about 
297 C: (Coughs) 
298 T. Determined not to drink 
299 C: Um 
In the above examples clients refer obliquely to the trauma, through reference to 
difficult memories or to dysfunctional coping strategies to deal with them, without 
actually disclosing the content of the memories. Rather than explore the content of 
the memories, the therapist talks around the issue, addressing the fact of the memories 
and the dreams and the function of the drinking, rather than the content of the 
memories, themselves. In this way the actual content of the distressing memories is 
not addressed directly, with the focus on the surrounding issues rather than the trauma 
itself. The client and therapist appear to be engaged jointly in a dialogue in which a 
full exploration of the past trauma is avoided. 
However, an alternative explanation is that it is the therapist who is being avoidant 
because it is the client who has introduced the traumatic material to the conversation, 
albeit obliquely, as illustrated in the following example in which the client introduces 
her w orrying dreams: 
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Example NL30-8 
30 C: (3.4) And I think I'm dreaming about everything that's worrying me 
31 T: Right 
32 C. I think 
33 T: So everything that's on your mind that's worrying you 
34 C: Yeah 
35 T: You're dreaming about that 
36 C: Yeah (sniffs) it's er 
37 T: (6.9) Has the dreaming recently started or 
38 C: Yeah 
It is possible that the client is seeking permission to speak of the abuse, indeed hinting 
at the content of her dreams, while the therapist continues to refer obliquely to the 
trauma, rather than facilitate an exploration of it. As it is the client who has 
introduced the subject, albeit indirectly, it is the reaction of the therapist that shapes 
the subsequent dialogue, enabling the content of the trauma to be circumlocuted. The 
therapist chooses to pursue the symptoms of the trauma, rather than the traumatic 
material itself and so directs the conversation away from the emotional material. The 
notion that it is the therapist who is avoiding exploring the abuse is supported by 
examples in which the client directly introduces the content of the traumatic material: 
Example RH138-53 
138 C: There ivas an incident when we were abroad and um I was (3.2) I suppose I 
139 was about seven and my, fäther tied my hands together to the back of the bed 
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140 T. Yes 
141 C: Um. I don't know whether that's got anything to do with it 
142 T. Right 
143 C: (3.7) But the more, the more things that are coming out the more I feel like 
144 drinking 
145 T. Yes 
146 C: because it's er, um, pain, pain 
147 T: So it's painful 
148 C: Yeah 
149 T. to have these 
150 C. " Um 
151 T: traumatic [horrible 
152 C: [um 
153 T. memories 
This supports the view that oblique reference to the abuse facilitates avoidance and 
that this avoidance is on the part of the therapist and not the client. This 
circumlocution on the part of the therapist is more marked when contrasted with 
examples in which the therapist encourages the client to explore the content of the 
abuse, as in the following example: 
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Example RW103-10 
103 T. 
" He he's, more over you on the bed he's sort of 
104 C: Yah, um over me but sort of back here because he's (her voice lowers)undoing 
105 my trousers 
106 T: mmhmm 
107 C: But I've go my top on () he doesn't do anything with that it's not lifted up or 
108 taken off or anything it's left on, it's just trousers and () ah () (lowers voice) () 
109 knickers down and I've still got my shoes on (laughter) 
110 T. So ca can you actually feel him doing this? 
In the above example, the therapist prompts the client to continue describing the 
content of the traumatic memories, resulting in a detailed exploration of the episode of 
abuse. It is the client who then terminates the discussion: 
Example RW 187-90 
187 T: He said that? () Is that what he said to you, it won't hurt? 
188 C: This is not going to hurt, this won't hurt () Whoo (laughs) 
189 T: Are you alright? 
190 C: () Can we stop there for a minute 
So when the therapist encourages the client to speak directly of the content of the 
abuse, moving away from oblique referencing, it is the client who regulates the 
expression of affect by eventually seeking a break from describing the memories. 
Focusing directly on abuse leads the client to express affect, whereas oblique 
reference to abuse prevents this. This supports the claim that oblique reference to 
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trauma is a way in which therapists seek to avoid affect, as the extent of the clients' 
exploration of the trauma can be influenced by the response of the therapist 
Furthermore, in terms of "validation through next turn", there is some evidence to 
suggest that, where therapists have referred only obliquely to the trauma, clients react 
as if the therapist has discouraged them from exploring it. Consider the following 
responses to the therapists' oblique reference to the past trauma: 
Example RH 156-64 
156 T: (7.4) So, how do you think you're going to be able to deal with these horrible 
157 memories 
158 C: Don't know 
159 T. " °Right° 
160 C: I don't know, [therapist's name] (3.7) 1 can't just say to myself oh it was in 
161 the past, it was years ago, um and forget about it because I can't do that which 
162 is what some people have said, but then others have said well no you can't 
163 forget it 
164 T: Um 
Example RH321-5 
3'21 T: and now you're saying, but why did it happen 
322 C. Yeah 
323 T. 'Yes'' 
. . 
-bnd I don't see how anyhociv can 
forget things like that. Perhaps they can, 3? 
-4 C. - 
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325 perhaps it is, perhaps I am wallowing in self pit3', but I don't think I am 
In each case, the clients respond as if the therapist has attempted to minimise the pain 
of their distressing memories and their associated negative thoughts and emotions by 
suggesting that they forget the past trauma. This provides further support that the 
therapist is avoidant with regard to addressing the trauma, as the clients appear to be 
inviting the therapist to allow them to explore it by introducing the subject, albeit 
tentatively and indirectly, and speak as if they experience the therapists' response as 
not enabling them to do so. 
So, the oblique references to the abuse serve to enable an avoidance of an exploration 
of the content of the trauma, resulting in circumlocution of the traumatic material and 
so an avoidance of the associated expressions of affect. This process was observed 
only in relation to those clients who had experienced childhood sexual abuse, and so 
may be a discursive strategy particular to therapy sessions with survivors of abuse, 
rather than to clients with PTSD in general. 
3.4 Focusing on the positive 
Therapists frequently respond to their clients' expression of negative affect by 
focusing on the positive aspects of the client's situation or by construing the clients' 
distressing accounts in positive terms, thus moving away from the clients' agenda and 
avoiding the expression of negative affect in the session. Consider the therapist's 
response to the assertion that " it has been horrendous" (485): 
Example RH497-504 
497 T. " (7.5) But it almost sounds a (inaudible) it almost sounds as if you now 
-198 experience life [without alcohol 
499 C: [Um hum 
500 T. and thinking hack to what you were saying earlier on you're determined not to 
501 drink, its almost as if you started 
I -8 
502 C: Um 
503 T. along the path as it were 
504 C: Um 
and a description of a panic attack experienced on a train home from work: 
Example HP285-91 
285 C: and I did, erm all the journeys and on Friday night, the tenth journey home 
286 last week, I had a panic attack (laughs). 
287 T: OK and was that something that went on for a long time, like the, the earlier 
288 panic attacks you described or was that shorter ? 
289 C: Oh, they're shorter, and they've, as I say, they, they've, once a week maybe, 
290 not three a day 
291 T: OK so that's quite a lot [better 
In response to the clients' expressions of distress, the therapist chooses to focus on 
positive aspects of the situation, rather than explore the distressing feelings 
themselves. In this way, the therapists' positive focus serves to move the discourse 
away from the client's pain and onto less affect-laden areas, enabling the therapist to 
pursue his or her own agenda rather than stay with that of the client. 
3.4.1 Therapist 's solicitation of expression of effectiveness of therapy 
A specific way, in which the therapist seeks to focus on the positive aspects of the 
client's situation is by soliciting positive expressions from the client with regard to his 
or her progress. as in the following examples: 
1 39 
Example NL333-42 
333 T: (12.6) So you were saying to my question about what has created this change 
334 in you, you said coming here and talking about the issues presumably 
335 C: Yeah 
336 T: and er also attending the group as well 
33 7 C. Yeah (11.0) the support's helped me 
338 T: Right 
339 C: (6.5) because when I'm drinking now, I don't drink to the extent of what I did 
340 before 
341 T: Right 
342 C. apart from that day, I smashed the bedroom 
Example HP318-23 
318 C: When I'm trying to relax and it's going so fast I'm like this, all the time, trying 
319 to slow down, cos they gave me that Diazepam, for a little while 
320 T: Um. Did that help? 
321 C. Yeah, but then I started panicking through them. They did when I was really 
322 desperate because I'd never had any tablets before, um, that first one was like 
323 heaven because it made me actually have, er, you knoll,, lay down and sleep 
It would appear that the therapist is seeking positive strokes for his effectiveness. 
moving away from the client's agenda to his own, thus avoiding the clients' 
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expressions of distress. It could be argued that the therapist is simply reflecting what 
the client has said and seeking clarification, rather than attempting to avoid emotional 
material. However, the reaction of the clients, namely reiterating their distress, 
suggests that the therapist has moved away from their agenda. Furthermore, one 
occasion was identified in which the client reacted as if a particular response to the 
positive focus was expected: 
Example NL443-51 
443 T: So you started to come here and you started reducing the number of times you 
444 harmed yourself 
445 C: Yeah 
446 T. (8.9) So what does that tell you 
44 7 C: (5.0) finding myself, I don't know, what do you mean ? 
448 T. No no, so you you're saying that you're finding yourself 
449 C: Yeah 
450 T: °Um-hum° 
-151 C. Though, sometimes it, erm, when I drink, I'm not myself 
The client's reaction to the therapist's question provides support for the notion that the 
function of the therapist's utterance is to seek a specific response of progress, as this is 
the way in which the client appears to understand it. After replying tentatively, the 
client goes on to remind him of her current drinking behaviour. In this way she resists 
a positive admission of the helpfulness of the therapy. while reasserting her ongoing 
distress, and so regains control of the agenda 
The therapists' positive focus can. therefore, be regarded as an avoidant strategy on 
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the part of the therapist in that an attempt is made to move the conversation to a more 
optimistic and upbeat tone. Furthermore, the therapist's solicitations of expression of 
progress function to elicit "strokes" from the client with regard to their professional 
effectiveness, and so serve to move away from the client's needs in order to address 
those of the therapist, again avoiding expressions of negative affect. 
An alternative explanation is that the positive focus, rather than being an avoidant 
strategy is, in fact, a function of the therapists' more solution focused approach to 
work with the client, and so may reflect the particular orientation of the therapist 
rather than an attempt to avoid painful material. However, the notion that focusing in 
this way serves the function of moving away from the clients' agenda and thus 
constitutes an avoidant strategy is evident from the variety of responses that this 
discursive practice elicits from the clients. These responses will be discussed here. 
4 Clients' responses to therapists' avoidant strategies 
Clients respond to this re-focusing in either of two ways, namely disengaging or 
reasserting negative affect. Each of these responses will be dealt with in turn and 
used to provide support for the claim that therapists avoid clients' negative affect. 
4.1 Clients' "disengaging" response to therapists' positive focus 
One way in which clients respond to therapists' positive focus is to answer briefly and 
monosyllabically, as illustrated by the following examples: 
Example RH370-80 
370 C. It's a bit sad, really, that I should be having to go through this at thirty-two 
371 and I've nothing else better to think about 
37? 
-L 'm, and I'm just thinking back to our session todai and it's almost as if the 
3 "3 emotions and, feelings that ww care there are now coming to the fore and you are 
3; now thinking about them, 1/: vou like, in detail 
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3 75 C: Um 
376 T: for the first time 
3 77 C: Yeah, um 
378 T. 
" and so that's why I'm questioning what you're saying about it's really pathetic 
379 isn't it, because maybe for the first time (4.6) feelings are coming out 
380 C: Um 
Example HP429-37 
429 T: Well, we can certainly talk some more about the physical symptoms you get 
430 when you get panic attacks. 
431 C: Yeah 
J32 T: and the good news is that there are things we can do to help you, get you 
433 know, reduce those panic attacks or, or you know, actually get rid of them 
, 
434 C: Yeah 
435 T: and I'd certainly be prepared to explain to you what's going on, work through 
436 those things. 
43 7 C: Yeah 
Example NL307-16 
307 C: Onlly critical comments (sflif f s) to try to put me, you know (9.2) but Igo 
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308 against that 
309 T: Right 
310 C: For my own benefit 
311 T. So it almost sounds as if you're now thinking about your needs 
312 C: Yeah 
313 T: And perhaps in the past you haven't 
314 C. °Um° 
315 T: thought about them. 
316 C: (sniffs) 
The clients, in effect, resist an engagement with the therapists' up-beat agenda by 
responding monosyllabically and not taking up the optimistic discourse. In this way 
monosyllables such as "um" or "yeah", although implying agreement, when used in 
succession, function as "disengagers", enabling the client to avoid entering into the 
therapist's agenda. This may, therefore, reflect a passive going along with the 
therapist by the client rather than an active agreement and provides support for the 
notion that the clients' agenda has been moved away from and so is being avoided by 
the therapist. 
However, the passive nature of this response enables the therapist to control the 
conversation, moving away from the clients' expression of distress and pursuing his 
or her own agenda. The impact on the therapy of this process is that an exploration of 
negative emotions is effectively curtailed. So, one «-ay in which the therapist's 
positive focus impacts on the therapy is that it results in the client deploying 
monosyllabic "disengagers" which, while allowing the client to disengage from the 
therapists' discourse. also effectively enable the therapist to control the agenda and to 
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move away from the client's expression of affect. So the clients' responses to the 
therapists' positive focus provide support for the notion that the process of introducing 
an optimistic discourse serves an avoidant function on the part of the therapist. 
4.2 Clients' reassertion of affect in response to therapists' positive focus 
The second of the two responses to the therapist's positive focus involves a reassertion 
by the client of his or her distress and enables the client to return to his or her own 
agenda. Clients initially report agreement with the therapist, as in the above 
examples, but then, unlike the above examples, revert to an exploration of their pain 
and distress. This enables the clients to regain control of the agenda and to continue 
exploring their distress. Consider the following examples, the first of which follows 
the therapist's solicitation of progress from the client, from example NL307-16 above: 
Example NL328-32 
328 C: (7.3) and I'm only going to waste if I don't do something 
329 T: You said that in a very determined way 
330 C. 'Yeah". (6.9) but I still cannot cannot pack anything, 
331 T: No 
332 C: Silly thing like that, you know (4.8) (sniffs) (sighs) 
Example HP291-6 
291 T. OK so that's quite a lot [better 
292 C: [Oh yeah I know it's, I know I'm much better. I mean I 
293 was complete/ y, everybody 
. 
just couldn't look at me I ii as so ill looking, and I 
294 1vc'nt down to under eight stone 
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295 T: So you've lost weight 
296 C. Couldn't eat over Christmas. Food, having a bath caused me panic. 
Example RH505-9 
505 T: and as you said earlier on that you're not going to drink 
506 C: Um 
507 T: What do you think that's about 
508 C: (9.0) 1 don't know (9.7) 'don't know° (9.4) it's just been sheer torture really 
509 and I can't see a light at the end of the tunnel at the moment 
In the above examples, the clients respond to the therapists' focus on the positive 
aspects of their situation by actively reasserting the extent of their distress, countering 
or indeed balancing the therapists' positivity with an account of their negative 
emotions. The client reacts as if the therapist is minimising his or her distress. This 
is a frequently observed pattern in the transcripts and suggests that the therapist is 
positively reframing the experience of the client and so reducing the expression of 
negative emotions in the session. This can result in a conversational "tussle" between 
the client and the therapist in which each attempts to frame the situation in their own 
terms, with the therapist focusing on the positive aspects of the client's situation and 
the client re-emphasising the negative aspects and his or her ongoing distress. This 
"discursive wrestling" is neatly illustrated in the following example: 
Example NL356-64 
356 C: 1Vo. I didn't self harm 
35 ; T: Right 
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358 C. But I threw away all my stuff, all my possessions (inaudible) another form of 
359 hurt I suppose 
360 T: but is it, it's different isn't it because it's not damaging your body 
361 C: Um, no 
362 T. (4.1) And it was just your possessions was it 
363 C. Yep 
364 T That you threw about, yes 
However, one occasion was found in which the client responded to the therapist's 
positive reframing by elaborating her positive feelings: 
Example RH570-3 
570 C: Um. Oh yes, and I will do it, I will get there 
571 T: You sound really determined 
5 72 C. Oh I am now, yeah, but I have got to get stronger um, but I will get there (4.2) 
573 because I actually think now I will be good 
Although this apparently deviant case initially appears to run counter to the pattern of 
responses described, it differs from the earlier examples in respect of the client's 
initial statement of the future. In the above example, the statement which the therapist 
reflects as "determined" can, in fact, be regarded as a positive statement, which is in 
contrast to the more negative statements in the other examples. Therefore, the 
therapist's positive construal of the client's statement in example RH570-3 is 
consistent with her construal of events and so does not lead to a re-assertion of her 
distress. The therapist's reflection of her optimistic statement results in positive 
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engagement from the client 
So, while the above example initially appears to challenge the claim that clients 
respond to therapists' positive focusing by not engaging with the positive discourse, it 
differs in respect of the therapist reflecting a positive statement from the client rather 
than framing statements of clients' distress in positive ways. So, although this 
example initially appears to contradict the claim, it can be considered as providing 
support for the pattern of responding. 
In summary, the clients' responses support the hypothesis that, when therapists 
attempt to reframe clients' negative feelings by focusing on the positive aspects of the 
situation, the client does not engage in the positive discourse and either responds 
monosyllabically, resulting in a curtailing of an exploration of his or her distress, or 
else reasserts his or her distress, enabling the negative discourse to continue. Indeed 
in some cases they might do both, as illustrated in the following example: 
Example RH 171-83 
171 T. I say that because you you you had a period of er of drinking over a few years 
172 and then you stopped drinking 
173 C: Um 
17-1 T over two and a half years ago 
175 C: Um 
176 T And now you're saying you're determined that not to drink again 
1-7 C. Um 
178 T.: But what's happening is that all these memories are coming to the fore 
179 C: Um 
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180 T: again and I'm just wondering how 
181 C: How I'm dealing with it 
182 T. Yeah 
183 C: Not very well because all I do, really is I sit there and cr', all I do is cry 
The above example neatly summarises the way in which the two strategies can be 
combined, with the client deploying the disengager, "Um", until the therapist provides 
her with an opportunity to reassert her negative emotions. In this way, the clients' 
responses to the therapists' positive focus provide support for it's function, that is to 
move away from the clients' distressing or negative agenda, thus attempting to avoid 
an exploration of affect. 
5 The mediating factor in avoidance of the therapeutic setting. 
The way in which clients and therapists negotiate the agenda in order to avoid affect 
differs as a function of their disparate roles within the therapeutic dyad. This is most 
in evidence in the way in which disagreement is managed in the session. 
5.1 The manazement of disagreement 
It is notable that in none of the above examples do the clients directly disagree with 
the therapist's positive construction of events. Rather they either respond passively or 
seek to balance them with an alternative negative construction, without actually 
stating that they do not agree with what the therapist has said. Each of these 
responses operates as a more "acceptable" alternative to directly disagreeing with or 
confronting the therapist. When disagreement does occur, clients seek to "correct" or 
assuage their contradiction in order to restore equilibrium. This may be a way in 
which the client is able to regain control of the agenda without directly challenging 
the therapist and so without "breaking the rules" of the therapy session, reflecting the 
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power imbalance inherent in the roles. Consider the following examples in which the 
clients' disagreement with the therapist is immediately followed by a correction of the 
disagreement : 
Example RH79-87 
79 T: and um at the moment you're in af at that you don't feel safe in 
80 C: No. It's not that I don't feel safe in it, it's um (4.3) I suppose just being on your 
81 own having all this, I'm still looking over my shoulder 
82 T. Yes 
83 C: I know that he can't go in there 
84 T: Yes 
85C: Um 
86 T: Yes 
87 C: but I think wherever I'm going to be I'm going to be anxious 
Example RH252-4 
252 T: And er, and and perhaps maybe coming here is in a way is quite exhausting 
253 C: No because I feel safe here, Ido, Ido feel safe here, um I haven't done in the 
25-I last few, fýw meetings, but you weren't there then, um 
In the above examples, the clients mollify their initial disagreement with the therapist. 
In the first case the client softens the disagreement by distinguishing between the 
knom1'lcd v that she is safe and the. feeling of safety. providing a «-aý- in which she is 
150 
simultaneously able to agree with the therapist. in this case in terms of the latter 
definition of feelings of safety. In the second example, the client's initial 
disagreement is softened with a suggestion that the therapist is right with regard to 
some occasions of therapy. Furthermore, this enables her to attribute any negative 
effects of therapy to other facilitators and not to the current therapist, thus preserving 
the equilibrium of the therapeutic relationship. So, having broken the rules of 
therapy, clients seek to restore equilibrium by turning their disagreement into 
agreement, and behave as if they have deviated from the expected response by 
correcting the disagreement with an alleviating follow-up response. 
However, two instances were identified in which clients' disagreement with therapists' 
interpretations do not conform to this pattern of correction following disagreement. 
Each of these deviant cases will be dealt with in turn. In the first example, the 
therapist refers to the client's understanding of the onset of her symptoms: 
Example HP390-6 
390 T It was a week afterwards, what makes you say ah-ha it must have been to do 
391 with the bike um accident 
392 C: Well I don't 
393 T. But, you know, when I, when I asked you this you said well [this 
394 C. 
39.5 me 
396 T. Oh, OK /hen, 
[Cos everybody told 
Unlike the cases discussed above, there is no immediate attempt to soften the initial 
disagreement. However, the client follows this by continuing to explain: 
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Example HP397-401 
397 C. Everyone told me that was it, the doctors, everybody was droning on about it, 
398 no it's not. 
399 T. 
- 
Um, but you're saying now it is or not sure, 
-400 C. Well, I said to [GP's name] I hold my hands up after all the tests had come 
401 back, you win I said to him, you know 
So the client goes on to accept reluctantly the doctors' diagnosis and, in this way, 
eventually corrects her initial disagreement with the therapist, thus restoring 
equilibrium. This case, therefore, conforms to the pattern. However, the second 
deviant case appears to contradict the hypothesis: 
Example HP442-6 
442 T. 
- 
I'm just wondering, can you say a bit about the thoughts that you had when 
4-13 this accident happened, when this, crash happened [outside your house 
444 C. [Well, I don't think it was, I 
-4-45 mean I was so brave with my mum, because she was like, she went like a bit 
4-16 like a child, you know 
There is no obvious attempt to correct the disagreement as in all the other cases, and 
so explanation needs to be sought from the individual contingencies of the case. The 
client does, in fact, go on to qualify her disagreement, following it with the words, "I 
mean" and going on to justify and explain her position, thus softening the 
disagreement to some extent. Furthermore, a lengthy discussion of her mother's 
illness ensues (448-505), moving the conversation away from the direct area of 
disagreement, thus avoiding confrontation over this issue, and so effectively 
"softening" any disagreement. Interestingly, later, the client implies she now agrees 
that the death of the "boy" in the accident affected her emotionally: 
I; ' 
Exile HP943-5 
943 C. Well, I mean I can see it now because erm, I didn't think that had affected me 
944 cos I didn't know that boy erm and I thought with my personality I can't 
945 believe that would affect me 
and: 
Example HP958-60 
958 C: I remember when I was really really bad there maybe was it because I was 
959 panicking and I didn't want to stay in the house, but it was definitely after that 
960 boy died 
So eventually, the client reaches convergence with the therapist's view, thus restoring 
equilibrium, and so fitting the pattern of the way in which clients deal with 
disagreement. The fact that a longer time elapses before correction may be particular 
to this client. Nevertheless, agreement is ultimately achieved and so this initially 
apparently deviant case can in fact be regarded as supporting the notion that 
disagreement with the therapist is avoided or corrected. 
Therefore, the management of disagreement clearly illustrates the way in which 
avoidance is mediated through the roles and power imbalances within the therapeutic 
dyad. Clients and therapists use different strategies in order to control the agenda, and 
the ways in which avoidance is achieved is a function of role expectations. The 
operation of this process highlights the power imbalance implicit in the therapy 
session, in which the participants function according to the social expectations 
inherent within the therapeutic discourse. Avoidance of expression of negative affect 
in the session is, therefore, mediated by the context of the therapy session in terms of 
its social expectations and, in particular, the power imbalance inherent between the 
client and therapist. 
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6 Summary of findings 
In summary, a range of processes between client and therapist, which serve to reduce 
or avoid the expression of affect during therapy, has been presented. The ways in 
which each of these function within the therapeutic conversations has been outlined 
and, in each case, an argument made that their deployment serves to enable either or 
both of the dyad to reduce or avoid expressions of strong negative affect in the 
session. Three important findings emerge from the analysis. 
Firstly, both clients and therapists seek to avoid expressions of emotion in the session. 
Discursive practices used by clients include understatement, normalising discursive 
constructions and the paralinguistic devices of laughter, overlapping speech and 
lowered voice utterances. Therapists deploy different avoidant discursive strategies 
from clients. These include negotiating the language of the traumatic experience, 
changing the subject away from feelings, oblique reference to sexual abuse and 
focusing on the positive aspects of the clients' experience, including the solicitation of 
expressions of the effectiveness of therapy. 
Secondly, the discursive practices used by clients and therapists are a function of the 
different roles of each within the therapeutic context. The "tussle" between clients 
and therapists to control the agenda, including the ways in which clients respond to 
therapists' avoidance, has been used to demonstrate this process. 
Thirdly, the ways in which avoidance is achieved are mediated by the power 
imbalances associated with the therapeutic context. This has been illustrated in 
particular by the way disagreement between the client and therapist is managed, and 
will be explored further in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
1 Introduction 
The findings indicate that both clients and therapists engage in avoidant discursive 
practices within therapy for PTSD, and that the nature of these practices is a function 
of the different roles adopted by each of the participants within the dyad. Each of 
these areas will be discussed with a focus on possible explanations for avoidant 
discursive behaviours and on the implications for therapeutic practice. A case will be 
made that the avoidant discursive behaviours in clients and therapists are associated 
with fear of being overwhelmed by emotional material. Furthermore, it will be 
argued that the disparate avoidant behaviours between client and therapist are a 
function of roles adopted by the participants that reflect the overarching therapy 
discourse and the power dynamics inherent within it. The interactive nature of 
avoidance will be explored, with a focus on implications for future research in the 
area. Methodological concerns will be addressed, including the interaction of the 
person of the researcher on the research process. Finally, conclusions will be drawn 
and consideration given to future directions for research and implications for 
practitioners working within the field of trauma. 
2 The avoidant discursive practices of clients 
Clients adopted strategies that resulted in a moving away from negative affect in the 
therapy session, through three main discursive practices: understatement, normalising 
discursive constructions, and paralinguistic devices. 
Consistent with the discourse analytic method used, the analysis focused on the ways 
in which avoidance was achieved in therapy, rather than on any supposed underlying 
motivations of the participants. It is nevertheless useful and appropriate at this stage, 
however, to consider the possible explanations for the behaviours observed. 
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2.1 Social expectation 
One possible explanation for the observed tendency of clients to move away from 
emotional material is that clients were responding to the social expectation that it is 
inappropriate to discuss intimate feelings or experiences with a stranger. Two 
transcripts were from clients' first sessions and it is possible that new clients may 
have been reluctant to speak about intimate or deep feelings because of these social 
demands. However, avoidant discursive practices were found across transcripts, 
including the remaining four transcripts that were taken from later sessions. Most of 
the clients in the study, therefore, had some experience of the therapeutic situation 
and so would be expected to be familiar with the expectation of speaking of personal 
issues in this context. While it is possible that social expectations account for 
reluctance to explore negative emotional material at the initial stages of therapy, it is 
unlikely that this is the case for those who have attended therapy for longer. In any 
case, most people are aware that therapy involves speaking about feelings even if only 
through media depictions of the therapist stereotype or from accounts from friends, 
regardless of any personal experience of therapy. Social expectation is not, therefore, 
a plausible explanation for the avoidant discursive practices observed, which were 
found across transcripts. 
2.2 Fear of being overwhelmed by affect 
A second possible reason for the discursive practices observed is that clients are afraid 
of being overwhelmed by strong negative affect. This is consistent with the well- 
documented findings regarding avoidance in clients with PTSD. For example, 
Horowitz' (1976) Information Processing Model of response to trauma proposes that 
the trauma remains in active memory, but is kept from conscious awareness by the 
defences of denial and emotional numbing. These mechanisms serve to prevent the 
individual from being overwhelmed by the memory. However, intrusive, re- 
experiencing phenomena such as flashbacks and nightmares are repeated as part of an 
attempt to process and integrate the traumatic memories. The individual, therefore. 
oscillates between periods of intrusive thoughts and avoidance, the "hallmarks" of 
PTSD. In Horowitz' model, therefore, avoidance is seen as a control process aimed at 
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regulating overwhelming affect. This provides a possible explanation for the avoidant 
discursive strategies observed in the study, "clients will often resist the therapist's 
attempts to touch the emotional core of their conflicts, although they long for this 
contact as well" (Teyber, 1992, p91). 
2.3 Feelings of vulnerability 
More particularly, the normalising discursive constructions identified suggest that 
some practices used by clients may function to distance them from a sense of 
vulnerability. For example, the discursive construction of luck can be regarded as a 
defence against a realisation of the client's own mortality, an acceptance of the 
ultimate vulnerability. The discursive construction of caution provides an alternative 
construction to the notion that the client is behaving in a more tentative and less 
confident manner than before the accident. Substitutions of words such as "uneasy" 
in place of "terrified" reframe the experience as less threatening and the clients as less 
vulnerable. This is consistent with the findings regarding increased feelings of 
vulnerability in those suffering from PTSD as "confrontations with violence challenge 
one's most basic assumptions about the self as invulnerable and intrinsically worthy, 
and about the world as orderly and just" (Reiker and Carmen, 1986 p367). It is, 
therefore, understandable that people who have experienced trauma may take great 
pains to distance themselves from the feelings of vulnerability that such adverse 
experiences can engender, and so provides a plausible explanation for the avoidant 
discursive practices observed in clients. 
Furthermore, feelings of vulnerability may be compounded by the tendency of 
traumatised clients to view these feelings as global and enduring. Horowitz and 
Epstein (1991) posit that, in many people with PTSD, trauma-related conceptions of 
themselves and the world come to dominate their everyday existence, and they may 
believe that they are weak, helpless or unworthy. This is because they may generalise 
from the experience of the trauma to the totality of existence, rather than view the 
traumatic event merely as one terrible incident that has occurred at a particular place 
at a particular time (Epstein, 1991. Janoff-Bulman, 1992). This therefore enhances 
the perceived need for such clients to disclaim feelings of vulnerability. as they 
perceive them as global and enduring. This may be tantamount to an admission, for 
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example, that "I am a weak person and a coward and will always be so". They may 
not understand their feelings in terms of a specific and transitory experience from 
which recovery is possible, in other words regarding their anxiety as a trait rather than 
a state. The tendency of clients in the present study to reconstruct negative feelings or 
symptoms as normal and functional is consistent with the view that feelings are 
regarded as global and enduring characteristics and so pose a threat to a positive and 
healthy self concept. In order to maintain a positive self-identity, clients seek to 
distance themselves from feelings of vulnerability and emphasise positive aspects of 
themselves and events, construing them in more normalising and positive ways. The 
body of literature associating feelings of pervasive, global and enduring vulnerability 
with PTSD provide a further plausible explanation for the avoidant behaviours 
observed in the current study, in that certain discursive practices may be functioning 
to move the conversation away from an exploration of vulnerability. 
2.4 Implications for effective therapy 
However, whatever the explanation for the avoidant practices observed, it is important 
that practitioners are aware of them, as they may obstruct progress in therapy. In 
therapy for PTSD, it is important to help people to begin to address and so accept the 
feelings of personal vulnerability that the trauma has engendered. The key element of 
therapy for people with PTSD is the integration of the alien, unacceptable, terrifying 
and incomprehensible into their self-concepts. Most models of PTSD regard an 
exploration of the distressing feelings associated with the trauma to be crucial to 
effective therapy. For example, Foa and Kozak's (1986) fear network theory posits 
that activation of the fear network is a prerequisite for the extinction of phobic fear. 
For this to occur, the client, at the very least, needs to be able to maintain a 
conversation about the emotional impact of the traumatic event. 
Thus an important part of therapy is to help clients to understand their feelings of 
vulnerability within the context of PTSD. to help them to view distressing and 
negative emotions as the temporary result of the traumatic experience and, therefore. 
amenable to change. Life events initially experienced as alien and imposed from 
outside upon passive victims, must come to be personalised as integrated aspects of 
the individuals' history and life experiences (van der Kolk and Ducey, 1989). If 
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clients can understand their symptoms as temporary and amenable to change, rather 
than construe their vulnerability as global and enduring, then they may be more 
prepared to address these feelings in therapy and this may pave the way for a positive 
outcome. 
The current study highlights that avoidance of emotion does occur in therapy for 
PTSD and, whatever reason is put forward for this process, it needs to be addressed in 
order for effective therapy to proceed. The therapist needs to be sensitive to any 
feelings of vulnerability in clients and to allow them time to begin to trust him or her 
before expecting them to expose these feelings. All too often we hear clients 
described as resistant or avoidant without any apparent sensitivity to these issues, and 
therapists should be respectfully aware of this behaviour and sensitive to it, rather 
than dismissing clients as resistant. 
2.5 Discursive practices particular to presentations of childhood sexual abuse 
A further point of interest with respect to the discursive practices used by clients is 
that certain practices were found to be particular to those clients who had experienced 
sexual abuse as children. The discursive practice of oblique reference to trauma was 
particular to therapeutic conversations with clients who had experienced childhood 
sexual abuse and there was no evidence that therapists referred obliquely to traumatic 
experiences other than sexual abuse. This suggests a particular dynamic between 
therapists working with clients with histories of sexual abuse. The nature of the 
traumatic event experienced may influence the discursive practices used within 
therapy and therapeutic conversations around childhood abuse may differ 
qualitatively from those around other trauma. 
One possible explanation for oblique reference to trauma being associated only with 
childhood sexual abuse is that there are certain symptoms and characteristics in 
presentations of childhood abuse that are distinct from those of traumatised clients 
who have not experienced sexual abuse. These symptoms are not acknowledged 
within the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. The long-term consequences of childhood 
abuse are very different from those of a natural disaster or other circumscribed trauma 
in adult life (Herman. 1992). Victims of childhood abuse are more likely to have 
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amnesias of the trauma and a range of dissociative symptoms (Saxe, van der Kolk, 
Berkowitz, Chinman, Hall, Lieberg and Schwartz, 1993). Other distinguishing 
features of childhood abuse include low self-esteem and a sense of shame, guilt and 
responsibility for what happened. As has been discussed, one important aspect of 
PTSD is that experiencing a traumatic event challenges basic assumptions about the 
self and the world, in terms of no longer seeing oneself as invulnerable and worthy 
and the world as a safe and just place (Reiker and Carmen, 1986). The assumption in 
this statement is that, prior to the traumatic event, the individual regarded him or 
herself as invulnerable and the world as a safe place. This may be true of those with 
secure and loving family backgrounds who have experienced a singular traumatic 
event in adult life. However, this is unlikely to be true of survivors of repeated 
childhood trauma, who have learned that the world is unsafe and unjust. Traumatic 
experiences are not only processed by means of currently existing mental schemas, 
they may also activate latent self-concepts and views of relationships that were 
formed earlier in life (Van der Kolk, 1996). This is particularly relevant for people 
with prior histories of trauma, as earlier self-schemata may be activated. The notion 
of "learned helplessness" (Seligman, 1974) which refers to the learned state produced 
by exposure to noxious, unpleasant situations in which there is no possibility of 
escape or avoidance (Reber, 1985) can be readily applied to the presentation of 
symptoms of survivors of childhood abuse. It is possible, therefore, that survivors of 
repeated childhood sexual abuse may differ qualitatively from those with 
unproblematic childhoods who have experienced an isolated traumatic event as an 
adult, resulting in the different discursive practices observed in this client group. 
Furthermore, the suggestion that a certain symptom presentation is particular to those 
with sexually abusive backgrounds calls for different and distinct therapeutic 
strategies from those presenting with other types of trauma. It highlights the 
importance of not treating trauma survivors as one generic group, when in fact the 
nature of the trauma experienced may be one of many factors differentiating the 
symptoms and particular presentations of individuals. This calls for a separate 
diagnostic category to accommodate the particular presentation and symptoms 
resulting from childhood sexual abuse and to separate these from the symptoms of 
other adult traumatic experiences. Further research might address the ways in which 
these two client groups differ in order to consider appropriate strategies for building 
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the relationship and providing effective therapies. 
3 The avoidant discursive practices of therapists 
So, a case has been made that the avoidant behaviours observed in clients can be 
accounted for in terms of clients' fear of being overwhelmed by affect or a sense of 
vulnerability, and that this is consistent with existing theory of PTSD. However, one 
of the most surprising findings from the present study is that it is not only the clients 
who avoid addressing affect-laden material, but also the therapists. 
Therapists frequently engage in the clients' avoidant discourses and serve to maintain 
and reinforce them. Furthermore, the therapist initiates much of the avoidance during 
sessions. Therapists use a range of discursive strategies to move away from their 
clients' emotional material, including focusing on the positive, changing the subject 
away from feelings and referring indirectly to the traumatic experience. This finding 
is an interesting addition to the models of avoidance in PTSD, which are inevitably 
one-sided, taking into account only the behaviour of the client within the therapeutic 
dyad. 
One of the roles of therapists is to enable their clients to address their pain and 
encourage them to explore the sources of their distress. As Teyber (1992) observes, 
while there are many ways in which therapists can respond to clients, for example 
information seeking, clarifying or relating the clients' material to other issues the 
client has mentioned, as a general guideline, "the most productive response is to 
respond to the feeling that the client is currently experiencing 
... 
the therapist's first 
priority is to acknowledge and approach the affective component of the client's 
response. " (p91). As discussed earlier with regard to clients' avoidance, most models 
of PTSD recognise that it is important for the client to speak about feelings in order to 
begin to address the trauma and to so reduce symptoms (see for example Foa and 
Kozak, 1986). It is initially counterintuitive, therefore, to consider that therapists may 
be responsible for facilitating avoidance of emotional material. Therapists' capacity to 
help clients change is in direct relation to how the therapist responds to their emotions 
(Teeber, 1992) and the reaction of the therapists in the study appears to run counter to 
161 
this understanding. 
3.1 Formulation and assessment 
One possible explanation for the observed discursive behaviour is that therapists are 
avoiding emotional explorations in order to establish certain facts, including being 
clear about the ways in which the person is suffering, in order to compile a 
formulation of the problem. This is likely to be the case in an initial session and, it 
could be argued that, it may not be appropriate to begin to address the client's feelings 
in any depth at the assessment stage. However, avoidant discursive behaviours were 
observed across all transcripts and not just in the two that were from initial sessions. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that, even in the case of initial sessions, a 
comprehensive formulation must involve an investigation of the person's feelings and 
thoughts as well as their behaviour and symptoms. Indeed, establishing safety is an 
integral part of the assessment process and this requires a thorough assessment of 
PTSD in which the client must describe traumatic memories, feelings and symptoms 
which are often accompanied by strong emotional reactions (Newman, Kaloupek and 
Keane, 1996). Some exploration of feelings would, therefore, be expected even in 
initial sessions, and so the exigencies of formulation and assessment do not provide a 
compelling explanation for the avoidant practices observed in therapists. 
3.2 Fear of being overwhelmed by the clients' traumatic material 
A further explanation for this behaviour is that it is the result of a fear on the part of 
the therapist that the client's distress is too overwhelming for them to bear. This is 
consistent with the wave of denial towards the end of the nineteenth century with 
regard to sexual abuse, when trauma symptoms were regarded as the result of 
children's sexual fantasies (Brown, 1961). Trauma-related thoughts and feelings bring 
back the intolerable affects that patients so carefully avoid which may prove to be 
almost unbearable for therapists as well (Turner, McFarlane and Van der Kolk, 1996). 
Hearing clients' traumatic experiences may be shocking and lead to lasting alterations 
in assumptions and expectations. which in turn impact therapists' feelings and 
relationships (Barlow, 1993). Therapists' reactions to clients' traumatic material can 
be understood as comprising three main factors, namely vicarious traumatisation, 
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countertransference and compassion fatigue (Leo, 1999). each of which will be 
discussed in turn. 
3.2.1 Vicarious traumatisation 
While empathic engagement with trauma survivors is necessary for effective 
psychotherapeutic intervention, such engagement also makes therapists vulnerable to 
the detrimental effects of vicarious trauma, with consequent negative effects on 
individual counsellor effectiveness and organisational dynamics in the workplace 
(Leo, 1999). Therapists have to cope with the challenge of being constantly 
confronted with the horrendous experiences that can befall people, and with the sense 
of disintegration and despair that these experiences can bring. This is summarised 
eloquently by Turner, McFarlane and Van der Kolk (1996) who state that: 
"Working with people who have been traumatised confronts therapists as well as 
patients with intense emotional experiences; it forces them to explore the darkest 
corners of the mind and to face the entire spectrum of human glory and degradation. 
Sooner or later, those experiences have the potential to overwhelm therapists. The 
repeated exposure to their own vulnerability becomes too intense, the display of the 
infinite human capacity for cruelty too unbearable, the enactment of the trauma 
within the therapeutic relationship too terrifying" (p552 ). 
The notion of vicarious traumatisation, therefore, provides a persuasive explanation 
for the observed tendency of therapists within the study to avoid directly addressing 
the clients' pain and attempting to move the conversation away from the traumatic 
material. 
3.2.2 Countertransference 
Similarly, therapists' avoidance may be understood in terms of countertransference, 
the therapist's emotional involvement in the therapeutic interaction (Reber, 1985). 
While the term is taken from the psychodynamic literature, it is becoming 
increasingly used within a range of approaches to counselling and the transference- 
countertransference relationship is now considered within the integrative paradigm 
(Woolfe and Dryden, 1996). 
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The pressure of working with traumatised clients may be heightened by the fact that 
clients with traumatic histories frequently idealise their therapists, because of a need 
to replace the sources of security that were destroyed by the trauma (Turner. 
McFarlane and Van der Kolk, 1996). Intense feelings of helplessness, rage, rescue or 
sadness may be evoked in therapists by traumatised clients and can leave therapists 
feeling powerless and incompetent. The therapist is in a helping role in relation to the 
client and so there is some expectancy from both parties in the dyad that the therapist 
will be able to help and to alleviate the client's pain. The therapist assumes 
responsibility for the client's feelings, "therapists tend to avoid their clients' feelings 
because they do not want to hurt them or make them feel bad" (Teyber, 1992, p113). 
This sense of responsibility places an additional pressure upon the therapist. Being 
frequently confronted by the intensity of the clients' distress is a reminder to the 
therapist that she/he has not been effective in alleviating the pain, which may result in 
the therapist feeling deskilled and so threaten her/his view of her/himself as effective. 
Turner, McFarlane and van der Kolk (1996) warn therapists working with traumatised 
clients to beware of their own needs to be comforted by their patients. Indeed, the 
current study found evidence of therapists attempting to solicit positive admissions of 
progress from clients and reassurance of the effectiveness of the therapy. If a positive 
admission is received, the therapist may feel more comfortable, however, a negative 
response from the client regarding progress in therapy may increase the therapist's 
feelings of inefficacy, helplessness and powerlessness. As Teyber (1992) observes, 
"therapists must also be aware that their biggest obstacle to providing clients with a 
relationship that can produce change will be their own discomfort with certain client 
feelings" (1992, p 119). Issues of countertransference, therefore, provide a plausible 
explanation for the avoidant discursive practices observed. 
Interestingly, the behaviour of the therapists initially involved in Part 1 of the study is 
consistent with these avoidant reactions to traumatic material observed in Part 2. The 
Part 1 quantitative design required therapists to administer before and after therapy 
questionnaires to clients with PTSD. As outlined earlier in the report. therapists cited 
their discomfort with researching clients in distress as one reason for failing to 
provide data that they had initially agreed to gather. Gathering data for research from 
clients may be seen to conflict with the tasks of therapy, and may be seen as intrusive 
and a barrier to the therapeutic relationship (Barker et al. 1996). While this argument 
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suggests a reluctance to research a range of client presenting problems. it may be even 
more the case for those with traumatic histories in view of the strong feelings of 
helplessness and the need to rescue the client, often evoked in therapists by this client 
group. 
Secondly, due to the "before and after" nature of the study, some therapists may have 
felt that their therapeutic competence and effectiveness with clients was being 
measured. This may have resulted in them finding the study threatening in terms of 
the perception of their professional, therapeutic effectiveness if their clients' 
symptoms were seen not to improve significantly. Barker et al (1996) suggest that 
research may produce findings that lead to a painful re-examination of one's ideas and 
challenge one's assumptions and ways of working. This is consistent with the notion 
that therapists may feel a threat to their efficacy as therapists and a threat to their 
professional identity, perhaps fearing that the outcome of therapy may not be as 
positive as they would hope and perhaps fearing the judgement of their peers. It 
would be interesting to compare the extent to which therapists engaged in similar 
studies with a different client group. 
3.2.3 Compassion fatigue 
Furthermore, therapists may feel less compassionate towards those expressing 
negativity than those expressing positivity. In a recent study, Capps and Bonnano 
(2000) found readers presented with the narratives of recently bereaved people to 
report feeling more frustrated and more inclined to avoid and less inclined to comfort 
individuals who more often expressed negatively valenced thoughts and emotions and 
diminished agency. It is conceivable that this process was present in the current study 
as it would account for the observation that therapists focus on the positive aspects of 
the situation and invite clients to express positivity. 
3.3 Implications for effective therapy 
If it is the case that the avoidant behaviours observed in therapists are the result of 
their own feelings that make working NA-ith clients with PTSD difficult, it is essential 
that therapists take steps to buffer themselves against any negative effects of clients' 
emotional material. Working with trauma survivors impacts on the whole person and 
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the effects pervade many areas of the therapist's life, and not just the therapeutic 
relationship. In an exploration of the narratives of trauma counsellors regarding their 
struggle with secondary traumatic stress, Arvay (1999) identified seven main themes. 
including struggling with changing beliefs, therapeutic relationship. social support 
and power issues. Due to the serious effects of secondary traumatisation on the 
counsellor, client and organisation, prevention and management of this phenomenon 
must be taken seriously by all concerned (Leo, 1999). McCann and Pearlman (1990b) 
make several recommendations for the effective buffering of therapists from the 
effects of secondary traumatic stress. These include the use of one's professional 
network for support, avoiding isolation, talking to others in the field who can 
recognise vicarious traumatisation, balancing victim and non-victim cases, engaging 
in other professional and personal activities, recognising one's own limitations, 
working for social change, and focusing on the positive personal impact of this work 
and ways in which it can enrich one's life. 
Whatever the explanation for the discursive behaviours identified, it is vital that 
therapists are aware of these processes when they occur, as therapy will inevitably be 
less effective and therapists less useful to their clients if they cannot tolerate the 
emotions expressed or are unable, for whatever reason, to hear their clients' pain. 
Avoidant reactions to clients' material will be mediated by the therapists' own issues 
and the way in which they regard themselves, "therapists' own personalities, needs, 
and current life situations will often keep them from responding to the strong 
emotions that clients present" (Teyber, 1992, p90). Therapists' own reactions to their 
clients are the biggest obstacles to responding effectively to their clients' emotions 
and, as Teyber (1992) observes, "If therapists are not prepared to work with their own 
emotional reactions to the feelings that clients present, 
... 
they will tend to avoid or 
intellectually explain their clients'feelings" (p111). 
It is, therefore, vital that therapists work at developing greater self-awareness of their 
own material that may impact upon the therapeutic encounter. as recommended by 
professional guidelines for therapists (see for example, BPS guidelines 2001-2002). 
Indeed, this is one of the main reasons for the inclusion of the requirement of personal 
therapy in most counselling and counselling psychology training. It enables the ltIN 
therapist to develop awareness of his or her own issues and personal w\-avs of 
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interacting which may come into play within the therapeutic process (Legg, 1999). 
Guidano and Liotti (1983) found that the therapist's own self-awareness is enhanced 
as he or she attends to the emotions accompanying his or her perceptions of the client. 
The process occurring between the therapist and the client needs to be continually 
addressed. The requirement in most therapy disciplines for trainees to undergo their 
own personal therapy has hitherto been largely one of unsubstantiated belief in its 
necessity, and the supposed benefit to clients of therapists undergoing their own 
therapy has not been subject to empirical test. The current findings go some way 
towards providing a more scientific rationale for requiring therapists to increase their 
self-awareness and to address their own feelings in relation to clients' material as it 
demonstrates the impact of therapists' avoidance within the therapeutic process. 
3.3.1 Implications for the training and supervision of therapists 
So whatever the underlying motivation of the participants with regard to moving the 
conversation away from emotional material, it is important that therapists develop 
insight into the way in which their discursive behaviour influences the course of 
therapy. As highlighted by the present study, many of the interpersonal dynamics in 
therapy are not immediately obvious to either party. It is only through detailed 
analysis of the transcripts that the reactions of the therapist and the client to each other 
can be fully elucidated and explored. This suggests a useful way forward in the 
training of therapists. Close analysis of transcribed material will enable therapists to 
gain further insight and self-awareness of the ways in which their reactions impact 
upon those of the client. This is partly addressed within Counselling Psychology 
training with the use of process reports to illuminate the interpersonal processes 
occurring within a brief sample of a transcribed session. However such reports tend 
to focus more on the demonstration of the competence with which the therapeutic 
approach is used, and less on the deeper processes, such as avoidance that may occur. 
Such a detailed analysis may lend itself more to exploration within clinical 
supervision, in which the supervisor is in a position more suited to highlighting the 
blind spots of the therapist and so enhancing the effectiveness of their practice in 
order to benefit clients. Indeed, Capps and Bonnano (2000) emphasise the importance 
of the potential of others' evaluations of narrative to illuminate relevant interpersonal 
dynamics. It is important that difficulties in working with certain clients are not 
merely dismissed as the result of transference, which implies that the problem lies 
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solely with the client. Indeed, Shlien (1984) argues that "transference is a fiction 
invented and maintained by the therapist to protect himself (sic) from the 
consequences of his own behaviour" (p153). Whether one agrees with this view, it is 
clearly the case that therapists need to take responsibility for what occurs within the 
dyad, and not attribute difficulties solely to the client, however tempting this may 
seem in terms of relieving the feelings of inadequacy frequently evoked in therapists 
working in this field. 
The findings from the current research are important as they offer a plausible 
demonstration of the ways in which the therapist's feelings regarding the client's 
traumatic experience may be played out in the therapy. It reveals the impact of this 
behaviour on the therapy session itself, and so ultimately on the well-being of the 
client. Hitherto, such effects were only supposed or else noticed in cases of extreme 
therapist traumatisation or unprofessionalism, for example when therapists are 
considered too unwell or too stressed to work. The importance of these findings is 
that avoidance in therapy applies to "well" therapists and not just to therapists who are 
aware of experiencing the effects of burnout or acknowledge vicarious traumatisation. 
Therapists who are functioning well are also subject to the influence of clients' painful 
material in powerful, albeit subtle, ways which may affect the engagement of the 
client with the therapy and with the painful material and so the outcome of the 
therapy. 
Qualitative research into the lived experience of counsellors working in the field of 
trauma is largely absent from the literature (Arvay, 1999). The current study can be 
regarded as a useful addition to this poorly researched area in terms of highlighting 
the actual discursive practices that construct avoidance in the therapy session, and so 
provides empirical evidence of therapists' avoidance. The current study, therefore, 
highlights an exciting way forward for enhancing the effectiveness of therapy. The 
extent to which the therapist is able to stay with the client's emotional pain, for 
whatever reason, may differentiate an effective from an ineffective therapist. This 
may illuminate one factor in the failure of some clients to engage in therapy in any 
meaningful way, never overcoming their avoidance and so not improving in terms of 
their symptoms. 
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4 Client and therapist roles within the therapy discourse 
A further important finding is that clients and therapists use different avoidant 
discursive practices from each other and that these practices reflect the disparate roles 
of each participant within the dyad. 
4.1 A enda regulators and mode regulators 
Therapists' discursive practices largely relate to the control of the agenda in that they 
determine what is discussed. Four of the five therapist practices generated function to 
control the agenda, namely changing the subject, positive focus, solicitation of 
effectiveness of therapy and oblique reference to abuse. As has been seen, through 
these discursive behaviours, the therapist actively changes the agenda by imposing 
new material on the conversation or by asking direct questions about another area, or 
alternatively avoids the client's agenda by circumlocution of the topic introduced. In 
this way the therapist dictates the content of the conversation in terms of what is 
spoken about. The only exception to this is the practice of therapists negotiating the 
language of trauma. However, as the practice of negotiating the language constituted 
only two examples, the overwhelming majority of therapists' avoidance can be 
regarded as controlling the agenda. Therapists' discursive practices can, therefore, 
largely be termed agenda regulators. 
In contrast, clients' discursive practices, on the other hand, relate to the way in which 
emotional material is spoken about. The practices of understatement, normalising and 
the use of paralinguistic devices enable clients to choose the way in which the trauma 
is discussed by either understating it, normalising it, minimising it or enabling it to be 
spoken of quietly, or with certain words not heard or spoken at all. In this way, the 
discursive practices used by clients are all concerned with the ways in which the 
emotional material is expressed. Client practices can, therefore, be regarded as mode 
regulators in that they are concerned with how the traumatic material is expressed. 
The division of strategies in this way indicates that clients and therapists achieve 
different things through their avoidant practices which, in turn, illuminates the 
different roles adopted by the participants in the dyad. The therapists' role enables 
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them to determine the agenda and take control over what is discussed. The clients, on 
the other hand, operate within the therapists' agenda, taking control only over the 
ways in which they speak about their experience rather than over the agenda or the 
direction of the conversation itself. 
Interestingly, however, the findings demonstrate that clients do, in fact, influence the 
agenda through other means, namely through the use of reassertion of affect in 
response to the therapists' avoidance. Clients were found to initially report agreement 
with the therapist's positive focus but then revert to an exploration of their pain and 
distress, enabling them to regain control of the agenda and to continue exploring their 
distress. However, the use of this particular, more passive, strategy for gaining 
control of the agenda, as opposed to the more active practices used by the therapists 
for the same purpose, demonstrates that the participants are positioning themselves in 
a more subordinate role and therapists in a more dominant role. These findings are 
consistent with Tracey and Miars (1986) who found therapists to have high levels of 
control over what was discussed during sessions, and clients to achieve control in 
more submissive ways. In this way, participants are operating within the overarching 
discourse of "therapy", conforming to perceived roles and expectations of "the client" 
and "the therapist" respectively. 
This overarching "therapy" discourse is further illuminated by the management of 
disagreement in the session, the observed tendency of clients to avoid direct 
confrontation or challenge of the therapist, ultimately expressing convergence with 
the therapists' view. The way in which clients manage disagreement with the 
therapist, therefore, reflects the subordinate role of the client within the dyad. This is 
consistent with the view that clients may find the positioning of themselves within a 
therapy discourse as disempowering (Harper. 1995), which may account for the more 
passive and subordinate discursive behaviour observed. 
4.2 Overarching discourses and power dynamics 
So, the current study illuminates the specific discursive practices that both reflect and 
construct the power dynamics within the therapeutic relationship, 
demonstrating that 
therapy can never be entirely free of context. operating as it does within certain 
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predefined parameters, in this case within the "therapy" discourse. However. much of 
the literature assumes that it is the therapist who holds the power within the 
therapeutic dyad. For example, traditional approaches to therapy, such as the 
psychoanalytic tradition, have been criticised for infantilising the patient, and that. far 
from helping clients to overcome infantile problems, the analyst resubmerges them in 
an infantile relationship in which it is the analyst who emerges as all-powerful 
(Spinelli, 1994). Masson (1988) does not draw a distinction between this inevitable 
use of power and its abuse, advocating the abolition of therapy on the grounds that an 
unequal power relationship is, in and of itself, abusive and that "the therapeutic 
relationship is inherently power-imbalanced in favour of the therapist and to the 
detriment of clients" (Spinelli, 1994, p117). 
As a result of such criticisms, more recent therapeutic traditions have attempted to 
address the power imbalance within the therapeutic relationship. The social 
philosophy or politics implicit in the humanistic paradigm has influenced adherents of 
this approach to work to reduce the status and power differences existing between 
client and helper (McLeod, 1996). Counselling Psychology approaches concern 
themselves with emphasising equality and respect within the counselling relationship 
(BPS, 2001). However, these accounts tend to be optimistic regarding the extent to 
which equality can be achieved within this context. It is naive to suggest that 
therapists can create an environment that is totally free of context. The words of Bob 
Dylan quoted by Spinelli (1994) to illustrate freedom of choice are particularly 
pertinent to the issue of freedom of context "Are birds free from the chains of the 
sky? " (Dylan, 1964). 
Also, throughout the debate on power, an assumption is made that the power 
imbalance always favours the therapist. However, it is important to recognise that 
clients too hold power that they can misuse or abuse within the same relationship, 
"Just as therapists may exert their power by setting the time, duration and cost of 
sessions, or may attempt to impose unwanted and destructive viewpoints or 
interpretations on their clients, so too may clients seek to deviate from the agreed-on 
firamc, or withhold payments, or simply not show up to sessions, or not return to 
therapy without providing notice, or heap undeserved verbal or even physical abuse 
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on the therapist" (Spinelli, 1994, p122) 
The current study goes beyond these power behaviours on the part of the client by 
demonstrating how the client's discursive practices within the session enable them to 
subtly take control of the way in which the trauma is spoken about. They achieve this 
either by use of certain discursive practices or else by disengaging with the therapist's 
agenda or by reasserting their distress. Clients' tendency not to overtly disagree or 
confront therapists on areas of contention suggests that they are operating within a 
perceived power imbalance weighted in favour of the therapist. The fact that they do 
sometimes achieve control of the agenda, albeit through passive means, and 
effectively regulate the expressed affect in the session suggests that they are able to 
gain power within and despite the overarching expectations of the therapy session and 
despite their positioning in a less powerful role in relation to the therapist, while at the 
same time adapting to the demand characteristics of the session. 
As Spinelli (1994) suggests, all relationships are unequal in power, indeed 
"relationship is power in flux" (p 121), and the imbalance of power is neither 
necessarily good nor bad, merely unavoidable. Discursive practices, therefore, can 
be explored at different levels, namely at the level of the utterances and what they 
achieve and at the level of the overarching discourses which address the relationship 
of the protagonists in the dialogue. Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1990) refer to these 
two levels of discursive psychology respectively as that which offers a fine grain 
analysis of the action orientation of talk, and as that involving investigations 
concerned with the imbrication of discourse, power and subjectification. The current 
analysis has focused largely on the former approach, that of a fine grain analysis of 
the utterances, however it is not possible to divorce these utterances from the context 
of the therapeutic relationship and what is being achieved by the discursive practices 
within this context. One is dependent upon the other and a division between the two 
approaches is opposed in favour of a synthesis of the two approaches, consistent with 
the view of Wetherell (1998). 
4 
.3 Implications 
for effective therapy 
The discourses of clients and therapists cannot be divorced from the context of 
therapy. therefore. and both the therapist and the researcher need to acknowledge that 
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they are engaged in a discourse in which certain boundaries are assumed. They must 
recognise that the therapy session is a particular piece of social interaction, which is 
an overriding discourse in itself, with its inherent boundaries, time-limitations, 
"scripts" and power imbalances. "Discourses are embedded in power relations and, 
therefore, have political effects... representations of people can serve to support 
power inequalities between them, while passing off such inequalities as fair or 
somehow natural" (Burr, 1995, p64). Future research might attempt to replicate the 
current findings for clients with PTSD, particularly with regard to the different 
discursive practices generated. Consideration may be given in future research to the 
extent to which the functions of agenda regulation and mode regulation proposed 
here can be generated in other transcripts of PTSD therapy and, if so, whether they are 
specific to therapy for PTSD or are relevant to therapy for a range of presenting 
problems. 
In their attempt to reduce inequality as far as possible, it is vital that therapists do not 
lose sight of the fact that power imbalances will necessarily exist, regardless of their 
attempt to promote collaboration and self-efficacy of clients. Biaggio (1996) clearly 
illustrates this point in her account of the way in which her own therapy helped her 
understand how she was influenced by the therapy experience, and how this, in turn, 
led to her shaping her professional views about the therapist's power and 
responsibility with regard to the client. She asserts that it is important at the training 
stage to instil in students an understanding of the power they have over clients and the 
incredible burden of responsibility that their professional role carries with it. The 
current study highlights the ways in which therapists use their power, albeit 
unwittingly, within the therapeutic relationship and provides a useful lesson to those 
in training, who may otherwise believe that it is only deliberately abusive therapists 
who need to be aware of power issues. 
As Parker (1992) suggests, greater awareness of these overarching power discourses 
may be achieved by exploring which categories of person gain and lose from the 
employment of the discourse and by looking at who would want to promote and who 
would want to dissolve the discourse. In the present study. the therapists' solicitation 
of an admission of positive progress from the client and reassurance of the usefulness 
of therapy serves the need of the therapist rather than that of the client and so 
it is the 
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therapist who serves to benefit from the discourse. 
5 Towards a "dyad-orientated" discourse of therapy 
Although the discussion has been organised around the discursive practices of clients 
as distinct from those of therapists, avoidance in therapy can be largely considered an 
interactive process between client and therapist, with both participants co-constructing 
the discourse of trauma. In particular, such interactive processes identified include a 
tendency for the client to reiterate distress in reaction to therapists' avoidance, and for 
the therapist to react to the clients' introduction of sexual abuse by circumlocution of 
the issue and addressing it indirectly. 
Viewing avoidance in this way contrasts with the view taken in most quantitative 
research on PTSD, including Part 1 of the current study, in which there is the tacit 
assumption that the client acts autonomously, and that the therapist is merely an 
impartial observer. This is an old-fashioned view of therapy, based upon the 
traditional medical model of treatment. Collaboration between the client and 
counsellor is a hallmark of current approaches to Counselling Psychology. (Bor, 
Legg and Scher, 1996). The counsellor is no longer considered as the "expert" and 
the counsellor's experience and knowledge is no longer privileged over the validity of 
the client's experience and knowledge. Indeed, as Turner et al (1996) suggest, therapy 
is an intensely intimate process. The word "process" is important here. It implies that 
therapy is not something done to the client by the therapist, but is a collaborative 
interaction between both parties in the dyad. While psychodynamic approaches to 
counselling in particular stress the importance of attending to transference and 
countertransference issues, more integrative approaches to counselling now recognise 
the importance of the interaction between client and therapist (Woolfe and Dryden, 
1996). It may be the case that particular therapist-client dyads together are more 
avoidant than others. with each responding in avoidant ways to the other. Turner et al 
(1996) point out that what occurs between a patient and a therapist is a function not 
only of the particular diagnosis of the patient but also of the unique and personal 
relationship between patient and therapist. Although they state that these factors 
cannot be easily quantified, nor subjected to scientific study, the current stud; has 
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attempted to subject these processes to study and so illuminate the ways in which 
avoidance is achieved. 
Moreover, the process between therapist and client mirrors the understanding in 
qualitative research of the process between researcher and researched. Qualitative 
research takes account of the fact that the researcher is not an invisible nor impartial 
observer, but instead is instrumental in creating the realities he or she is investigating, 
inevitably shaping the object of inquiry (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992). The current 
study reveals the importance of the interactions between client and therapist and 
shows how avoidant discourses can be co-constructed between the therapist and 
client. Considering avoidance in this way is a move away from regarding avoidance 
as an entity which is the result of certain personality traits of the client, and a move 
towards considering avoidance as a process occurring through the medium of the 
interaction between the client and the therapist. Avoidant discursive practices were 
found across all the transcripts, that is across all clients and therapists studied, and 
suggests that avoidance is not a function of any particular coping style or personality 
trait, but rather is situational and an important constituent within the therapeutic dyad. 
It then makes more sense to regard avoidance as an unstable and social process and 
therapists need to be educated to deal with the avoidance as it occurs in the here and 
now, within the social context and to address it accordingly, exploring the particular 
function it is serving at a particular time. The apparent complexity of avoidance in 
terms of its interactional nature within the dyad renders it elusive to quantitative 
methods of analysis alone, which may oversimplify the issue. Further qualitative 
research would be a more appropriate way forward in the exploration of avoidant 
processes in therapy, and help move away from the traditional "client-orientated" 
discourse of therapy to an emerging discourse of a "dyad-orientated" therapy. 
The discussion thus far has focused on the avoidance of the client and therapist, 
demonstrating how avoidance is an interactive process that cannot be divorced from 
the overarching framework of the therapeutic session, with its inherent expectations, 
roles and power differentials. Similarly, in a parallel process, the writing of this 
report and the interpretations made must be understood within the overarching 
framework of the research activity and the person of the researcher. I turn now to 
consider these methodological issues. 
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6 Methodological concerns 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the measures taken to enhance the validity and reliability of 
claims, in terms of the methods of transcription and analysis used. This section will 
assess the findings in terms of their trustworthiness, transferability and fruitfulness, 
and provide a reflexive account of the researcher's part in the process. In each case 
an attempt will be made to ensure the transparency of the process of assessing the 
findings against these criteria. 
6.1 Transferability 
6.1.1 Transferability to other therapeutic dyads 
As an alternative to "generalisation", qualitative research relies on "transferability" of 
findings, the application of findings in contexts similar to the context in which they 
were first derived (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Therefore, in the present study, the 
avoidant strategies identified might be expected to occur in other transcripts from 
clients receiving therapy for PTSD. Replication of the study in similar settings would 
be required in order to assess the extent to which the discursive practices generated 
are consistent with those for other therapeutic dyads. 
Some discursive practices occurred more frequently in some transcripts than others. 
The practice of oblique reference to trauma being specific to sexual abuse transcripts 
has been discussed, however most behaviours generated were not common to all 
transcripts. This may be partly due to the difference in length in transcripts, with 
smaller transcripts offering less opportunity for observation of patterns. However, the 
purpose of the analysis was not to achieve consistency across transcripts but rather to 
generate a range of avoidant discursive practices that may play a role in therapy for 
PTSD. 
The patterns identified in the current analysis can be considered in terms of the extent 
to which they are social practices that are possible in similar settings as, in the 
analysis of dialogue, it is the possibilities of language use that are the central objects 
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of generalisability (Perakyla, 1997). While the results cannot be said to be 
generalisable as descriptions of what other counsellors or other professionals do with 
their clients, they can be regarded as generalisable as descriptions of what any 
counsellor or other professional with his or her clients can do, given that he or she has 
the same array of interactional competencies as the participants under study have 
(Perakyla, 1997). As possibilities, the processes identified in the six transcripts in the 
current study can be said to be generalisable to other therapeutic conversations and to 
other therapist and client dyads. 
6.1.2 Discursive practices and PTSD 
It is not possible to know whether the avoidant discourses generated are particular to 
clients with PTSD or whether they might be found in transcripts of clients who 
present with other psychological problems, or indeed in a non-clinical sample. It 
could be the case that such avoidance is a critical factor in all mental health problems. 
Avoidant discourses might be found in the transcripts of a variety of clients with a 
variety of presenting problems and not just in those with PTSD. In order to assess 
how far the discourses found are particular to clients with PTSD, similar studies 
would need to be undertaken with samples of other clinical populations and with non- 
clinical samples. However, the current study is concerned only with social behaviour 
within the therapy session. Analysis of the discourses of a non-clinical population 
who are not receiving therapy, does not tell us anything about therapeutic discourses. 
The study can only be seen as lacking validity if it is purporting to measure something 
which it is not. In this case the study does not suggest that avoidance is only to be 
found in this particular client group to the exclusion of all others. Instead it is 
concerned with the question of how avoidant discourses are used within the 
transcripts analysed. However, an interesting area of research might be to assess the 
importance of avoidance in PTSD by comparing the discourses identified here with 
those from clients with mental health problems other than PTSD. This would 
determine the extent to which the avoidant discourses can be applied across different 
presenting problems, or whether different diagnoses might generate different 
presentations of avoidance. It might be the case that certain discursive practices are 
more prevalent or receive greater emphasis for some presenting problems than others. 
For example, as has been discussed, the discursive practice of oblique reference to 
trauma is in evidence only in the transcripts of those who had experienced childhood 
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sexual abuse rather than individuals suffering from PTSD as a result of other adult 
trauma. It might be the case that certain discourses are particular to certain client 
presenting problems. However, unlike most other presenting problems, avoidance is a 
part of the diagnostic make-up of PTSD, and it was this fact that prompted the current 
study. An exploration of avoidance in other presenting problems, therefore, may be 
less relevant. 
In any case, if therapists are aware of the range of discursive practices used and the 
ways in which they function to achieve avoidance, then they can consider strategies to 
address them. They can be on their guard with regard to their own need to collude, 
rescue, victimise or whatever particular response is provoked when working with 
traumatised clients, thus enabling them to achieve greater effectiveness by attending 
to the processes at work within the therapy session. 
6.1.3 Diagnostic categories 
Another issue regarding the transferability of findings relates to the diagnostic 
category of PTSD. DSM-IV categories can be regarded as constructs that are useful 
in order to help professionals working with people with psychological difficulties. 
The issue of diagnostic categorisation, itself, is of interest to discourse analysts in that 
categories cannot be assumed to represent disorders in an objective fashion, but rather 
are constructed and accomplished within psychiatric discourse (Harper, 1995). The 
criteria listed for inclusion or exclusion of a category can, in many cases, be regarded 
as arbitrary and subject to revision as knowledge of the disorder increases or with 
social and political changes. Clients do not always fit neatly into the currently used 
category and may sometimes span several. While the introduction in 1980 of PTSD 
as a diagnostic category is welcome in that it has generated more research in the area, 
scientific categorisation tends to regard people's problems as discrete psychological 
disorders, divorced from context and largely independent of the person or their 
particular history (van der Kolk and McFarlane, 1996). As has been seen, this has 
been illustrated regarding the particular presentations of those traumatised by 
childhood abuse and how they may differ from those with non-abusive traumatic 
experiences. The decision in the current study to use a DSM-IV diagnosis of PTSD as 
an inclusion criterion was one of convenience. What is of interest is the experience of 
clients in general who have been traumatised. It might be more valid, therefore. to 
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broaden future studies to consider all clients who have been traumatised, rather than 
only those conforming to the current DSM criteria for PTSD. This is consistent with 
the notion that validity should be regarded as a process of checking. questioning and 
theorising, and not an attempt to achieve correspondence between the research 
findings and the "real" world, but rather choosing among competing and falsifiable 
explanations (Kvale, 1989) as in the current study. 
6.2 Trustworthiness 
6.2.1 Discursive practices 
A similar criticism concerning trustworthiness may be made with regard to the 
discursive practices generated within the transcripts. Qualitative research is 
frequently criticised for its lack of objectivity, and the tendency for researchers to "see 
faces in the fire". While many qualitative research methods attempt to address this 
perceived shortcoming by deploying independent judges to validate categories or 
coding generated, this criticism is particularly pertinent to discourse analytic methods 
in which independent judges are not normally used. As suggested by Miles and 
Huberman (1994), it is difficult to avoid seeing what you expect to see without using 
careful procedures. In the current study, an attempt was made to employ careful 
procedures, outlined in the Method Section, and to be transparent with regard to the 
way in which each discourse was generated. The rationale and justification for each 
has been clearly argued, with several examples of each to illustrate the practice 
proposed. Furthermore, the research supervisor served as an independent judge in 
order to validate the findings. An attempt has also been made to adhere to Miles and 
Huberman's (1994) seven criteria for considering external reliability in qualitative 
research. These include providing a clear, detailed and explicit description of the 
procedures used, the collection, processing and condensing of the data and the explicit 
linking of conclusions with examples from the data. 
While reliability can be increased by seeking to construct a negotiated joint reality 
with participants (Westkott, 1983) it was considered neither practicable nor ethical to 
discuss the generated meanings with participants. Firstly, in some of the cases, 
archive data was used and so the respondents are not available. In the cases of those 
clients who provided data concurrently, they may 
have now completed their therapy. 
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There are ethical reasons for not re-approaching these clients once therapy has ended. 
Observations regarding their process need to be carefully timed and sensitively- 
delivered with the sole reason of facilitating the progress of therapy. To confront 
individuals with a number of researcher observations which have not been fully 
addressed with the client in therapy may be seen as counter-therapeutic and even, in 
some cases, harmful or unethical. A further obstacle with regard to negotiating 
meaning with the participants is that this negotiation of meaning would take place 
within a relationship of power and so is not a free and democratic process, and 
therefore, it could be argued, not a valid nor reliable one. 
6.3 Fruitfulness 
Qualitative research can be judged in terms of its fruitfulness, "the scope of an 
analytic scheme to make sense of new kinds of discourse and to generate novel 
explanations" (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p 171) and by its ability to create fresh 
solutions to problems. The current study has provided important observations 
regarding the ways in which avoidance is constructed within therapy for PTSD, 
particularly with regard to the avoidant discursive practices of therapists and has 
proposed new notions of agenda regulation and mode regulation in the discursive 
behaviours of therapists and clients respectively. The implications for practitioners of 
these findings and directions for future research have been discussed. 
6.4 Reflexivit 
Qualitative research acknowledges the ways in which research activity inevitably 
shapes and constitutes the object of inquiry. The researcher and researched are 
characterised as interdependent in the social process of research (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1983). In this way, qualitative research challenges the dualistic distinction 
between knower and known, leading to the realisation that the personal is always 
present in research (Polanyi. 1958; Stanley and Wise, 1983). 
The notion of reflexivity is particularly important in this study as the idea that 
researcher and researched are interdependent is analogous to the notion of therapist 
and client being interdependent. In both cases there 
is a move away from the notion 
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that clients may have certain characteristics that predispose them to behaving in a 
certain way. Any such characteristics must be seen in the context of the interaction of 
the dyad and also within the overarching framework of the therapy session with the 
expectations and power dynamics that this implies. Therefore, there is a parallel 
process between the undertaking of this research and working with a client in therapy. 
Just as there is an interactive process between the therapist's and the client's 
responses, so in my analysis of the texts, I used what I had learned from one text to 
analyse another. Through this process, I reshaped my conceptualisation of events, 
approaching each stage of the process within a different frame of mind, with evolving 
attitudes and understandings as my knowledge base expanded. These understandings 
are likely to be influenced by my role as a practitioner and my role as a scientist, and I 
shall address each of these in turn. 
6.4.1 The practitioner 
As a counselling psychologist, myself, working with clients with PTSD it would be 
naive to assume that I can divorce myself from thinking as I would as a practitioner, 
to become merely the "objective" observer and describer of social processes. I 
already possess a preconceived model of PTSD and how symptoms are triggered and 
maintained, operating within a discourse of mental health and more specifically, a 
cognitive discourse of diagnosis and therapy. 
Two of the six transcripts were from my own work with clients. It is possible that the 
way in which I interpreted and described the two transcripts from my own counselling 
work differed from the transcripts supplied by other therapists. As the therapist 
working with two of the clients in the study, my knowledge of the clients in a context 
outside of the immediate transcript will have influenced my understanding of their 
utterances as I had preconceived ideas about these clients in advance of analysing the 
transcripts. This is likely to have influenced my understanding of the internal world 
of the clients that may have impacted on my conceptualisation of the social processes 
occurring in the session. It is also likely that I have blind spots in relation to my work 
with these two clients, and that I may have found it easier to notice avoidant processes 
at work with the other therapists in the study rather than my own. A different 
researcher is likely to have proposed alternative processes that lie beyond m}- field of 
vision. 
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While I learned a considerable amount about my own practice in terms of the ways in 
which I contributed to avoidance of the clients' emotional material, I felt somewhat 
constrained from discussing the work of the other therapists in the same terms. While 
it felt acceptable to describe my own responses to clients' material as avoidant. to 
highlight similar processes in the other therapists in the study felt as if I was being 
critical of others' practice. Avoidance was common to all transcripts. This suggests 
that it is a normal part of the therapeutic encounter and does not imply bad practice, 
and so no criticism of any therapist's work should be inferred. 
In these ways, the findings from the analysis are likely to be influenced by my identity 
as a therapist and, more specifically, as one of the therapists in the study. This may 
have affected consistency with regard to my understanding of each of the transcripts 
and with regard to the way in which I described and expressed my observations and 
interpretations. 
6.4.2 The scientist 
It is not only the analysis of the transcripts which must be regarded as a reflexive 
process, but also the way in which the analysis is reported and described. The 
language, expressions and indeed discourses I choose to use in conveying my points 
are influenced by my own understandings, personal attitudes, biases and knowledge 
bases, and what I am attempting to achieve. As Stringer (1985) suggests, the 
reporting of research is not merely a record of events but a complex, multifaceted 
social achievement (Stringer 1985). 
As with therapy, research is not a neutral process in terms of being value- and 
context-free. Nor is it neutral in terms of feelings and mood, the research being 
influenced by the researcher's affective states at the various points during the process. 
I was aware of feeling frustrated and anxious at various stages in the process. The 
research is part of a doctoral study and so the desire to enhance the body of 
knowledge about avoidance in PTSD must be understood within the context of my 
motivation to achieve a qualification. Frustrations with regard to the slow pace of the 
research and other process factors will have 
impacted on my mood at the time of 
writing and may have influenced my rationale 
for completing the research. 
182 
The realisation that I was not going to be able to gather sufficient data for Part 1 of the 
study led me to consider alternative ways to explore the problem of avoidance. I 
ultimately decided to use a qualitative approach in the second part of the study. While 
this felt initially liberating, I was also aware of a problem at the other end of the 
spectrum to that of the quantitative study, that was a feeling of being overwhelmed by 
the sheer amount of data. Furthermore, the content of the data was such that it 
involved accounts of clients' distress and pain. Just as the findings suggest that 
therapists may feel overwhelmed by the client's affect, as a researcher I felt 
overwhelmed by the amount of distress contained within the utterances I was 
analysing. Using a discourse analytic approach did not enable me to behave as a 
distant and impartial observer, but rather I needed to immerse myself in the accounts, 
and so in the pain of the clients whose utterances made up the transcripts. As Rennie 
et al (1988) suggest, such methods require commitment and hard work and getting 
"close to the bone" (p145) of the data. The research was hard work and painstaking 
and I was aware of feeling tired and drained. The content and nature of the transcripts 
may have affected my mood, which in turn may have influenced my understanding 
and interpretation of the material. However, by remaining "close to the bone" of the 
transcripts and by grounding my findings within the context of established research, I 
attempted to ensure that my mood did not adversely nor inappropriately affect my 
arguments or conclusions. 
In summary, my identities of scientist and practitioner are likely to have influenced 
the analysis and reporting of the study in a variety of ways, including ways in which I 
can never be consciously aware. One practical implication of accepting the inevitable 
role of the researcher in the research process is that this should be highlighted and 
revealed in the documentation of qualitative studies. In this way an attempt is made 
not so much to reduce researcher bias but rather to be more honest and transparent 
about it. As Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest, the researcher must be as explicit 
and self-aware as possible about personal assumptions, values, biases and affective 
states and how each of these may have come into play during the study. I have here 
attempted to ensure that such influences are not detrimental to the research. realising 
the futility of the belief that such influences can ever be eradicated. Instead I have 
attempted to be transparent and honest about their likely impact. and to accept that 
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part of the process is inevitably a critical interrogation of my own presuppositions and 
my unexamined techniques of sense making (Ashmore, 1985). 
6.5 The "truth" of claims 
So an attempt has been made to demonstrate the transferability, trustworthiness and 
fruitfulness of the findings and to provide a transparent and reflexive account of the 
process of the research undertaken, in order to increase the persuasiveness of the 
claims made. However, it is not claimed that what has been arrived at has any 
objective "truth". The naturalistic view is that relying upon correspondence with the 
empirical world as the ultimate arbiter of truth is both impractical and untenable, and 
that we need to move away from the notion that there is a universal truth against 
which findings can be compared. The outcome of qualitative research is 
understanding rather than explanation, being based on principles of social 
constructionism (Gergen 1985) which assume that there is no fixed external reality to 
be objectively known but a fluid social reality that is co-constructed. The researcher, 
therefore, does not claim to generate universal truths. The findings from the current 
study must be regarded as one "reality" constructed by the researcher. Claims should 
be judged not so much against any empirical truth but rather in terms of their 
helpfulness and applicability to understanding the process within the therapy session. 
Accordingly, the conclusions drawn with respect to implications for effective therapy 
rely on the observed practices of avoidance themselves rather than on any 
interpretations made of participants' motivations for the avoidance. Further research 
is needed to explore the extent to which the motivations of therapists and clients 
proposed here are responsible for the avoidant discursive practices observed, and such 
research may generate alternative "truths". "An advantage of qualitative research is 
that theory is generated which is contextually sensitive, persuasive, and relevant" 
(Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992, p97). The more pragmatic argument can be made that 
the outcomes of research will be evaluated in terms of their persuasiveness and power 
to inspire an audience (Feyerabend, 1975). 
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7 Summary and conclusions 
The discussion has addressed the avoidance of emotional material by clients and 
related it to issues of fear of overwhelming affect and vulnerability. highlighting the 
particular presentations of those with a history of childhood sexual abuse. The 
avoidance of therapists has been addressed and related to issues of vicarious 
traumatisation, countertransference and compassion fatigue. Recommendations made 
for therapists to ensure their own well-being and to develop self-awareness of their 
own emotional issues that may impact upon the therapeutic encounter and the 
implications for the training of therapists has been considered. A case has been made 
that the discursive practices engaged in by the participants are a function of role 
differences and power dynamics within the overarching context of the therapeutic 
setting. The interactive and inconsistent nature of avoidance within therapy has been 
highlighted, and contrasted with the traditional understanding of stable avoidant 
personality traits, and the value of qualitative research to address these complex 
processes has been highlighted. Finally, methodological issues, including the 
transferability of the findings, the trustworthiness of the process, the fruitfulness of 
the research and the impact of the researcher on the process have been explored and 
addressed. Throughout, an attempt has been made to ensure the applicability of 
findings by considering the implications for improving the effectiveness of therapy 
and suggestions for future research in the field of avoidance in PTSD. 
Perhaps the most important finding of the research is the extent to which avoidance in 
therapy is an interactive process between client and therapist, rather than just the 
responsibility of the client. An awareness of this process forces us to move away 
from a preoccupation with the development of new techniques and methods for the 
treatment of PTSD that focus solely on the behaviour of the client. Instead the focus 
must shift to the avoidant behaviours of therapists and the ways in which they interact 
with those of the client, with a view to facilitating the client's addressing of the painful 
emotional material and evoke the affect necessary for an alleviation of PTSD 
symptoms. As van der Kolk (1996) states, the issue of avoidance is. arguably. the 
most prevalent process factor in PTSD treatment and, as such, should be given 
consideration in the development of new therapies. 
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A case study of an intervention for the treatment of survivors of 
childhood sexual abuse suffering from posttraumatic stress 
In the interests of confidentiality, all names and identifiers have been changed. 
1 The referral and context 
Penny was referred by her GP to the Psychology Department of the NHS Trust in which I 
work. The only information I received at this stage was that Penny, aged twenty-six, had 
described suffering from flashbacks of sexual abuse that she had suffered as a child, 
perpetrated by her parents. 
2 The assessment session 
2.1 First impressions 
- 
appearance and behaviour 
Penny was tall and thickset, with short, spiky hair dyed orange. She wore thick, heavy 
denim clothes, which made her appear very large and strong. When I went to meet her in 
the waiting room, she was sitting hunched over with her head in her hands, and I was 
initially taken aback as I thought she was a man. When she spoke, Penny presented as a 
confident and articulate person. 
2.2 Biographical information and family history 
Penny has two married parents who run a successful removal business. She has a younger 
brother and sister, aged twenty-one and nineteen respectively who both live at home with 
their parents. Penny left home two years ago. She is a lesbian and for the last year she has 
been living with her partner, whom she describes as supportive. She is employed as a 
youth worker for lesbian and gay adolescents. which involves providing some 
counselling and group work. She described an adolescent history of alcohol and drug 
abuse and overeating. 
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2.3 The client's definition of the problem 
Penny reported that she had been suffering from flashbacks and nightmares of the abuse 
she had suffered. These symptoms began four years previously when she first became 
aware that abuse had occurred. She had received some counselling at that time, which she 
described as helping her to become more aware of her feelings, however the flashbacks 
continued, being triggered particularly during sex with her partner, and she reported that 
she had never allowed any partner to bring her to orgasm, although she was able to do so 
herself. She felt she was not functioning well at work as she was having difficulty 
concentrating and that she often felt numb and detached. 
2.4 The counsellor's definition of the problem 
I felt that Penny was suffering from the symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) with delayed onset (DSM-IV) following the abuse, namely flashbacks, 
distressing dreams, extreme headaches, dissociation and avoiding activities or places 
which reminded her of the abuse. Her history of drug and alcohol abuse and overeating is 
typical of survivors of sexual abuse, for "victims often develop antisocial and self- 
abusive behaviours" (Foreward and Buck, p23). Her current lack of concentration and 
numbness is consistent with this formulation, for survivors often suffer from "continued 
shock and disbelief, perceptual dissonance, numbed detachment and psychic pain" (Mayr 
and Price, 1989, p38). Memories of the abuse may be triggered off unconsciously in 
situations akin to the abusive situations (van der Kolk and van der Hart, 1991; Ainscough 
and Toon, 1993) and I felt that Penny's difficulty allowing her partner to stimulate her to 
orgasm was a result of memories of the abuse being reactivated during sex. Penny felt 
that all aspects of her life were currently being affected by these symptoms. She 
described feeling low and depressed, though not suicidal. I obtained a measure of her 
symptoms by asking her to complete a PTSD symptom questionnaire, the Impact of 
Events Scale (Horowitz et al, 1979), with a view to repeating the test at the end of therapy 
as a measure of change. I explained the nature of PTSD and provided Penny with an 
information leaflet about it. 
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2.5 The approach taken, rationale and goals 
In my experience, when survivors of child sexual abuse display PTSD symptoms such as 
flashbacks, humanistic counselling alone, while supportive, seems to have little impact on 
the symptoms. I have been able to help people most by using a specific cognitive- 
behavioural approach called "Imagery Rescripting". This is an approach pioneered by 
Smucker, Dancu, Foa and Niederee (1995), which they describe as a "new treatment for 
survivors of childhood sexual abuse suffering from posttraumatic stress" (p3). It 
constitutes a nine session programme, including assessment, combining imaginal 
exposure, mastery imagery and cognitive restructuring of the abuse. I outlined this 
approach to Penny and she seemed initially sceptical. Penny's counselling experience had 
led her to believe that she should spend at least two years in therapy working on these 
issues, and she was disappointed when I explained that I was initially only able to work 
with her on a short-term basis, due to the NHS Trust limitations. However, when I 
reassured her that we would continually review progress and that we would not end 
therapy until she felt ready, she was more positive and ready to engage in the process. 
She recognised that it would be a painful experience, and I reassured her that I would go 
at her pace so that the control was with her, and that I would not push her to talk before 
she felt ready. 
2.5.1 The contract and structure of the sessions 
Consistent with the Smucker programme, we contracted initially for eight further weekly 
sessions, which would vary from one to one and a half hours' duration, followed by a 
review of progress and the option of further sessions to be negotiated. These were to take 
place within the Community Mental Health Team. 
2.5.2 Goals 
The main goal at this stage was to relieve Penny of her PTSD symptoms and to begin to 
work through her feelings about the abuse, with a view to enabling her to function more 
effectively in her relationships and in her work. The therapy was not directed at 
encouraging Penny to confront her parents about the abuse unless she chose to do so 
ýýý 
(Smucker et al, 1995). 
2.5.3 Confidentiality 
I explained to Penny that what we discussed was between ourselves, with the exception 
that there may be aspects of her case which I would discuss with a supervisor within the 
Department, in order to be able to help her as best I can. I informed her that I would 
contact her GP when we finished seeing each other, and that I would contact her GP 
before that time only if I considered her to be at risk of harming herself, and that in that 
event I would make all possible efforts to let her know of my action before I did so. 
3 The content and process of the sessions 
3.1 The overall content of the sessions 
3.1.1 Building the relationship 
Over the next eight sessions we worked through the Smucker programme, with some 
modifications. While Smucker suggests that the client should begin to relive her/his 
experiences in the second session, I feel that this is too early and my initial concern was 
to build a good working relationship with Penny before the painful material was worked 
through. Penny had already told me that she did not trust her GP, who had made some 
apparently homophobic remarks to her and had pathologised her sexuality, and so I felt 
that trusting another professional may be an issue for her. I was particularly careful not to 
pathologise her sexual identity and to show her acceptance and warmth. This was not 
difficult as she had a warm and open manner, was insightful about the abuse and 
appeared highly motivated to work on her issues. I was optimistic about being able to 
help her because of this and because of the good client-therapist match in terms of age 
and gender (for example: Berzins, 1977). 
In the first session I adopted an almost purely Rogerian stance, employing the core 
conditions of empathy genuineness and unconditional positive regard (Rogers, 1990) and 
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by listening reflecting and not offering any interpretations at this stage, on the basis cited 
by Dryden (1992) that "if the counsellor believes it is important for the client to trust her, 
she may set for herself the goal of being especially accepting of the client's ambivalent 
feelings" (p8). At this stage I felt it was important for Penny to realise that I would 
continue to accept her, regardless of what she may disclose. 
We used the second session to practise relaxation techniques, which were to be used to 
aid imaginal exposure in forthcoming sessions, and visualising a "safe place" where she 
could return in her imagination if the abuse imagery became too painful. 
3.1.2 The memories 
From the third session onwards, Penny related several incidents of sexual abuse by her 
parents, either individually or together, including having objects inserted into her vagina 
and rectum or being forced to have oral sex or intercourse. The memories began at about 
age three. Despite Penny's initial concern that she would be able to recall the events in 
only a fragmentary form, she was able to visualise the abuse quite vividly and began to 
fill in some of the gaps in her memory to form coherent scenarios. I was careful to adhere 
to the clinical guidelines for dealing with recovered memories (Bloom, 1994) on the basis 
that the way in which the therapist facilitates recall "may profoundly shape the recalled 
memory" (p 174). Reliving these events was clearly very painful for Penny, and she was 
frequently tearful as she spoke. It was clear from her account that she had frequently 
dissociated from the events as they occurred which is consistent with her forgetting the 
abuse for so long and with her current flashbacks (Mayr and Price, 1989). I felt moved as 
I listened to her pain, however I was able to remain focused as I had faith in the therapy 
and believed that only by processing the events consciously and experiencing the 
emotions attached to them would Penny be able to move on (Smucker et al, 1995). Penny 
reported relief that I had been able to stay with her pain and that I did not react with 
shock or disgust, which had previously been a barrier to her disclosing her abuse to 
others. 
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3.1.3 Expressing anger 
Part of the therapy involved helping Penny to express anger and outrage toward the 
abusers and to be able to feel warmth and nurturing to herself as a child. To start NA-ith, 
Penny expressed these emotions readily and dramatically, being able to visualise 
cuddling and rescuing the child and destroying the abuser. However, as therapy 
progressed, it became harder for her to experience and express this anger, particularly 
towards her father, as she continued to see him as all-powerful. Despite attempts at 
cognitive restructuring, including homework in which she wrote unposted letters to him, 
her ability to express her anger seemed to fluctuate. On exploring her reluctance, she said 
she felt that the setting was inhibiting and that she felt that if she were to become angry 
she would like the scope to be able to throw cushions around and be destructive which 
was implicitly inappropriate in this NHS setting. I wondered whether she was afraid of 
what might happen if she were to give full vent to her anger. Furthermore, I am aware 
that I find it hard to express anger myself, having come from a family in which 
"negative" emotions were not sanctioned, and I wondered to what extent my unconscious 
non-verbal communication might have inhibited her from full expression. However, 
subsequent events led me to an alternative hypothesis for this resistance: 
- 
3.1.4 Resistance 
As Penny's expression of anger fluctuated, so did her defences. When the memories 
became too painful, her defences grew stronger. She cancelled one session, arrived 
twenty minutes late for another, and began to question how far her recollections of the 
events were accurate. She had seen a chat show about false memory of abuse and 
wondered how far her memories could be false. Penny was insightful and aware of this 
avoidance, so we were able to explore this openly in the sessions. She said that her 
relationship with her partner was currently unstable. Her partner was finding it hard to 
deal with Penny's apparent increasing emotional dependency upon her during this 
vulnerable time. The impact of this insecurity was that Penny felt less inclined to feel 
anger toward her parents for the abuse, as she felt she may need to rely on them more, 
should her relationship with her partner break up. It is common for survivors of sexual 
abuse to crave love from the aggressor and from the family (Mayr and Price, 1989) and 
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they "will go to almost any length to reverse that feeling of being unloved" (Foreward & 
Buck, 1978, p20), particularly at such times of emotional vulnerability,. Penny's partner 
ended their relationship and Penny moved out to live alone for the first time. Some 
sessions were, therefore, spent exploring this and her insecurity at being able to maintain 
an identity as a "single dike" (Penny's expression) out of the context of a sexual 
relationship. She had also begun to have some dreams and sexual fantasies about men. 
which she perceived also as a threat to her sexual identity. She began to express some 
concern about the ending of therapy as we approached session eight, as she could 
potentially lose partner, sexual identity, parents and therapist at the same time. We 
contracted for a further six sessions to provide space to continue to work on the abuse 
issues, together with exploring her current relationship problems so that she felt 
supported over this time. 
3.1.5 One foot in the present 
Smucker et al's programme provides little space for addressing current issues. In order to 
work on Penny's relationship with her partner and parents we deviated from the 
programme and extended our contract. I believe with abused clients that it is important to 
keep "one foot in the present" as not only does it provide some sense of normality and a 
respite from the past, but it also enables evaluation of the impact of the therapy on the 
client's current relationships. Jones (1992) suggests that, as all abuse occurs within a 
wider context than that of the individual, all sexual abuse counselling should occur within 
a family framework, even if that work is with the individual, on the basis cited by White 
and Epston (1990) that family therapy is more to do with the framework in which therapy 
operates than the number of people attending. 
3.1.6 The continued development of the therapeutic relationship 
During Penny's reliving of her experiences, I became aware that I felt very close and 
warm toward her. On one occasion, as she spoke of an abusive episode when she was 
three years of age concerning her mother, she described feeling unable to articulate what 
she was visualising. I felt that these early memories may have been primarily encoded 
through the sensori-motor and visual modes of representation, and therefore not likel}- to 
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be accessible through linguistic or verbal means (Staten, 1990). I asked her if she wý ould 
like a pencil and paper to draw what she was experiencing. When she agreed, I sat in a 
chair beside her, closer than I would usually, in order to follow what she was drawing. As 
she became tearful I felt moved and impulsively placed my hand on her arm by 
, N-ay of 
reassurance and encouragement. I very rarely touch clients as I believe it can be 
perceived as intrusive, particularly in the case of survivors of sexual abuse, however it 
felt entirely appropriate at the time, and had the effect of encouraging her to continue. I 
failed to address this with her afterwards, but the fact that when we ended therapy she 
asked if she could hug me suggested that she had not found my action intrusive. 
4 Evaluation 
4.1 The client's report of the outcome 
Over the last two or three sessions, despite moving out from her partner and expressing 
some anxiety about maintaining an identity as a "single dike", Penny described feeling 
strong and surprised at how well she had handled the split. Later she reported that, despite 
living separately, she had resumed her relationship with her partner. I saw this as a 
reflection of Penny's renewed strength, as it had been her emotional dependency that her 
partner had previously found hard to cope with. She was also able to allow her partner to 
stimulate her to orgasm for the first time. Penny was doing extremely well at work, had 
acquired some new work, and had appeared on local radio to promote her youth project. 
She no longer suffered from flashbacks, headaches or other somatic symptoms and I was 
somewhat surprised by this dramatic change in her mood so soon after the apparent pain 
of revelation. However, this rapid improvement is something I have observed previously 
with people suffering from PTSD symptoms (both survivors of sexual abuse and others). 
I asked Penny to complete a second Impact of Events Scale, and together we compared 
her responses with her earlier ones. This showed dramatic improvements in all areas and 
Penny found it encouraging to see in black and white just how far she had come over the 
months. We explored relapse prevention, while recognising that often survivors need 
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several sessions of therapy at different points in their life, and that Penny was welcome to 
return should she feel the need. Penny gave me some useful feedback, describing the 
work we had done together as "superb" and, as we ended, she asked for a hug. I felt it 
would be counter-therapeutic to refuse, and we hugged warmly. It felt like a good ending. 
4.2 Professional dilemmas and concerns experienced 
-i. 2.1 Expressing anger 
An issue raised by my work with this client is the extent to which there is a fine line 
between being accepting of the client, listening to her story without expressing shock or 
disgust and showing acceptance or complacence about the abuse she has suffered. There 
were times when I felt that a stronger reaction from me would have helped Penny to 
experience a sense of outrage towards her abusers, and we addressed this issue during 
therapy. 
4.2.2 The recovered memory debate 
This case brought up the whole issue and ongoing debate of recovered memories (see for 
example, Brown 1995; Farrants, 1998). Penny had come to therapy aware of abuse, these 
memories had emerged before our sessions, and I ensured that I adhered strictly to the 
guidelines on false memory (Bloom, 1994). It is, nevertheless, a matter of ongoing debate 
whether people can remain unaware for many years that they have suffered abuse, in the 
way that Penny did. Penny described feeling certain that the abuse had occurred, and that 
her questions about false memories were a way of "clutching at straws" so that she could 
deny the reality of the painful experience. 
5 Summary and conclusion 
In summary, this client report illustrates the use of Smucker's Imagery Rescripting 
therapy with one client. It highlights the need to incorporate into the approach time for 
addressing current issues that may impact upon the exploration of past trauma. The 
importance of attending to process variables is raised. Such processes might include the 
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feelings of the therapist toward the client and the therapist's discomfort with expressing 
certain emotions such as anger. In particular, the extent to which the interaction between 
client and therapist impacts upon the therapy is discussed. Finally, the client study 
illustrates one way in which the false memory debate may influence therapy, now that it 
has entered the consciousness of clients as well as therapists, and emphasises the 
importance of therapists to not only be aware of the issues regarding false memory of 
abuse but to be able to communicate these issues clearly and sensitively to clients where 
appropriate. 
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Section C: Client Work 
Part 2: 
A case study of an intervention with a client suffering from 
intrusive thoughts and traumatic grief. 
_J 
A case study of an intervention with a client suffering from intrusive 
thoughts and traumatic grief. 
In the interests of confidentiality, all names and identifiers have been changed. 
1 The referral and context 
Jonathan was referred to me by one of the Community Psychiatric Nurses (CPNs) within 
the Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) in which I work. The CPN had supported 
him over a period in which Jonathan had been admitted to a psychiatric ward as an in- 
patient following a depressive and suicidal episode six months previously. Jonathan's 
depression had lifted after a few months of medication and CPN support, however, he 
was experiencing obsessional, disturbing and graphic thoughts of dismembered bodies 
and other gruesome images. He reported having suffered from these thoughts since his 
teens, but that they had reached a peak during his depression. Despite his depression 
lifting, they had remained and the CPN felt that Jonathan may benefit from seeing a 
psychologist. 
2 The assessment session 
2.1 First impressions 
- 
appearance and behaviour 
Jonathan was a small, casually but neatly dressed, twenty-nine year old man. Although 
visibly nervous, he was warm and polite. He was tearful for part of the session and 
regarded therapy as his final chance of what he referred to as "peace of mind". Although 
pessimistic that anything would change, he was anxious for reassurance that he was a 
"deserving case" for treatment. This led me to believe that he wished me to adopt the role 
of nurturer and I expected that he may become dependent upon me (Dryden, 1989). 
Jonathan's demeanour did indeed evoke in me a strong desire to take care of him, and so 
I was careful from the start to monitor this countertransference. 
? J4 
2.2 Biographical information and family histo 
Jonathan is single and shares a house with his mother and older brother. His father died 
suddenly eight years ago in a mental hospital following a psychiatric illness. Jonathan 
runs his own gardening business. He has a history of adolescent drug and solvent abuse 
and self-mutilation (cutting his arms with glass), however, he has done none of these 
things since adolescence. 
2.3 The client's definition of the problem 
Jonathan reported that he felt he was no longer depressed but that he was finding his 
disturbing thoughts overpowering and difficult to cope with. He was becoming irritable 
with his family and found it hard to concentrate on his work. 
2.4 The counsellor's definition of the problem 
Initially, I wondered whether Jonathan was suffering from Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) following some distressing events actually experienced (DSM IV). For example, 
he described witnessing two road accidents during adolescence and seeing dismembered 
bodies in the wreckage, and also that his aunt had been robbed at knife-point when he 
was aged eleven. His symptoms shared some of the characteristics of PTSD, for example 
the vivid images accompanying the thoughts, the fact that they were frequently triggered 
by news stories relating to death or injury and his irritability with his family (DSM IV). 
Following assessment, which included completion of the Impact of Events Scale 
(Horowitz et al, 1979), it was clear that Jonathan's disturbing thoughts did not relate 
directly to any of the events he had witnessed, a requirement for a diagnosis of PTSD 
(DSM IV). 
Jonathan referred to other obsessional thoughts and behaviour, including positioning of 
household objects and a fear of contamination leading to excessive hand-washing and I 
formed the hypothesis that his disturbing and intrusive thoughts were obsessions, defined 
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by DSM IV as "Persistent thoughts, impulses, or images that are experienced, at least 
initially, as intrusive and senseless" (p 245). 
Furthermore, Jonathan became distressed and tearful when he spoke of his father who 
had died eight years previously and I hypothesised that this prolonged grief was a result 
of some unresolved bereavement tasks (Worden, 1995). 
It has been suggested that obsessional behaviour is frequently underpinned by extreme 
underlying anxiety, of which the client may not be consciously aware (for example: 
Ehlers and Steil, 1995; Wells, 1995) and I wondered whether there was some further 
underlying anxiety which Jonathan had not yet articulated. Also, I planned to explore the 
events surrounding the onset of his depression, which had begun only six months 
previously. 
2.5 The approach taken, rationale and goals 
2.5.1 The contract and structure of the sessions 
We contracted initially for eight further weekly sessions, each of one hour's duration 
followed by a review of progress and the option of further sessions to be negotiated. 
These were to take place within the Community Mental Health Team. Because of 
Jonathan's tendency for dependence, I was acutely aware of the importance of structure 
and boundaries and of a need to be consistent and open with him. (Dryden, 1989). 
2.5.2 Goals 
The main goals agreed at this stage were to relieve Jonathan of his intrusive thoughts and 
to begin to work through his feelings about his father's death, with a view to enabling him 
to function more effectively in his relationships and in his work. 
2.5.3 Confidentiality 
I explained to Jonathan that what we discussed was between ourselves, with the 
exception that there may be aspects of what he told me which I would discuss with a 
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supervisor within the Department, in order to be able to help him as best I could. I 
informed him that I would contact his GP when we finished seeing each other. In view of 
his previous suicide attempt, I was careful to explain that I would contact his GP before 
that time only if I considered him to be at risk of harming himself or others, and that in 
that event I should let him know of my action before I did so. 
2.5.4 The approach taken 
In the first session I adopted an almost purely Rogerian stance, employing the core 
conditions of empathy, genuineness and unconditional positive regard (Rogers, 1990). At 
this stage I felt it was vital for Jonathan to realise that I would continue to accept him, 
regardless of what he may disclose. In later sessions I adopted a cognitive behavioural 
approach to explore the cognitions related to his intrusive thoughts (Beck, 1976; 
Rachman and DeSilva, 1978) and followed Worden's (1995) approach to the treatment of 
traumatic grief. 
3 The content and process of the sessions 
3.1 Bereavement work 
The early sessions were spent working through Jonathan's confused feelings about the 
death of his father eight years previously, following Worden's (1995) approach to 
traumatic grief. Jonathan described his father as a distant, shy and withdrawn man and 
that he did not feel as if he had ever had a relationship with him. His father had developed 
a mental illness two years before his death, which resulted in aggressive, unpredictable 
and sometimes violent outbursts toward the family. Jonathan was tearful when he spoke 
of his father's death and described relief that his father's terrorisation of the family had 
ended, while also expressing regret at the lost chance for a closer relationship with him. 
Worden states that "The most frequent type of relationship that hinders people from 
adequately grieving is the highly ambivalent one with unexpressed hostility" (Worden, 
1995, p65) and I felt that Jonathan may be suffering from a traumatic grief reaction as a 
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result of his ambivalence to the death. 
As part of the therapy, I asked him to write a letter to his father expressing his feelings, 
and this appeared to provoke a cathartic reaction. Following this, Jonathan reported that 
his intrusive thoughts had been fewer and less intense than at any time since the onset of 
his depression six months ago, and I felt that we had established a good working 
relationship. I was encouraged by his early improvement, particularly in view of the fact 
that patient ratings of their counsellor after the third session have been found to be 
predictive of the outcome of therapy better than any other variable (Winefield, 1992). 
3.2 The nature and content of the intrusive thoughts 
Through a cognitive exploration of the nature and content of Jonathan's intrusive thoughts 
(Beck, 1976) a deep sense of Jonathan's feelings of worthlessness and self-loathing 
emerged. The vivid images which accompanied the thoughts followed either of two 
themes, namely images of himself being humiliated, for example being stamped or spat 
upon, or otherwise of himself carrying out acts of "depravity" (his word) for example 
eating the entrails of a dead friend. Jonathan regarded the fact that he had these thoughts 
as evidence that he was bad and depraved. He believed himself to be capable of carrying 
out these actions in reality. This negative view of himself as a result of the thoughts 
served to perpetuate the thoughts and so maintain a circular feedback loop (Penn, 1982) 
of self-loathing. This is consistent with Salkovskis' (1985; 1989) findings that intrusive 
thoughts result in distress according to the extent to which their occurrence and/or content 
is interpreted in a particular type of negative way. It may also account for his obsessional 
behaviour as, according to Salkovskis, Richards and Forrester (1995), obsessional 
behaviour is likely to occur if the intrusive thoughts are interpreted as an indication that 
the person may be responsible for harm to others. I explained to Jonathan the difference 
between fantasy and reality and reassured him that the thoughts did not mean that he was 
likely to carry out these actions. (Salkovskis et al, 1995). Jonathan found it particularly 
difficult to talk about the content of his thoughts as he feared that I too might despise and 
reject him. 
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The act of voicing the thoughts for the first time enabled Jonathan to experience that he 
could be listened to with warmth and empathy and that I would continue to accept him 
regardless of his disclosures. The whole issue of acceptance and approval became a 
theme in itself and underpinned all the work that followed, and I believe was the single 
most important factor in Jonathan's progress. I reflected to Jonathan these themes of 
worthlessness and self-loathing and used immediacy (Egan, 1994) to reflect his desire for 
approval. Together we explored how he may have come to feel this way and it became 
clear that he had suffered from emotional neglect as a child by both his mother and father 
and had never felt loved or approved of. This may account for his low self-esteem, 
feelings of worthlessness and his dependency, particularly upon older women (Kenward 
and Hevey 1989). We explored his childhood experiences which led to his deep sense of 
worthlessness, in order to identify negative schemas which he had carried into adulthood 
(Salkovskis et at, 1995) and their impact on his current relationships. 
3.3 Relationships with women 
From what Jonathan told me of his relationships with women, I formed the impression 
that he was searching for the care and mothering that he had lacked. He had had only two 
sexual relationships, both with older women in their fifties. The first relationship lasted 
over one year and was with a woman who had commissioned him for some gardening 
work. The relationship became sexual after he sought sympathy from her following an 
accidental cut to his finger while gardening. Jonathan was currently in his second 
relationship, the onset of which he associated with the onset of his depression six months 
previously. He had arranged a first date with the woman for which she had been over two 
hours late. He describes the time while he was waiting for her as a 'spiralling into a black 
depression. On exploring during the session his cognitions at this time, it was clear that 
her lateness had reinforced his notion that he was unimportant, worthless and deeply 
unlovable, mirroring his feelings during childhood, and this seemed to precipitate his 
depressive episode. Although the relationship had continued, he worried about the fact 
that his partner was over twenty years older than himself. and he felt a sense of the 
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relationship having no future. His partner was inconsistent and conditional in her feelings 
for him and frequently threatened to end the relationship at some prearranged date. When 
the time came, she would agree to see him for a further period. 
3.4 The therapeutic relationship 
I was aware that my contract with Jonathan very much mirrored the relationship with his 
girlfriend. We had a fixed contract, following which further sessions would be negotiated. 
He began to express anxiety at the impending ending of our contract, despite my 
reassurance that we would stagger the ending and that we would not stop suddenly or 
without warning or until he felt ready, as advocated by Ward (1984) for dependent 
clients. On the penultimate session of our initial contract, Jonathan disclosed that he had 
strong sexual feelings for me. I was not surprised by this disclosure and I regarded his 
feelings as an extreme form of transference to the therapist as nurturer (Watkins, 1983). I 
explained to him that his attraction to me was understandable in that our relationship had 
been the first unconditional relationship he had experienced with a woman. I explained to 
Jonathan that I cared about his well-being and felt that we had a good working 
relationship and reinforced that it was to remain on a purely professional footing. He was 
fearful that I would reject him on account of this disclosure and I reassured him that my 
respect for him was unchanged, which I demonstrated by continuing to behave 
consistently towards him and by not terminating our contract early, which he had feared. 
I feel that his disclosure may have been a way to test whether I would continue to accept 
him unconditionally and seemed to me to be an attempt to elicit a declaration of my 
feelings for him. Jonathan had clearly become dependent upon our sessions and his need 
for the love and approval that had so clearly been absent from his early life manifested 
itself in both the content and process of therapy, namely in his sexual relationships and in 
his relationship with me. We continued to work on this theme throughout the therapy and 
I was careful to be consistent. to maintain firm boundaries and to continue to accept him 
unconditionally. We extended our contract and, on the advice of my supervisor, did not 
have a fixed end date so that Jonathan would continue to feel safe and accepted. 
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3.5 Factors maintaining current anxiety 
Jonathan's current living circumstances were a source of anxiety. He was living with his 
mother who expressed no emotion toward him and a brother who was out of work and 
becoming reclusive, and occasionally abusive, violent and unpredictable. Jonathan feared 
that his brother was becoming like his father and he believed that his own intrusive 
thoughts were evidence that he too was becoming unstable, like his father. Also, his 
gardening business was not thriving as well as he would have liked and he therefore had a 
sense of a foreshortened future, devoid of hope or happiness. 
Having expressed these anxieties during therapy, Jonathan's intrusive thoughts changed 
from involving fictional gruesome and disturbing images to more realistic anxieties 
concerning his future. He agreed that the intrusive thoughts had perhaps previously been 
effective in allowing him to avoid responsibility for changing the realities of his present 
life, which he felt helpless to alter. I suspected that his depression may have served a 
similar function and that he had become stuck in a negative "rut" of learned helplessness 
(Seligman and Maier, 1967), believing he was powerless to change his circumstances. 
Through therapy Jonathan was able to begin to take responsibility for change. He began 
working towards moving into a home of his own, he became more relaxed about the 
future of his relationship with his partner and was able to enjoy the time they spent 
together on a day-to-day basis. He increased his advertising for his gardening business 
and began to cycle occasionally instead of driving, as he enjoyed the exercise. He 
accepted that his mental health was improving and no longer believed he would 
degenerate as his father had done. He planned to widen his social circle by joining a 
conservation action group. 
Once Jonathan's sense of helplessness had begun to diminish, we began to work on his 
specific OCD symptoms, using exposure and response prevention (Meyer, 1966). Almost 
as soon as he had begun to monitor his obsessional behaviour he was largely able to resist 
the compulsion to wash his hands inappropriately and to place objects symmetrically. 
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Similarly, he reported that for many years he had suffered from panic attacks in 
supermarkets, which we were then able to deal with using a biopsychosocial approach 
(Barlow, 1988) and which he was then able to control with relative ease. I was surprised 
at the speed of these improvements. It appears that the very fact of gaining mastery over 
his compulsions and anxieties promoted a sense of control over his life. This in turn 
reduced his need to carry out the compulsions for the illusory sense of control which they 
had afforded (Reed, 1985) and so formed a circular self-reinforcing feedback loop (Penn 
1982). As a consequence, Jonathan seemed to attach less importance to his intrusive 
thoughts which, although still present, were considerably less frequent and, when they 
occurred, briefer. He took the responsibility himself for beginning to end therapy, 
suggesting that we reduce our meetings to fortnightly and a few weeks later he suggested 
that we change this to every three weeks, which indicated that his dependency upon me 
was diminishing as his sense of control and self-efficacy increased. I reflected this to him, 
and he was able to see a change from his earlier anxiety about ending. I felt that it was 
important that it was he who was able to begin to "reject" me. 
4 Evaluation 
4.1 A critical assessment of the effectiveness of the thera 
Jonathan's progress was considerably more extensive and rapid than I expected at the 
start. It appears that my interventions helped him to reframe his situation and to alter his 
negative beliefs about himself and his life, and to begin to believe that he could change. 
However, I suspect that most change was caused not so much by the content of the 
cognitive interventions, but more by the process between us. Strupp (1989) refers to the 
"overriding significance of the interpersonal relationship between patient and therapist as 
the vehicle for therapeutic change. " Jonathan learned that he could feel accepted and 
cared for unconditionally. I feel that the relationship between us was the most productive 
factor during therapy. 
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4.2 The client's report of the outcome 
Jonathan reported feeling considerably less distressed than he had done for several years, 
and was able to begin to take action to improve his circumstances, once he overcame his 
belief that he was helpless. He described feeling that, although he enjoyed our sessions, 
he no longer felt he needed them so frequently as he felt he was managing well between 
sessions. 
4.3 Professional dilemmas and concerns experienced. 
It was vital to Jonathan's progress that I dealt in an objective and professional manner 
with regard to the transference and countertransference issues, namely his sexual feelings 
toward me and my strong caring feelings toward him. I was able to remain warm and 
accepting without revealing the depth of my feelings and without encouraging his 
dependency, as is evidenced by his ability to take the initiative to make changes in his life 
and to take control of reducing the frequency of our sessions. 
5 Summary and conclusion 
The work with Jonathan clearly illustrates how dealing with symptoms such as OCD or 
panic attacks can be considerably more effective when underlying anxiety about other 
factors has been worked through. For example, once Jonathan had worked on his 
anxieties concerning his current life and his lack of hope for his future, his obsessional 
behaviour ceased with relative ease and rapidity in a way in which dealing with clients' 
symptoms alone does not always appear to. It seems as if once the underlying anxiety 
has been addressed there is no longer anything to maintain the behaviour. I have found 
this to be the case with several clients and, although my findings are admittedly 
anecdotal, it may be interesting to attempt to quantify these results in some way in future 
empirical research. 
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Furthermore, this client study demonstrates the importance of the development and 
management of the therapeutic alliance with clients who may have a tendency to become 
dependent upon the therapist. A solid collaborative working alliance, in which the 
therapist relates to the client with genuineness and as an equal partner in the dyad, allows 
the client to experience validation of their feelings from a person they respect. This, in 
turn, increases their perception of self-efficacy as they no longer regard themselves as 
"the mental patient", and this shift occurs when therapists are able to validate clients and 
to encourage them to take responsibility themselves for change. This is consistent with 
the approach of Counselling Psychology which promotes the "working alliance" (Dryden, 
1992) between psychologist and client, in contrast to traditional approaches which 
operate according to the medical model, with the therapist as expert (Cunningham and 
Davis, 1985). 
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SECTION D: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The "False Memory" Debate: A critical review of the research on 
recovered memory of child sexual abuse. 
248 
The "False Memory" Debate: A Critical Review of the Research on 
Recovered Memories of Child Sexual Abuse. 
1 Introduction 
Few issues within psychology have been so hotly debated as that of "false memory 
syndrome", the notion that illusory and untrue memories of earlier childhood sexual 
abuse can be implanted by therapists in adult clients. The issue is of increasing relevance 
to any professional involved in therapy, particularly in view of the wealth of publicity and 
media attention afforded to cases of alleged false recall. The reputation of the therapy 
professions is at stake, as clients begin to sue therapists for the implantation of false 
memories. In an increasingly polarised and emotive debate, extreme positions have been 
adopted, on the one side by those believing that recovered memories nearly always 
represent actual traumatic experiences and, on the other side, by those describing a 
growing epidemic of false "memories" of abuse which never occurred. Proponents of the 
latter position draw upon findings from laboratory studies of the fallibility of memory and 
are critical of the methods used by therapists, which they believe to promote the creation 
of false memories. In response, those who believe that recovered memories are likely to 
be genuine provide evidence from research on those known to have suffered earlier 
sexual abuse and propose putative mechanisms which may account for any subsequent 
delay in recall of the abuse. The following is an evaluation of the evidence put forward by 
both sides of the controversy in order to assess the extent to which either of the two 
stances is viable. 
2 Laboratory studies demonstrating the fallibility of memory 
Firstly, proponents of false memory syndrome have utilised the findings from laboratory 
studies of the suggestibility of memory to support their stance. 
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2.1 The suggestibility of memory 
A long history of research on human memory documents the extent to_ which misleading 
suggestions can distort recall of events (Lindsay and Read, 1994). In a classic study, 
Loftus (1993) led five subjects to believe over a period, with the use of misleading and 
suggestive questioning, that a particular event had occurred, for example that they had 
been lost in a shopping mall as a child. Loftus concluded that it is indeed possible to 
implant false memories that can be as vivid, internally coherent and detailed as true 
memories, and that repetition of erroneous suggestions can lead to an acceptance by the 
subject of their truth. This they referred to as the "misinformation effect" and Ceci and 
Loftus (1994) found such memory for non-events and the subjects' staunch belief in their 
reality to be far from rare. However, this study is not without its critics. 
It has been argued that studies such as these reveal nothing helpful to the study of 
memories of abuse (Pezdek, 1994). Firstly, in Loftus' study, the events were implanted by 
a relative, who could in theory have witnessed the event, thus giving it credence, and 
secondly it could be argued that individuals may be operating according to a pre-existing 
script for common events such as being lost while shopping, rendering such a memory 
easy to construct. Pezdek (1994) argues that individuals, especially children, are unlikely 
to possess such a script for sexual abuse, unless it is something which they have directly 
experienced. However, Pezdek's point fails to recognise that most adults in the present 
culture, with all its publicity about abuse, may in fact possess such a script. Admittedly, 
children may be less likely than adults to possess this script, however, the debate 
concerns the recall of adults and not children. Furthermore, Read and Lindsay (1994) 
report findings by Holst and Pezdek (1992) that subjects shared common scripts for three 
types of robberies which affected their memory of events, despite no direct of experience 
of them. These studies, therefore, suggest that personal experience of sexual abuse is not 
essential for the recovery of such "memories", as the possibility remains that pre-existing 
scripts arc being deployed. 
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However, caution needs to be exercised in generalising the Loftus study to other 
situations, as it has been criticised for manifold methodological flaws (Brown, 1995). 
Only five subjects took part in the experiment, all of whom were friends or relatives of 
the researcher, and no control subjects were used. This may introduce a confirmatory 
bias, something of which Loftus, herself, accuses memory recovery therapists. While the 
misinformation effect may provide some support for the notion that memory can be 
distorted through suggestive questioning, the extent to which entirely new memories can 
be created has been questioned (Toon, Fraise, McFetridge and Alwin, 1996). 
Consequently, Toon et al (1996) dismiss the shopping mall study as irrelevant to the 
understanding of recovered abuse memories. A case for the inappropriateness of 
attempting to generalise the findings from laboratory research to real situations has been 
made by several commentators. Watkins (1995) warns against discounting anecdotal, 
observational data in favour of laboratory studies, stating that new phenomena are 
frequently found first in this way, and Olive (1996) regards anecdotal case study evidence 
as more valid than laboratory studies. Brown (1995) states that overgeneralisation from 
one area of enquiry to another eliminates the complexity of variables involved. 
2.2 The effect of social influence 
Others have argued that the subjects involved in the laboratory studies are subject not so 
much to memory distortions as to the effect of social influence and that it is the reporting 
of events and not the memory of them which changes. Brown (1995) cites the studies of 
Zaragoza (1991) in which the Loftus study was replicated, and found that the tendency to 
recall according to the misleading suggestion was more a function of social influence, 
namely a desire to agree with the experimenter, than an impaired memory. If this is in 
fact the case, then it is an overstatement to say that memories can be transformed by 
misinformation, if it is merely the reporting of them which is transformed (Brown, 1995). 
A distinction should be made between post-event misinformation and interrogatory 
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suggestion, involving interpersonal pressure and which is more likely to result in false 
recall (Gudjonsson, 1992). There is little evidence then that the occasional misleading 
question by a therapist can create false memories of abuse. 
2.3 Memory for trauma 
A further criticism of laboratory studies is that they do not deal with traumatic stimuli in 
the way that recall of child sexual abuse does (Brown, 1995) and that individuals are 
more suggestible to the relatively trivial subject matter used in laboratory research than 
they are to important events (Sherif, 1979). However, it is clearly simpler and more 
ethically sound to demonstrate memory distortion in controlled laboratory conditions 
using trivial information than in real situations using traumatic stimuli (Spector, 1996) 
provided that generalisations are made only cautiously. Traumatic memories should, 
therefore, be distinguished from narrative memories (Van der Hart and Nijenhuis, 1995). 
Recovery of sexual abuse memories often results in Post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) symptoms (Vardi, 1994; Smucker, Dancu, Foa, and Niederee, 1995). If the 
memories recovered are indeed false, this raises the question of what caused the PTSD 
symptoms. Furthermore, Watkins (1995) regards the apparent terror of some clients when 
recounting traumatic memories to be unexplainable if the memories recounted are indeed 
false. Brown (1995) suggests that to generalise, therefore, "from normal to traumatised 
individuals with PTSD symptoms may be like comparing apples and oranges in terms of 
encoding, retention, or retrieval" (p13). Some go as far as to posit that emotional and 
traumatic experiences are processed differently in the brain from intellectual experiences 
(Le Doux, 1989; Metcalfe and Jacobs, 1996) as trauma implies the disruption of normal 
memory processes (Horowitz and Reidbord, 1992). Memories of sexual abuse may be 
encoded, stored and retrieved differently from other memories (Van der Kolk, 1994), 
particularly if the abuse occurred under circumstances of high arousal, terror or 
ambivalence, where escape was impossible or when the meaning of abuse, if confronted, 
could be devastating. This, they argue, may lead to repression or dissociation, 
psychologically motivated defences, which may not be demonstrable in the laboratory. 
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While Ceci and Loftus (1994) acknowledge some of the criticisms of laboratory research, 
they counter these by citing examples of memory distortion not only for mundane and 
trivial memories but also for intensely painful memories. For example. they refer to the 
findings of Wright (1993) which demonstrate that individuals' recall of the distressing 
Hillsborough disaster, became distorted over time. They argue that if memory of such 
traumatic events can become distorted, so too could memories of abuse. However, the 
distortion of an existing memory should be regarded as distinct from a total fabrication of 
an event that did not occur at all. Furthermore, alternative findings support the notion that 
traumatic memory is no more likely to be distorted than normal memory. For example, 
Terr's (1990) study of twenty children who suffered from trauma following being 
kidnapped from a California school bus, found their recollection of events at twelve 
years' follow up to be more accurate, clearer, more detailed and longer-lived than 
ordinary memory. However, this sample may not be typical of trauma victims, as the 
kidnap was not a solitary experience, occurring as it did with other children and being in 
the public eye. This may have resulted in the children sharing their experiences with each 
other, their parents and the media repeatedly since the event. This may have provided 
greater opportunity for rehearsal and cognitive processing and for making sense of the 
event, which is frequently not the case for many abused children who may not have 
spoken of the abuse at all during childhood. Further evidence from therapy for trauma 
victims suggests that repetition of the event and exposure to the intrusive images helps 
alter the emotional reaction to the memory although not the memory itself (Foa, Feske, 
Murdock, Kozac, and McCarthy, 1991; Resick and Schnicke, 1992). However, the 
Hillsborough victims in Wright's study had a similar experience to the California children 
in terms of sharing their memories with others and the media and yet, according to 
Wright, their memories revealed distortions. It cannot be ruled out that the discrepancies 
in these findings may be the result of the misinformation effect, with the extent to which 
memories were recalled accurately being a function of the way in which individuals had 
been questioned about the event previously. 
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So, the research findings are mixed, with some evidence for the fact that the misleading 
or suggestive questioning can result in memory distortion, although the extent to which 
entirely new memories of traumatic incidents can be created from nothing, the claim of 
the false memory proponents, has yet to be demonstrated. False memory proponents have 
argued that it is the way in which the therapist operates which leads the client to recover 
false memories. Indeed it has been reported that over two thirds of alleged abusees stated 
that their first suspicion that abuse had occurred arose during a therapy session (Roe, 
Schwarz, and Peterson, 1994) and it is therefore, necessary to examine both the evidence 
that pseudomemories have been recovered during therapy, and the methods used by the 
therapists. 
3 The evidence that false memories have been recovered durini thera 
In a critique of Lindsay and Read's (1994) article outlining the risk of false memories 
being created in therapy, Pezdek (1994) argues that evidence for therapist implanted 
memory is weak, as do Baker-Ward, Gordon, Ornstein, Larus and Clubb (1993). Lindsay 
and Read (1994) have been criticised for asserting the possibility that false memories can 
be created while providing no evidence for the phenomenon (Pezdek 1994). As Pezdek 
reflects, "it is illogical to infer the existence of a phenomenon from the possibility of 
explaining it" (p 340). In order to support the view that it is possible for pseudomemories 
to be created, Read and Lindsay (1994) cite examples of bizarre and unlikely memories 
which have been recovered during therapy, some of which were in press at the time of 
Lindsay and Read's article. For example, Bass and Davis (1988) write of recovered 
memories of entire cities of satanic ritual abusers, Wagenaar (in press) described a 
woman who recalled giving birth at the age of eight, and Loftus (in press) writes of 
therapist-aided memories of life in the womb, the bizarre nature of which lead Read and 
Lindsay to conclude them to be highly unlikely to be true. They also refer to Piper (in 
press) who reports a therapist-assisted memory of molestation by a man who was later 
found to have been out of the country at the time. Far from regarding this fact as evidence 
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that the abuse did not occur, the client reported that she must, therefore, have been abused 
by a different man. While this example does not in any way prove that abuse did not 
occur, it does provide an example of a client altering the story to fit the facts and grants 
some credence to the notion that it is possible to recall events inaccurately. Ceci and 
Loftus (1994) cite the example of Laura Pasley who sued her therapist for incompetence, 
having recovered memories which Laura later retracted, believing them to be false. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether Laura had any corroborating evidence that the abuse 
did not occur, and so this cannot be regarded as evidence of false recall. In fact it is 
almost impossible to prove that abuse did not occur, with the retraction of earlier 
statements alone constituting insufficient evidence (Pezdek, 1994). Read and Lindsay 
(1994) conclude that even their critics now concede that false memories can be implanted 
by therapists, and maintain that the debate has shifted from the possibility of therapy- 
induced false beliefs to their prevalence. The specific attitudes and behaviour of 
therapists has been cited by false memory proponents as a factor contributing to this 
prevalence. 
3.1 The contribution of therapists to the recovery of false memories 
Watkins (1995) states that "Certainly part of the controversy today is the fault of 
overeager therapists who have too suggestively championed the possibility of child 
abuse" (p178). Some have blamed poorly trained therapists for inadvertently implanting 
false memories of abuse in their clients, or therapists who practise without an 
understanding of psychological theories of normal memory. However, it is not only the 
inexperienced and incompetent who are accused of eliciting false memories during 
therapy. Scotford (1994) the director of the British False Memory Society (BFMS) claims 
that, while therapists "palm off blame" (p 5) onto poorly trained hypnotherapists, in fact 
the BFMS also receives complaints about fully trained professionals such as psychiatrists 
and psychologists. Ceci and Loftus (1994) state that even eminent, experienced therapists 
use techniques likely to create false memories. They cite the example of Fredrickson 
(1992) who states that survivors will have a series of realisations of the abuse without a 
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sense of having experienced it, and that they will refer to this as memory not because they 
recall the experience but more because the pieces fit into their sense of reality. Ceci and 
Loftus (1994) criticise Fredrickson for his apparent lack of concern that such 
"realisations" may indeed not be true memories. Similarly, Rogers (1995) found a 
significant number of doctoral therapists to regularly apply methods involving leading 
suggestions which may have potential risk, and Andrews, Morton, Bekerian, Brewin, 
Davies, and Mollon's (1995) survey of the beliefs of British Psychological Society (BPS) 
practitioners revealed that many psychologists believe their clients' reports of ritual 
satanic abuse, despite the La Fontaine report (1994) which found no evidence of satanic 
abuse and despite any lack of police or other corroborative evidence for the practice. It 
has been argued, therefore, that recovery of false memories is a function of suggestive 
probing by the therapist or the influence of popular culture (for example Lindsay and 
Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993). However, such claims are not supported by any systematic, 
empirical or ecologically valid evidence (Berliner and Williams, 1994). Indeed Elliott 
(1994) found only 15 per cent of subjects recalling abuse to have done so during 
psychotherapy, contrary to Roe et al's (1994) figure of two thirds, suggesting that more 
often than not factors other than therapy or the therapist are triggering the recall. False 
memory proponents ignore the fact that there is a standard of care in psychotherapy 
literature, and unfairly deploy selective references to anecdotal accounts of bad practice 
to support their stance (Brown, 1995). The suggestion that therapists deliberately plant 
false memories has been criticised by McKissack (1993) on the basis that, if false 
memories are created by unscrupulous therapists, their motives are, at the least, puzzling 
(Withers and Mitchell, 1995). Indeed, most professionally trained therapists are aware of 
the dangers. The fact that the BPS have issued guidelines to help prevent the creation of 
false memories in therapy is an indication of the awareness within the psychology 
profession of such risks (BPS, 1995). While the BPS guidelines suggest ways in which 
practitioners can minimise the risk of false memory production, it has been argued that it 
is the nature of certain memory recovery therapies, rather than specific therapist 
interactions, which may inadvertently lead some adults to create illusory memories 
(Lindsay and Read, 1994) and that the BPS guidelines do not go far enough in warning 
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against these methods (McCullough, 1996). 
4 The contribution of memory recovery methods to the recovery of false memories 
4.1 Hypnosis 
In particular, the use of hypnotic procedures has come under some criticism for 
producing false recall, as a result of the suggestibility of clients under hypnosis. As 
Bloom (1994) reflects, "Every clinician using hypnosis is asked on occasion to facilitate 
recall of past memories of trauma including sexual abuse. The response to these requests 
by therapist and patient may profoundly shape the recalled memory itself and how it is 
subsequently used. " (p173-4). Furthermore, Campbell (1995) states that "It has long been 
known that the effects of hypnosis are to increase productivity, most of which is error, 
and to increase confidence for both correct and incorrect material" (p 190). Campbell also 
warns against "disguised hypnotic procedures", such as regression work, dream analysis 
and guided imagery, and Lindsay and Read (1994) also cite a range of techniques which 
they regard as likely to increase the incidence of false recall. 
On the other hand, Brown (1995) cites studies which have found the high hypnotisability 
of clients, rather than the specific use of hypnosis, to be associated with the creation of 
false memories, for example Laurence and Perry (1983) and Orne (1979). 
Pseudomemories were found to reduce when free recall was used as opposed to forced 
choice retrieval strategies, and Sheehan, Statham and Jamieson (1991) conclude an 
interaction between hypnotisability and social influence in the creation of false memories. 
While Andrews et al (1995) regard as acceptable the direct questioning of a client 
concerning whether they have been abused, this in itself could be regarded as a loaded 
suggestion with which the client may feel socially influenced to comply, and the very use 
of the question implies plausibility of earlier abuse as an explanation of current 
symptoms. Contrary to the fact that therapists using hypnosis may be responsible for 
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inadvertently creating false memories, Andrews et al (1995) found therapists using 
hypnotic regression to be more alert than others to the possibility that their own clients' 
memories could be false. Another therapy frequently criticised is bibliotherapy, involving 
popular books. 
4.2 Popular books 
Several authors have expressed concern at the rise of popular books about abuse, 
particularly that of Bass and Davis (1988) "The Courage to Heal", fearing that such books 
may inadvertently lead some readers to create illusory memories or beliefs of childhood 
sexual abuse (Lindsay and Read, 1994). Indeed, Campbell (1995) goes as far as to 
suggest that the most common way in which false memories enter conscious is through 
reading this book. According to Campbell (1995) the book encourages suing without 
external corroboration, and refers to ritual satanic abuse despite the fact that so far no 
evidence has been found for such practices (La Fontaine, 1994; Lanning, 1992). 
However, despite the concern expressed by some authors, there is as yet no hard evidence 
that reading the book has led to the creation of false memories of abuse, and indeed it is 
questionable whether such evidence could ever be found, although the Independent on 
Sunday, 15 May (1994) reported that Laura Davis, who wrote a companion book, "The 
Courage to Heal Workbook" is being sued for professional negligence and 
misrepresentation by a reader for advice given in the book. 
There is, as yet, no evidence that any particular therapeutic approach may produce false 
memories (Mollon, 1996). Recovered memory is not limited to sexual abuse, nor to the 
therapeutic context, nor to untrained therapists and is a robust and frequent phenomenon 
(Andrews et al, 1995) and so neither therapists nor therapies can take the full 
responsibility for the recovery of such memories. If this is the case and if recovered 
memories are not generally implanted by therapists, then the onus is on those believing 
such memories to be genuine to provide evidence that experiences of abuse can be 
forgotten and subsequently recovered. It is necessary to explore the evidence suggesting 
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that childhood sexual abuse can be forgotten for a period and later recovered. 
5 The evidence that childhood sexual abuse can be forgotten and later recovered 
Proponents of genuine recovered memory have cited a wealth of studies documenting 
that people who have been sexually abused as children have, at some time, forgotten the 
experience. Elliott and Briere (1995) found 42 per cent of a sample of sexually abused 
subjects to report some level of amnesia for the abuse, with 20 per cent describing a 
period of complete amnesia. However, as Elliott and Briere acknowledge, one weakness 
of this study is its reliance on uncorroborated, retrospective data. Similarly, Herman and 
Schatzow (1987) found 64 per cent of the 53 clients in a twelve week group therapy 
programme to have some degree of memory impairment and 28 per cent to have severe 
lacunae in memories of the abuse. However, once again the study places reliance on 
clients' retrospective reports, assessed by memory recovery therapists (Lindsay and Read, 
1994). Herman and Schatzow (1987) claim that 74 per cent of their patients obtained 
independent corroboration of the abuse, although the nature of this corroboration is not 
detailed in the report (Williams, 1995). Furthermore, the term "impairment" is not 
defined and could presumably range from forgetting minor details of the abuse to being 
unable to recall it at all for a period of time. Further retrospective studies by Feldman- 
Summers and Pope (1994) and Loftus et al (1994) reported similar findings with regard 
to subjects' forgetting and recall of abuse. 
The problems of retrospective studies are overcome by Widom and Morris (1993) in a 
longitudinal study in which they found a substantial proportion of a sample of 
documented child abuse cases to fail to recall at follow-up, although it is not clear 
whether the "substantial proportion" referred to is significant. Williams (1994) attempted 
to overcome the methodological weakness of lack of external corroboration of abuse by 
interviewing a sample of women for whom earlier childhood sexual abuse was well 
documented in medical records (Williams. 1994). She found that 38 per cent of 129 
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women with documented abuse histories did not recall the abuse on re-interview 
seventeen years later. Of those recounting the abuse, 47 per cent claimed that there had 
been a time when they had not remembered the abuse. Unlike most other retrospective 
studies, Williams' study provides clear corroborative evidence that abuse did occur. The 
shortcoming of the study is that it relies on subjects' retrospective reports of the forgetting 
of the abuse. It is unclear how reliable are the individuals' retrospective reports that they 
had not remembered the event for a period, and there may be alternative reasons for those 
not recalling at the time of the interview. Failure to recount the memory to a researcher 
does not imply forgetting, and may instead reflect deliberate avoidance (Ceci and Loftus, 
1994). Furthermore, Della Femina, Yeager and Lewis (1990) in a study documenting 
severe physical abuse, found apparent lack of memory to do with underreporting rather 
than amnesia for a variety of reasons, including being too painful to discuss, a desire to 
protect parents, a belief that they deserved the abuse, a dislike of the interviewer or a 
desire to forget. This raises the issue of how far it is possible to distinguish between 
amnesia or underreporting for abuse and also of the extent to which it may be unhelpful 
to remind people of events which they may have good reason to wish to forget. 
Furthermore, some of the subjects in these studies reported always having been aware of 
the abuse and that there had never been a period during which they had forgotten. 
Research has found forgetting to be related to the degree of intensity, severity and 
duration of the trauma, and to the age of abuse onset, with less recall for those for whom 
abuse began at a younger age (Van der Hart and Nijenhuis, 1995; Van der Kolk and Van 
der Hart, 1989; Herman and Schatzow, 1987). Williams (1994) also found the 
"forgetters" in her study to be younger at the time of the abuse and were less likely to 
have received support from their mothers or any counselling at the time. This may 
suggest that the opportunity for support provides the individual with a way of making 
sense of what occurred, making it less likely that they would forget the abuse and 
supports the findings detailed earlier of Terr (1990) amongst others, in which opportunity 
for expressing and sharing traumatic experiences may enhance memory. There are clearly 
individual differences in the extent to which traumatic memories may be forgotten. 
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In order to support the notion that some individuals may forget an experience of abuse for 
a period of time, the proponents of recovered memory have outlined the mechanisms that 
may account for such forgetting. Cognitive researchers have differing views about the 
mechanisms underlying loss of memory, including repression, dissociation and childhood 
amnesia (Lindsay and Read, 1994). 
6 The putative mechanisms involved in the forgetting of early traumatic 
experiences 
6.1 Repression 
One mechanism used to explain forgetting of childhood sexual abuse is that of repression. 
In the classic Freudian model, repression is regarded as an unconscious defence 
mechanism which can function to protect the individual from memories which would 
produce anxiety, apprehension or guilt were they to become conscious (Reber, 1987). 
This mechanism would, therefore, provide a possible explanation for the forgetting 
associated with childhood sexual abuse were it not for the fact that the concept of 
repression itself is controversial. Repression has been defined as merely "a hypothesised 
mental process" (Reber, 1987 p640) and a "fuzzy concept" (Van der Hart and Nijenhuis, 
1995) for which there is no evidence (Holmes, 1990) and which even some 
psychoanalytic authors would like abolished (Giora, 1989, Shapiro, 1965). However, 
Watkins (1995) states that the process of repression is well supported contrary to the 
assertions of researchers such as Loftus (1993) and that there is some evidence for the 
concept (Davis, 1987; Weinberger, Schwartz, and Davidson, 1979). 
If we accept that the concept of repression is, as some suggest, the mechanism by which 
memories of sexual abuse are not recalled, it would follow that medical procedures such 
as catheterisation, which are just as traumatic to children, would also be subject to 
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repression (Ceci and Loftus, 1994) yet such memories are rarely recovered in therapy. 
Similarly, Gardner (1992) compares forgetting of abuse with forgetting of time spent in a 
concentration camp, alleging that, if trauma was to be forgotten, then so would 
experience of the concentration camps. However, the two experiences are incomparable 
as one may be an isolated incident, the other a considerable and prolonged change of life 
circumstances, witnessed and experienced by others. This suggests that a failure to recall 
may have nothing to do with repression. 
Furthermore, different authors within the recovered memory debate appear to use a 
variety of definitions for "repression". Technically, if an experience has been repressed it 
is not available for conscious retrieval, and so, by this definition, repression could not 
account for memories of abuse recovered in therapy (Cohler, 1994). Ceci and Loftus 
(1994) therefore, regard repression as an overused explanation for memory failure. Ofshe 
and Watters (1993) regard repression to be an invalid construct, concluding that all 
memories based on repression are necessarily false. However, it is not a logical 
conclusion to suggest that all recovered memories are false because of problems with the 
concept of repression, as they could arguably be a function of less controversial 
mechanisms such as infantile amnesia or dissociation. Indeed sceptics of recovered 
memory, for example Loftus (1993), frequently selectively focus their attacks on the 
concept of repression while ignoring the vast literature on total amnesia for traumatic 
events (Van der Hart and Nijenhuis, 1995). 
6.2 Dissociation 
A further mechanism which may explain the forgetting of childhood sexual abuse is that 
of dissociation, the process whereby thoughts or memories that produce anxiety are cut 
off from consciousness (Reber, 1987). Williams (1995) suggests that "If the young child 
has limited resources to cope with the abuse, she may rely on dissociation as a means for 
dealing with overwhelming trauma, or she may become adept at altering her state of 
consciousness" (Williams, 1995, p 668). This is consistent with the findings suggesting 
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that duration of abuse is important in forgetting (for example: Van der Hart and 
Nijenhuis, 1995; Van der Kolk and Van der Hart, 1989; Herman and Schatzow, 1987) as 
the longer the duration of the abuse, the more likely is the individual to acquire the 
defence of dissociation. However, dissociation may be regarded more as a description of 
observable behaviour than an explanation of it, which has encouraged researchers to seek 
alternative explanations for forgetting of early abuse. 
6.3 Infantile amnesia 
Several researchers have turned to the concept of infantile amnesia in response to a 
traumatic event as a possible explanation for forgetting. The research evidence suggests 
that earliest recall for events is rarely before the ages of three to four (Pillemer and White, 
1989; Sheingold and Tenney, 1982; Wetzler and Sweeney, 1986). This would account for 
the findings suggesting that age of onset of abuse affects recall (Van der Hart and 
Nijenhuis, 1995; Van der Kolk and Van der Hart, 1989; Herman and Schatzow, 1987) 
and may account for very early abuse experiences not being available for recall. 
However, by the same token, it is unlikely that these early memories would be later 
recalled in adulthood (Williams, 1995) on the basis that what has not been encoded in the 
first place cannot be recalled (Ornstein, 1995). However, contemporary cognitive 
psychology argues that the mode of encoding memories changes with the acquisition of 
language, rendering the earlier memories irretrievable (Reber, 1987). If early information 
is encoded non-verbally then it may be retrievable if triggered by nonverbal stimuli, for 
example another victimisation experience or certain types of therapy (Pillemer and 
White, 1989), for example imagery or hypnosis. It is not uncommon to experience as a 
therapist clients for whom a traumatic experience in adulthood has triggered an emotional 
response to earlier abuse. Events may be recalled once they fit the adult schemata, 
whereas they were not understood by the child at the time and therefore not incorporated 
(Harvey and Herman, 1994; Usher and Neisser, 1993) This is consistent with the findings 
of Williams (1995) that maternal support or counselling for the child may aid memory by 
enabling the child to make sense of the event and so enabling the memory to be I- I 
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incorporated and so reduce stress. Indeed, fewer stress symptoms have been found in 
children receiving maternal support (Everson, Hunter, Runyan.. Edelson, and Coulter) 
1989; Waterman, 1993) although this may be a spurious correlation, in that in those 
families where mothers were speaking openly to their children about the abuse, the child 
may be more likely to be removed from the abuse. 
So, those seeking to demonstrate that recovered memories can be genuine have provided 
some possible explanations of the ways in which childhood sexual abuse may be 
forgotten, then subsequently recalled in adulthood. However, most explanations of 
forgetting seem more descriptive of the fact that traumatic events may be forgotten than 
they are explanatory of the way in which this occurs. Understanding of memory 
mechanisms generally tends to be theoretical and the mechanisms which underpin 
observable memory phenomena are arguably mere constructions accounting for what is 
observed rather than a factual account of what is known about the way in which memory 
operates. A further complication that needs to be addressed by both sides of the 
controversy is the apparent difficulty of distinguishing between false and true memories. 
6.4 The discrimination between accurate and inaccurate memories of sexual abuse 
Before a resolution of the controversy, both sides of the debate need to recognise that true 
and false memories of child sexual abuse are not always easily differentiated (Gardner, 
1995). The discrimination of true from inaccurate recall of memories for clients who have 
undergone extensive memory recovery therapy is problematic, as "illusory memories can 
look, feel, and sound like real memories. " (Lindsay and Read, 1994, p325). Roe et al 
(1994) found abuse memories to become more vivid and patients to became more 
confident in them over time. However, these findings are consistent with both genuine 
improved recall and with mistaken recall (Ceci, Huffman, Smith and Loftus, 1994) and so 
do not aid in the search for discriminatory criteria. 
It has been suggested that there may be some means of distinguishing true from false 
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memories, for example with the use of EEG (Campbell, 1995) or with training, as has 
been used for psychotic patients (Watkins, 1995), although it could be argued that the 
delusions of psychotic patients bear no relation to false recall of abuse. There is some 
evidence that people tend to use different language when describing illusory memories 
than when describing memories of events actually experienced (Schooler, Gerhard and 
Loftus, 1986; Johnson and Suengas, 1989) and work is currently proceeding on 
expanding content validity analysis to address the problem of differentiation (Lindsay and 
Read, 1994). However, at present there are clearly no criteria for discriminating between 
false and accurate recall of abuse and, indeed, some therapists regard the ability to 
discriminate in this way as immaterial, with the exception of cases in which litigation 
may be involved. Rather than focusing on the validity of clients' memories, perhaps it 
would be more pertinent to address the secondary gains involved with clients who 
produce such memories, if indeed they do, and to avoid confirming or denying clients' 
memories, working instead on their underlying motivations (Spector, 1996). 
7 Is memory recovery necessary and therapeutic? 
One concern of those who argue against the concept of false memory is that genuine 
survivors of sexual abuse may not be taken seriously, and so may not receive adequate 
help. This highlights the fact that throughout the debate there has been an assumption that 
all those who have genuinely suffered from abuse should be made aware of the fact and 
receive some form of therapy. However, several authors have questioned the therapeutic 
value of uncovering events, even if they genuinely did occur, and of the extent to which a 
past experience of abuse can lead to present day symptoms. 
The belief of some therapists that all symptoms have trauma as their primary aetiology 
may be a possible factor which can lead to false recall (Brown, 1995). Berliner and 
Williams (1994) state that "some therapists make the mistake of attributing far too many 
current problems to a sexual abuse history" (p384) and that "the importance of the factor 
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of sexual experience in the causation of disease has been greatly overestimated b,.,, - Freud" 
(Moll, 1913 p279). For example multiple personality disorder (MPD) is said to have an 
aetiology of child sexual abuse (Coons and Milstein, 1986) and DSM-IV lists traumatic 
childhood abuse as the sole predisposing factor in MPD. however "So firmly is child 
abuse linked with the theory of MPD pathogenesis that some investigators have used 
abuse as the criterion for diagnosis", Piper (in press, p26) and so diagnosis becomes 
circular. Furthermore, Piper states that "sexual abuse does not appear to predispose to any 
one diagnosis" (p27). 
It is well documented that people who have experienced trauma do not all react in the 
same way, for example not everyone who experiences a traumatic event develops PTSD 
symptoms. Perhaps it is because child sexual abuse is considered so abhorrent that it is 
difficult for therapists to accept that individuals can survive abuse without developing 
psychological problems. This may also be a function of the fact that therapists may only 
see those survivors who have developed psychological problems and have little 
experience of those who do not develop symptoms, as they do not present for therapy. 
However, it is the case that several of the recent studies have not involved a clinical 
population (for example: Feldman-Summers and Pope, 1994) and so should help to 
redress any bias. If not all abuse leads to symptoms, it could be argued that not all those 
abused require therapy. It is possible that defences such as denial, repression or 
dissociation may have enabled some survivors to continue to function without developing 
pathological symptoms. If this is the case, it may be useful to leave these defences intact, 
rather than to assume that such defences are always more damaging to the individual than 
the uncovering of the trauma. Ceci and Loftus (1994) argue that if unconscious past 
memories lead to symptoms, so may consciously dwelling on them. Campbell (1995) 
blames "New Age ideology that insight into symptoms leads to their alleviation, and that 
a relentless search for 'confirmatory' imagery is therapeutic" (p 196). Moll (1913) asks 
whether "interminable digging" into a client's past is necessary to achieve a positive 
mental health outcome and the possibility has been raised that an approach 
dealing with 
past trauma may detract from other important therapeutic 
issues (Hacken and Schlaps, 
266 
1991). However, several have disagreed with this, regarding dealing M' ith past issues to 
be therapeutic. Herman (1992) states that directly addressing the feelings and beliefs 
related to prior traumatic events can be helpful in reducing symptoms, and Herman and 
Schatzow (1987) liken the treatment of a client without excavating their past to the 
planting of a garden on a toxic waste site, although they do not provide any evidence that 
this is the case (Briere, 1989). Indeed Spiegal (1994) found no difference in the outcomes 
between treatments involving dealing with current symptoms and those involving 
working on past experiences. For this reason, Ceci and Loftus (1994) ask whether it is 
worth the risk of using memory recovery methods until the base rates for false recall are 
known, however, it is unlikely that this can ever be known for certain, given the frequent 
lack of external corroboration and the fact that false and true memories are 
indistinguishable in their nature (for example: Lindsay and Read, 1994). The fact remains 
that the actual number of those adults who have been sexually abused as children is not 
known and nor is the number of those who have developed psychological problems as a 
result. It is, therefore, important not to assume that memory recovery therapies always 
provide the most beneficial approach, regardless of one's stance on whether such 
memories are accurate or not, particularly in view of the resulting upheaval in family 
systems when abuse, either accurately or inaccurately is recovered. 
8 The False Memory Societies 
Much concern centres around the damage to families of false accusations. "False 
allegations cause a huge amount of distress in the relatively small number of families 
where this occurs and these families should be identified and supported (Toon et al, 
1996). False Memory Societies have been founded in several countries to support parents 
who claim to have been wrongly accused of abuse. The False Memory Society 
Foundation (FMSF) was established in America, founded by Pamela and Peter Freyd in 
1992, who were themselves accused of abusing their daughter after she had undergone 
two sessions of psychotherapy (Fried. 1994). They do little to add credence to their 
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claims, however, by producing emotive and misleading publications, and by some of the 
extreme views held by their founder members. 
The false memory societies maintain that it is not possible for true memories of traumatic 
events to be forgotten, regarding any recollection of abuse from previous amnesia to be 
false. However, by adopting such a rigid stance, they disregard the evidence to the 
contrary, for example, Herman and Schatzow (1987), Briere and Conte (1993) and 
Williams (1992), and the studies of those traumatised by war (Archibald and Tuddenham. 
1965; Grinker and Spiegal, 1945; Kolb, 1984). Following from this extreme viewpoint is 
the assumption by the false memory societies that all those who deny abuse are innocent 
and they make no attempt to screen out genuine abusers, accepting that all those who 
contact their society have been wrongly accused (Watkins, 1995). The language in the 
false memory society publications is emotive and provocative. The FMSF publish 
newsletters, in which they claim that false accusations of child sexual abuse are "running 
rampant" and that "an epidemic is emerging 
... 
[which is] the mental health crisis of the 
decade 
- 
if not the century! " (FMS Foundation Newsletter, November1991). The Director 
of the British counterpart to the FMSF, the BFMS, himself accused of sexually abusing 
his two daughters, likens the false memory phenomenon to the Salem witch hunt of 1692 
(Scotford, 1994). In a paper to the British Society of Experimental Hypnosis (BSEH) 
(1994) Scotford states that the deep cultural anxiety concerning child sexual abuse may 
be leading to overexaggeration of its incidence, and asks "has the pendulum of concern 
swung too far the other way? "(p 2). 
In his address to the BSEH, Scotford dismisses therapeutic methods such as the empty 
chair technique as "necromancy". He states that police regard hypnosis as a "truth serum" 
and that juries convict in spite of the lack of corroborative evidence, although he does not 
provide any support for this claim. As information gleaned during hypnosis is not 
admissible as hard evidence in court, this suggests that the law does, in fact, recognise the 
fallibility of memories recalled under hypnosis, rendering Scotford's claim untenable. He 
then lists a catalogue of myths about recovered memory. including that memories 
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retrieved under hypnosis are more accurate than other memories and that it is possible to 
regress clients to a former life. Scotford does not make it clear, however. who he regards 
as believing such myths. Trained professionals, particularly those who practise hypnosis 
are all too aware of the suggestibility of those under hypnosis (for example: Andrews et 
al, 1995). Such emotive language and unsupported claims do little to assist a reasoned 
debate. 
Furthermore, the case of the false memory societies is not assisted by the views held by 
some of its founder members regarding child sexuality. Early advocates of false 
memories, Paul and Shirley Eberle, have been regarded by some as proponents of child 
pornography, being described by one police child abuse expert as "the most prolific 
publishers of child pornography in the USA". Similarly, Watkins (1993) reports that 
Ralph Underwager, an early founder and director of the FMSF was quoted approving 
paedophilia as "a responsible choice" in family relations and "a part of God's will". Also 
worrying is the assertion by Gardner (1992) that not all sexual activities between adults 
and children are psychologically damaging. While this may be true in the sense that not 
all those abused develop symptoms, this should not, however, condone the practice. Such 
views undermine the claims of the false memory societies and have rendered others 
sceptical of their motives. It is unfortunate that much of the current controversy appears 
to centre around the firmly-held beliefs of those involved in the debate, as this 
polarisation of views is unhelpful to both genuine survivors and to those falsely accused 
(Withers and Mitchell, 1995). 
9 Summary and conclusion 
Despite mixed research findings, there is clearly some evidence to support both sides of 
the debate. In light of the evidence of the fallibility and suggestibility of memory, it is 
conceivable that there are occasions when individuals develop false memories of 
childhood sexual abuse. However, the evidence suggesting that it is also possible to 
269 
forget and later recall sexual abuse indicates that recovered memory for real events is also 
a genuine phenomenon. The extreme positions adopted are, therefore, not tenable and to 
claim either that false memories are never created, or that genuine abuse is never 
forgotten cannot be justified in view of the evidence. A more rational position is to accept 
that both may be possible. A more productive way forward, therefore, would be to 
explore the factors likely to produce false memories and to draw up guidelines to aid 
practitioners (for example BPS, 1996; Bloom, 1994) in order to reduce the incidence of 
false memory creation. This will help to protect therapists from accusations of bad 
practice and to prevent the growing scepticism for child sexual abuse which this emotive 
and polarised debate has engendered. The reality is that child sexual abuse does occur in 
all too many cases, and, as Toon et al (1996) put it, "This reality and its distressing effects 
on victims and their families must not be lost in the current uproar. " (p77). 
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Appendix 1: Instructions for researchers. 
Research into the effects of traumatic experience 
Instructions for researchers 
Dear Colleague 
Thank you for agreeing to help with this research into the coping styles of 
patients with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, (PTSD). It is hoped that the 
results of this research may lead to the design of more appropriate 
therapies for those clients who do not benefit from the currently available 
therapies. 
This pack contains two sets of papers, Pack A and Pack B. 
Pack A contains: 
"Ix Participant consent form 
01x Posttraumatic-stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS) 
"1x Impact of Events Scale (IES) 
"Ix Monitor-Blunter Style Scale (MBSS) 
"1x Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
Pack B contains: 
01x Posttraumatic-stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS) 
"1x Impact of Events Scale (IES) 
"1x Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
"1x Patient Details and Researcher Observation Sheet 
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Instructions 
9 Please explain the nature of the study as outlined in the Participant Consent Form 
(from Pack A) to all those patients who present with symptoms of PTSD. 
" 
Ask those who agree to take part to complete the Participant Consent Foren, and 
provide them with a copy. 
" 
Please ensure that you inform the patient's GP of the study before the start of the 
research (required for ethical reasons, and can be done by adding a line on your 
standard letter to the GP) 
9 Administer Pack A before the start of therapy to all those patients who have 
given their written consent to participate in the study. 
9 Do not write the participant's name on any of the papers 
-a unique reference code has 
been allocated by the researcher instead. 
" 
At the end of therapy or after 8 sessions, whichever is sooner, you should complete, 
yourself, the Patient Details and Researcher Observations Sheet from Pack B. 
9 Administer the remainder of Pack B to the participant. 
" 
You are not required to score any of the tests yourself, unless you wish to do so for 
your own purposes. 
9 Please return all completed paperwork to: 
Jacqui Farrants, Chartered Counselling Psychologist, Community Mental Health 
Team, Victoria Centre, Pettits Lane, Romford, Essex, RMI 4HL 
If you have any queries, please telephone me at the Victoria Centre on 01708 724416, 
or e-mail me at J. R. Farrants@city. ac. uk. Thank you for your co-operation 
Yours sincerely, 
Jacqui Farrants, BSc (Hons), MSc, CPsychol. 
Chartered Counselling Psychologist 
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Appendix 2: The Monitor-Blunter Style Scale (MBSS) 
Subject #: Date: // 
MONITOR-BLUNTER STYLE SCALE (MBSS) 
1. Vividly imagine that you are afraid of the dentist and have to get some dental work done. 
Which of the following would you do ? Check all of the statements that might apply to 
you. 
I would ask the dentist exactly what he was going to do. 
I would take a tranquilizer or have a drink before going. 
I would try to think about pleasant memories 
I would want the dentist to tell me when I would feel pain. 
I would try to sleep. 
I would watch all the dentist's movements and listen for the sound of the drill. 
I would watch the flow of water from my mouth to see if it contained blood. 
I would do mental puzzles in my mind. 
2. Vividly imagine that you are being held hostage by a group of armed terrorists in a public 
building. Which of the following would you do? Check all of the statements that might 
apply to you. 
I would sit by myself and have as many daydreams and fantasies as I could. 
I would stay alert and try to keep myself from falling asleep. 
I would exchange life stories with the other hostages. 
If there was a radio present, I would stay near it and listen to the bulletins about what 
the police were doing. 
I would watch every movement of my captors and keep an eye on their weapons. 
I would try to sleep as much as possible. 
I would think about how nice it's going to be when I get home. 
I would make sure I knew where every possible exit was. 
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3. Vividly imagine that, due to a large drop in sales, it is rumoured that several people in your department at work will be laid off. Your supervisor has turned in an evaluation of your 
work for the past year. The decision about lay-offs has been made and will be announced in several days. Check all of the statements that might apply to you. 
I would talk to my fellow workers to see if they knew anything about what the 
supervisor's evaluation of me said. 
[ would review the list of duties for my present job and try to figure out if I had fulfilled them all. 
I would go to the movies to take my mind off things. 
I would try to remember any arguments or disagreements I might have had with the 
supervisor that would have lowered his opinion of me. 
I would push all thoughts of being laid off out of my mind. 
I would tell my spouse that I'd rather not discuss my chances of being laid off. 
I would try to think which employees in my department the supervisor might have 
thought had done the worst job. 
I would continue doing my work as if nothing was happening. 
4. Vividly imagine that you are on an airplane, thirty minutes from your destination, when the 
plane unexpectedly goes into a deep dive and then suddenly levels off. After a short time, 
the pilot announces that nothing is wrong, although the rest of the ride may be rough. You, 
however, are not convinced that all is well. Check all of the statements that might apply to 
you. 
[ would carefully read the information provided about safety features in the plane and 
make sure I knew where the emergency exits were. 
I would make small talk with the passenger beside me. 
I would watch the end of the movie, even if I had seen it before. 
I would call for the flight attendant and ask her exactly what the problem was. 
I would order a drink or tranquilizer from the flight attendant. 
I would listen carefully to the engines for unusual noises and would watch the crew to 
see if their behavior was out of the ordinary. 
I would talk to the passenger beside me about what might be wrong. 
I would settle down and read a book or magazine or read a letter. 
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Appendix 3: The Impact of Events Scale (IES) 
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Appendix 4: The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale, (PDS) 
Part 1 
Many people' have lived through or witnessed a very 
stressful and traumatic event at some point in their lives. 
Below is a list of traumatic events. Put a checkmark in the 
box next to ALL of the events that have happened to you 
or that you have witnessed. 
(1) Q Serious-accident, fire, or explosion (for example, 
an industrial, farm, car, plane, or boating accident) 
(2) [ý Natural disaster (for example, tornado, hurricane, 
flood, or major earthquake) 
(3) Q Non-sexual assault by a family member or 
someone you know (for example, being mugged, 
physically attacked, shot, stabbed, or held at 
gunpoint) 
(4) Non-sexual assault by a stranger (for example, 
being mugged, physically attacked, shot, stabbed, 
or held at gunpoint) 
Part 2 
(14) If you marked more than one traumatic event in Part 1, put a checkmark in the box below next to the 
event that bothers you the most. If yob marked only 
one traumatic event in Part 1, mark the same one below. 
F Accident 
Disaster 
Non-sexual assault/someone you know 
Non-sexual assault/stranger 
Sexual assault/someone you know 
Sexual assault/stranger 
Combat 
Sexual contact under 18 with someone 5 or more years 
older 
F Imprisonment 
F] Torture 
Life-threatening Illness 
Other 
(5) Sexual assault by a family member or someone 
you know (for example, rape or attempted rape) 
(6) F-I Sexual assault by a stranger (for example, rape 
or attempted rape) 
In the box below, briefly describe the traumatic event 
you marked above. 
(7j Military combat or a war zone 
(8) Sexual contact when you were younger than 18 
with someone who was 5 or more years older than 
you (for example, contact with genitals, breasts) 
(9) Q Imprisonment (for example, prison Inmate, 
prisoner of war, hostage) 
10) Q Torture 
11) Q Life-threatening illness 
12) Q Other traumatic event 
13) If you marked Item 12, specify the traumatic event 
below. 
IF YOU MARKED ANY OF THE ITEMS ABOVE, 
CONTINUE. IF NOT, STOP HERE. 
Below are several questions about the traumatic event 
you just described above. 
(15) How long ago did the traumatic event happen? (circle ONE) 
1 Less than 1 month 
21 to 3 months 
33 to 6 months 
46 months to 3 years 
53 to 5 years 
6 More than 5 years 
For the following questions, cirde Y for Yes or N for No. 
During this traumatic event 
(16) YN Were you physically injured? 
(17) YN Was someone else physically injured? 
(18) YN Did you think that your life was in danger? 
(19) YN Did you think that someone else's life was in 
danger? 
(20) YN Did you feel helpless? 
(21) YN Did you feel terrified? 
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Part 3 
Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have 
after experiencing a traumatic event. Read each one 
carefully and circle the number (0-3) that best describes 
how often that problem has bothered you IN THE PAST 
MONTH. Rate each problem with respect to the 
traumatic event you described in Item 14. 
0 Not at all or only one time 
1 Once a week or less/once in a while 
22 to 4 times a week/half the time 
35 or more times a week/ almost always 
; 22) 012 
-3 Having upsetting thoughts or images 
about the traumatic event that came into 
your head when you didn't want them to 
: 23) 0123 Having bad dreams or nightmares about 
the traumatic event 
24) 0123 Reliving the traumatic event, acting or 
feeling as if it was happening again 
'25) 0123 Feeling emotionally upset when you were 
reminded of the traumatic event (for 
example, feeling scared, angry, sad, 
guilty, etc. ) 
26) 0123 Experiencing physical reactions when you 
were reminded of the traumatic event (for 
example, breaking out in a sweat, heart 
beating fast) 
27) 0123 Trying not to think about, talk about, or 
have feelings about the traumatic event 
28) 0123 Trying to avoid activities, people, or 
places that remind-you of the traumatic 
event 
29) 0123 Not being able to remember an important 
part of the traumatic event 
30) 0123 Having much less interest or participating 
much less often in important activities 
31) 0123 Feeling distant or cut off from people 
around you 
32) 0123 Feeling emotionally numb (for example, 
being unable to cry or unable to have 
loving feelings) 
33) 0123 Feeling as if your future plans or hopes 
will not come true (for example, you will 
not have a career, marriage, children, or a 
long life) 
(34) 0123 Having trouble falling or staying asleep 
(35) 0123 Feeling irritable or having fits of anger 
(36) 0123 Having trouble concentrating (for example, 
drifting in and out of conversations, losing 
track of a story on television, forgetting what 
you read) 
(37) 0123 Being overly alert (for example, checking to 
see who is around you, being uncomfortable 
with your back to a door, etc. ) 
(38) 0123 "Being jumpy or easily startled (for example, 
when someone walks up behind you) 
(39) How long have you experienced the problems that 
you reported above? (circle ONE) 
1 Less than 1 month 
21 to 3 months 
3 More than 3 months 
(40) How long after the traumatic event did these 
problems begin? (circle ONE) 
1 Less than 6 months 
26 or more months 
Part 4 
Indicate below if the problems you rated in Part 3 have 
interfered with any of the following areas of your life 
DURING THE PAST MONTH. Circle Y for Yes or N 
for No. 
(41) YN Work 
(42) YN Household chores and duties 
(43) YN Relationships with friends 
(44) YN Fun and leisure activities 
(45) YN Schoolwork 
(46) YN Relationships with your family 
(47) YN Sex life 
(48) YN General satisfaction with life 
(49) YN Overall level of functioning in all areas of your 
life 
288 
Appendix 5: PDS Hand Scoring Directions 
Fcsttraumatic Stress 
[Jiagnostic 
r 
1 
cale 1 Edna B. Foa, PhD 
PDS' Hand-Scoring Directions 
Validity 
1. Items 1-12: If the client marked at least one item, go to Step 2. If the client did 
not mark at least one item and did not respond to Items 13 and 14, put an X in 
the No box under "Criteria A-F Met? " at the bottom of the PDS Hand-Scoring 
Worksheet. This client does not meet DSM-IV criteria for posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), and the rest of the test should not be scored. 
2. Item 13: If the client ptit a checkmark next to at least one item from 1-11, go to 
Step 3. If the client put a checkmark next to Item 12 only, the clinician must 
read the client's responses to Items 13 and 14 to determine if the event meets 
DSM-1V criteria for a "traumatic event. " If it does, go to Step 3. Otherwise, put 
an X in the No box under "Criterion A-F Met? " at the bottom of the 
worksheet. This client does not meet DSM-IV criteria for posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). You can stop scoring at this point or continue scoring to 
determine the client's Level of Impairment in Functioning, Number 'of 
Symptoms Endorsed, Symptom Severity Score, and Symptom Severity Rating. 
3. Item 14: Determine which traumatic event the client marked and write it on 
the Traumatic Event line at the bottom of the worksheet. (If the client chose 
"Other, " refer to Item 13 and the box below Item 14 for a description of the 
event. ) If Item 14 has no response or multiple responses, the clinician should 
determine what event the client based his or her answers on. 
Note: Item 15 is not included in any score calculations. 
Worksheet Section A 
4. Items 16-19: Record the number of Yes and No responses for Items 16-19. If 
the client omitted all four items, put an X in the Incomplete Information box 
under "Criterion A Met? " and go to Step 6 (skip Step 5). If the No total is 4, put 
an X in the No box under "Criterion A Met? " and go to Step 6 (slip Step 5). 
Otherwise, go to Step 5. 
Copyright 1995 © NATIONAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC. All rights reserved. Product Number 
Published and distributed exclusively by National Computer Systems, Inc. 51621 
Printed in the United States of America. 
ABCD 
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5. Items 20-21: On the worksheet, record the client's responses to Items 20 and 
21. Fill in the appropriate box under "Criterion A Met? " according to the table 
below. 
Client's Responses to 
Items 20 and 21 Criterion A Met? 
One or two Yes Yes 
Both No No 
Any other combination Incomplete Information 
Worksheet Sections B, C, and D (Items 22-38) 
6. In the first column of boxes in Sections B, C, and D, write the number of 0,1,2, 
and 3 responses the client chose. Add up the numbers in the boxes labeled 1's, 
2's, and 3's and record the total in the Number of Symptoms box. (Do not 
count the number in the box labeled 0's. ) If the client omitted all of the items in 
a section (B, C, or D), put an X in the Incomplete Information box for that 
section. Skip Step 7 for that section. 
Then multiply the number in each box (except the 0's box) by the number that 
appears to the right of the box (multiply the number of 1 responses by 1, the 
number of 2 responses by 2, etc. ). Write the results in the boxes in the second 
column. Add up these numbers and write the total in the Symptom Severity 
box. Follow the above steps for Sections B, C, and D. 
7. Using the tables below, put an X in the appropriate box for "Criterion Met? " 
for Sections B, C, and D. 
Number of 0 
Responses Criterion Met? 
B5 No (go to Step 8) 
C7 No (go to Step 8) 
D5 No(gotoStep8) 
Number of 
Symptoms Criterion Met? 
p Incomplete Information 
B 1 or greater Yes 
Less than 3 Incomplete Information C 3 or greater Yes 
Less than 2 Incomplete Information 
D2 
or greater Yes 
Worksheet Section E 
8. Item 39: Record the client's response to Item 39 on the worksheet. Find the 
client's response in the table below and put an X in the appropriate box for 
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"Criterion E Met? " in Section E and "Symptom Duration" at the bottom of the 
worksheet. 
Symptom Duration 
Criterion E Met? (Specifier 1) 
Response 1 No Does Not Apply 
Response 2 
Response 3 
Omitted 
Yes 
Yes 
Incomplete 
Information 
Acute 
Chronic 
Incomplete 
Information 
9. Item 40: Record the client's response to Item 40 on the worksheet. If the client 
chose response 1, put an X in the No box under "Delayed Onset" at the bottom 
of the worksheet. If the client chose response 2, put an X in the Yes box under 
"Delayed Onset. " if the client omitted the item, put an X in the Incomplete 
Information box under "Delayed Onset. " (Note: The Symptom Duration and 
Delayed Onset specifiers are used only to identify onset and duration of PTSD 
symptoms. They are not used for determining whether or not a diagnosis of 
PTSD is appropriate. ) 
Worksheet Section F 
10. Item 49: Record the client's response to Item 49 on the worksheet. If the client 
chose the Yes response, put a9 in the Number of Areas Affected box and an X. 
in the Yes box under "Criterion F Met? " Otherwise, count the number of Yes , 
responses for Items 41-48 and write the total in the Number of Areas Affected 
box. If this total is 2 or greater, put an X in the Yes box under "Criterion F 
Met? " If the number of No responses is 7 or greater, put an X in the No box. 
Otherwise, put an X in the Incomplete Information box. 
PTSD Diagnosis 
11. If you put an X in the Yes box under "Criterion Met? " in Sections A, B, C, D, E, 
and F, put an X in the Yes box under "Criteria A-F Met? " at the bottom of the 
worksheet. If you put an X in the No box for one or more of the criteria, put an 
X in the No box under "Criteria A-F Met? " Otherwise, put an X in the 
Incomplete Information box. 
Level of Impairment in Functioning 
12. Find the client's Number of Areas Affected for Criterion F in the table below 
and write the corresponding label on the Level of Impairment in Functioning 
line at the bottom of the worksheet 
Criterion F-Number of Level of Impairment 
Areas Affected 
." 
in Functioning 
All omits Unknown 
0 No Impairment 
1-2 Mild 
3-6 Moderate 
7-9 Severe 
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Number of Symptoms Endorsed 
13. Add up the Number of Symptoms for Criteria B, C, and D. Write the total on 
the line labeled Number of Symptoms Endorsed at the bottom of the work- 
sheet. 
Symptom Severity Score and Rating 
14. Add up the numbers in the Symptom Severity boxes for Criteria B, C, and D. 
Write the total on the line labeled Symptom Severity Score. Find the client's 
score in the table below and write the appropriate label on the Symptom 
Severity Rating line at the bottom of the worksheet 
Symptom Severity Score Symptom Severity Rating 
0 No Rating 
1-10 Mild 
11-20 Moderate 
21-35 Moderate to Severe 
36-51 Severe 
Number of Omitted Items 
15. For Items 14-49, look at the client's answer sheet and count the number of 
items he or she omitted. Write the total on the line labeled Number of Omitted 
Items at the bottom of the worksheet. Find the total in the table below and put 
an X in the appropriate box next to "Excessive Omits? " on the worksheet. 
N Number of Omitted Items Excessive Omits? 0 
0-5 No 
6-12 Yes, symptoms may be 
understated 
13-36 Yes, results are questionable 
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Appendix 6: The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (RADS) 
HAD Scale 
Name: Date: 
Doctors are aware that emotions play an important part in most illnesses. If your doctor knows about these feelings he will be able to help you more. 
This questionnaire is designed to help your doctor to know how you feel. Read each item and place a firm tick in the box opposite the 
reply which comes closest to how you have been feeling in the past week. 
Don't take too long over your replies: your immediate reaction to each iten! Will probably be more accurate than a long thought-out 
response. 
Tick only one box in each section 
I feel tense or `wound up': I feel as if I am slowed down: 
Most of the time 
............................... 
Nearly all the time 
................................. A lot of the time 
................................ 
Veryoften 
............................................. Time to time, Occasionally 
.............. 
Sometimes 
........................................... Not at all 
.......................................... 
Not at all 
............................................... 
I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy: I get a sort of frightened feeling like 
Definitely as much 
........................... 
'butterflies' in the stomach: 
Not quite so much 
............................ 
Not at all 
............................................... 
Only a little 
....................................... 
Occasionally 
......................................... 
Hardly at all 
..................................... 
Quite often 
............................................ 
Very often 
............................................. 
I get a sort of frightened feeling as If 
something awful is about to happen: I have lost Interest In my appearance: 
Very definitely and quite badly 
......... 
Definitely 
.............................................. 
Yes, but not too badly 
...................... 
I don't take so much care as I should..... 
A little, but it doesn't worry me 
......... 
I may not take quite as much care 
........ 
Not at all 
.......................................... 
I take just as much care as ever 
........... 
I can laugh and see the funny side of I feel restless as if I have to be on the 
things: move: 
As much as I always could 
.............. 
Very much indeed 
................................ 
Not quite so much now 
.................... 
Quite a lot 
............................................. 
Definitely not so much now 
.............. 
Not very much 
...................................... 
Not at all 
.......................................... 
Not at all 
............................................... 
Worrying thoughts go through my 
mind: 
A great deal of the time 
.................... 
A lot of the time 
................................ 
From time to time but not too often... 
Only occasionally 
............................ 
I feel cheerful: 
Not at all 
.......................................... 
Not often 
.......................................... 
Sometimes 
...................................... 
Most of the time 
............................... 
I look forward with enjoyment to things: 
As much as ever I did 
........................... 
Rather less than I used to 
..................... 
Definitely less than I used to 
................. 
Hardly at all 
.......................................... 
get sudden feelings of panic: 
Very often indeed 
................................. Quite often 
............................................ 
Not very often 
.......................:............... 
Not at all 
............................................... 
I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV 
I can sit at ease and feel relaxed: programme: 
Definitely 
................................:........ 
Often 
.................................................... 
Usually 
............................................. 
Sometimes 
........................................... 
Not often 
.......................................... 
Not often 
............................................... 
Not at all 
.......................................... 
HI 
Very seldom 
......................................... 
1_ 
_J 
Do not write below this line 
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Appendix 7: Participant Consent Form 
Reference code 
............ 
Participant Consent Form 
Research into the effects of traumatic experience 
Information for the participant 
I am conducting a research study in order to help people suffering from 
the effects of a traumatic experience. I am asking you to participate in the 
study, which will entail completing two very brief questionnaires about 
how you feel. 
Only your therapist and myself will see the completed questionnaires. 
Your name will not appear on any of the questionnaires so that 
confidentiality will be maintained at all times. 
Participant's consent: 
I agree to participate in the above study. The purpose of the research has 
been explained to me by my therapist, and I have been given the 
opportunity to ask questions. I understand that I can withdraw from the 
study at any time, and this will not affect my therapy in any way. 
Signature 
Name Date 
Address 
Witnessed by 
Signature 
Name Date 
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Appendix 8: Patient details and researcher observations sheet. 
Reference code 
............ 
Patient Details and Researcher Observations Sheet 
Patient's age 
Patient's gender 
Date of first therapy session 
Date of most recent therapy session 
Total number of sessions attended 
Researcher's name 
Please state briefly your overall impression concerning the extent to 
which the patient engaged in therapy, and the extent of his'her- 
improvement over the period. (continue overleaf if necessary). 
29ý 
Appendix 9: List of variables used in the analysis 
Variable code names are denoted in bold type. Numbers denote the codings for each of 
the responses where appropriate. 
Subject ref 
.................................................................... 
ref 
Period over which therapy took place, between 
before and after measures taken: 
................................... 
period 
Age 
............................................................................... 
age 
Gender 
........................................................................... 
gender (male = 1; female = 2) 
Number of therapy sessions between before and 
after measures taken: 
..................................................... 
sessions 
Before After 
HADS 
Depression hadsdepa hadsdepb 
Anxiety hadsanxa hadsanxb 
IES 
Intrusion iesintra iesintrb 
Avoidance iesava iesavb 
MBSS 
Monitoring mbssm 
Blunting mbssb 
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PDS 
Reexperiencing 
Number of symptoms pdsrexna 
Severity of symptoms pdsrexsa 
Avoidance 
Number of symptoms pdsavna 
Severity of symptoms pdsavsa 
Arousal 
Number of symptoms pdsarna 
Severity of symptoms pdsarsa 
pdsimpa 
Level of impairment in functioning No /Mild /Mod /Severe 
/Mod /Severe 
1234 
Number symptoms endorsed 
Symptom severity score 
Symptom severity rating 
Mod-Severe /Severe 
Symptom duration 
/Chronic 
Delayed onset 
Full diagnosis of PTSD 
Therapist's comments 
pdssynoa 
pdssysea 
pdssyra 
Mild /Mod/Mod-Severe /Severe 
1234 
pdsdura 
NA /Acute /Chronic 
123 
pdsdela 
Yes /No 
10 
pdsdiaga 
Yes /No 
10 
Qualitative data. 
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pdsrexnb 
pdsrexsb 
pdsav, nb 
pdsavsb 
pdsarnb 
pdsarsb 
pdsimpb 
No /Mild 
1234 
pdssynob 
pdssyseb 
pdssyrb 
Mild /Mod/ 
1234 
pdsdurb 
NA /Acute 
12 3 
pdsdelb 
Yes /No 
10 
pdsdiagb 
Yes /No 
10 
Appendix 10: Raw data from questionnaires 
ref age gender period sessions hadsdepa hadsanxa 
1 003 42 m 96 8 11 12 
2 016 61 f 126 8 11 20 
3 028 32 m 91 7 8 18 
4 031 44 m 68 8 1O 9 
5 036 50 m 63 8 12 16 
6 037 58 f 71 8 7 7 
7 041 28 m 56 9 12 16 
8 042 52 f 102 12 9 9 
9 014 50 m 264 8 16 19 
F 
ft 
'r 
,; r 
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Stage 1 
iesintra iesava mbssm mbssb pdsrexna pdsrexsa pdsavna 
1 12 8 8 5 5 9 3 
2 16 23 11 5 4 10 7 
3 12 15 9 4 5 7 4 
4 16 19 7 5 5 13 7 
5 20 17 16 2 5 6 7 
6 18 13 11 4 5 14 7 
7 21 17 12 2 5 14 7 
8 15 13 5 5 5 8 4 
9 19 11 4 3 5 11 7 
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Stage 1 
pdsavsa pdsarna pdsarsa pdsimpa pdssynoa pdssysea pdssyra 
1 7 3 6 4 11 22 3 
2 20 5 14 4 16 44 4 
3 6 5 8 4 14 21 3 
4 18 3 8 4 15 39 4 
5 13 5 14 4 17 33 3 
6 15 4 10 4 16 39 4 
7 17 5 13 4 17 44 4 
8 9 4 6 4 13 23 3 
9 19 5 13 4 17 43 4 
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Stage 1 
pdssdura pdsdela pdsdiaga hadsdepb hadsanxb iesintrb iesavb 
1 3 0 1 2 4 10 4 
2 3 0 1 9 10 7 7 
3 3 0 1 9 13 11 8 
4 2 0 1 17 14 18 18 
5 3 0 1 15 17 
6 3 0 1 3 2 6 7 
7 3 0 1 7 11 13 11 
8 3 1 1 6 3 8 12 
9 3 0 1 15 14 15 13 
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Stage 1 
pdsrexnb pdsrexsb pdsavnb pdsavsb pdsarnb pdsarsb pdsimpb 
1 3 3 3 6 2 2 4 
2 4 4 5 5 5 8 4 
3 4 4 4 5 5 8 4 
4 5 12 7 19 4 8 4 
5 5 7 7 17 5 14 4 
6 5 13 7 
. 
18 5 11 3 
7 5 11 6 11 3 4 4 
8 2 2 3 3 0 0 3 
9 5 10 7 17 5 11 4 
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Stage 1 
pdssynob pdssyseb pdssyrb pdsdurb pdsdelb pdsdiagb 
1 8 11 2 3 0 1 
2 14 17 2 3 0 1 
3 13 17 2 3 0 1 
4 16 39 4 3 0 1 
5 17 38 4 3 0 1 
6 17 42 4 3 0 1 
7 14 26 3 3 0 1 
8 5 5 1 3 1 0 
9 17 38 4 3 0 1 
I- 
303 
Appendix 11: Raw data from computed variables 
hadsdepc hadsanxc iesintrc iesavc pdsrexnc pdsrexsc pdsavnc 
1 9 8 2 4 2 6 0 
2 2 10 9 16 0 6 2 
3 
-1 5 1 7 1 3 0 
4 
-7 -5 -2 1 0 1 0 
5 
-3 -1 0 
-1 0 
6 4 5 12 6 0 1 0 
7 5 5 8 6 0 3 1 
8 3 
1 
6 7 1 
--- 
3 
- 
6 1 
9 5 14 
-2 
t 0 1 0 
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computed 
pdsavsc pdsarnc pdsarsc pdsimpc pdssynoc pdssysec pdssyrc 
1 1 1 4 0 3 11 1 
2 15 
,0 6 0 2 27 2 
3 1 0 0 0 1 4 1 
4 
-1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 
5 
-4 0 0 0 0 -5 -1 
6 
-3 -1 -1 1 -1 -3 0 
7 6 2 9 0 3 18 1 
8 6 4 6 1 8 18 2 
9 2 0 2 0 0 5 0 
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computed 
pdsdurc pdsdelc pdsdiagc 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 
-1 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
8 0 0 1 
9 0 0 0 
.... i 
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computed 
mbssdiff 
1 3.00 
2 6.00 
3 5.00 
4 2.00 
5 14.00 
6 7.00 
7 10.00 
8 
. 
00 
9 1.00 
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Appendix 12: SPSS output of bivariate correlation coefficients 
AGE GENDER SESSIONS PERIOD MBSSM 
AGE Pearson Correlation 1.000 
. 
724* 
. 
148 
. 
274 
-. 
026 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
027 
. 
703 
. 
476 
. 
947 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
GENDER Pearson Correlation 
. 
724* 1.000 
. 
468 
-. 
052 
-. 
045 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
027 
. 
204 
. 
894 
. 
909 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
SESSIONS Pearson Correlation 
. 
148 
. 
468 1.000 
-. 
060 
-. 
326 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
703 
. 
204 
. 
879 
. 
391 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PERIOD Pearson Correlation 
. 
274 
-. 
052 
-. 
060 1.000 
-. 
610 
Sig.. (2-tailed) 
. 
476 
. 
894 
. 
879 
. 
081 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
MBSSM Pearson Correlation 
-. 
026 
-. 
045 
-. 
326 
-. 
610 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
947 
. 
909 
. 
391 
. 
081 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
MBSSB Pearson Correlation 
. 
351 
. 
460 
. 
169 
-. 
009 
-. 
522 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
355 
. 
213 
. 
664 
. 
982 
. 
150 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
MBSSD(FP Pearson Correlation 
-. 
120 
-. 
166 
-. 
317 
-. 
S01 
. 
971` 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
758 
. 
670 
. 
406 
. 
170 
. 
000 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
HADSDEPC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
035 
. 
249 
. 
229 
. 
059 
-. 
063 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
930 
. 
519 
. 
554 
. 
881 
. 
871 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
HADSANXC Pearson Correlation 168 
. 
458 
. 
137 
. 
297 
-. 
128 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
667 
. 
215 
. 
725 
. 
438 
. 
742 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
IESINTRC Pearson Correlation 
. 
470 
. 
746* 
. 
293 
-. 
059 
. 
477 
Sig. (2 tailed) 
. 
240 
. 
034 
. 
481 
. 
889 
. 
232 
IN 8 8 8 8 8 
FESAVC Pearson Correlation 
. 
203 
. 
423 
-. 
285 
-. 
323 
. 
772` 
Sig. (2 tailed) 
. 
630 
. 
296 
. 
493 
. 
435 
. 
025 
N 8 8 8 8 8 
PDSREXNC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
061 
. 
224 
. 
654 
-. 
062 
-. 
459 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
877 
. 
563 
. 
056 
. 
873 
. 
214 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSREXSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
032 
. 
414 
. 
417 
. 
014 
-. 
342 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
936 
. 
268 
. 
264 
. 
972 
. 
367 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSAVNC Pearson Correlation 
. 
260 
. 
574 
. 
389 
-. 
017 
. 
097 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
500 
. 
106 
. 
300 
. 
965 
. 
803 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSAVSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
166 
. 
444 
. 
284 
. 
210 
-. 
139 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
669 
. 
231 
. 
460 
. 
587 
. 
722 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSARNC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
197 
. 
210 
. 
871 
-. 
054 
-. 
255 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
612 
. 
588 
. 
002 
. 
891 
. 
508 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSARSC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
208 
. 
166 
. 
535 
. 
003 
-. 
065 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
591 
. 
670 
. 
137 
. 
993 
. 
869 
.N 
9 9 9 9 9 
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Correlations 
AGE GENDER SESSIONS PERIOD MBSSM 
PDSIMPC Pearson Correlation 
. 
445 
. 
756* 
. 
619 
-. 
156 
-. 
186 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
230 
. 
018 
. 
075 
. 
688 
. 
633 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYNOC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
068 
. 
354 
. 
848* 
-. 
059 
-. 
300 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
862 
. 
351 
. 
004 
. 
880 
. 
433 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYSEC Pearson Correlation 
. 
029 
. 
390 
. 
425 
. 
1,17 
-. 
177 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
941 
. 
299 
. 
255 
. 
765 
. 
648 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYRC Pearson Correlation 
. 
000 
. 
500 
. 
468 
. 
022 
-. 
346 
Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
. 
170 
. 
204 
. 
955 
. 
362 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSDURC Pearson Correlation 
. 
079 
. 
250 
. 
117 
. 
212 
. 
223 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
839 
. 
516 
. 
764 
. 
584 
. 
564 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSDELC Pearson Correlation a a a a a 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
, N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSDIAGC Pearson Correlation 
. 
192 
. 
500 
. 
936 
-. 
012 
-. 
424 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
620 
. 
170 
. 
000 
. 
975 
. 
255 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
309 
Correlations 
MBSSB MBSSDIFF HADSDEPC HADSANXC IESINTRC 
AGE Pearson Correlation 
. 
351 
-. 
120 
-. 
035 
. 
168 
. 
470 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
355 
. 
758 
. 
930 
. 
667 
. 
240 
N 0 9 9 9 8 
GENDER Pearson Correlation 
. 
460 
-. 
166 
. 
249 
. 
458 
. 
746* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
213 
. 
670 
. 
519 
. 
215 
. 
034 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
SESSIONS Pearson Correlation 
. 
169 
-. 
317 
. 
229 
. 
137 
. 
293 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
664 
. 
406 
. 
554 
. 
725 
. 
481 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PERIOD Pearson Correlation 
-. 
009 
-. 
501 
. 
059 
. 
297 
-. 
059 
Sig. (2 tailed) 
. 
982 
. 
170 
. 
881 
. 
438 
. 
889 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
MBSSM Pearson Correlation' 
-. 
522 
. 
971 -. 063 
-. 
128 
. 
477 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
150 
. 
000 
. 
871 
. 
742 
. 
232 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
MBSSB Pearson Correlation 1.000 
-. 
711 * 
. 
072 
. 
221 
-. 
248 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
032 
. 
853 
. 
567 
. 
554 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
MBSSDIFF Pearson Correlation 
-. 
711` 1.000 
-. 
073 
-. 
168 
. 
497 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
032 
. 
853 
. 
666 
. 
211 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
HADSDEPC Pearson Correlation 
. 
072 
-. 
073 1.000 
. 
809 
. 
521 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
853 
. 
853 
. 
008 
. 
185 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
HADSANXC Pearson Correlation 221 
-. 
168 809 1.000 
. 
579 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
567 
. 
666 
. 
008 
. 
133 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
IESINTRC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
248 
. 
497 
. 
521 
. 
579 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
554 
. 
211 
. 
185 
. 
133 
N 8 8 8 8 8 
IESAVC Pearson Correlation 
. 
165 
. 
615 
. 
173 
. 
524 
. 
426 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
695 
. 
105 
. 
682 
. 
183 
. 
293 
N 8 8 8 8 8 
PDSREXNC Pearson Correlation 
. 
499 
-. 
519 
. 
413 
. 
336 
-. 
125 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
171 
. 
153 
. 
269 
. 
377 
. 
769 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSREXSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
635 
-. 
460 
. 
604 
. 
737` 
. 
140 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
066 
. 
213 
. 
085 
. 
024 
. 
742 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSAVNC Pearson Correlation 
. 
196 
. 
025 
. 
228 
. 
534 
. 
505 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
614 
. 
948 
. 
555 
. 
139 
. 
201 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSAVSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
297 
-. 
198 
. 
283 
. 
642 
. 
345 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
437 
. 
610 
. 
460 
. 
062 
. 
402 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSARNC Pearson Correlation 
. 
034 
-. 
220 
. 
449 
. 
361 
. 
188 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
930 
. 
570 
. 
226 
. 
340 
. 
655 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSARSC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
031 
-. 
044 
. 
541 
. 
533 
. 
331 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
937 
. 
910 
. 
132 
. 
139. 
. 
423 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
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Correlations 
MBSSB MBSSDIFF HADSDEPC HADSANXC IESINTRC 
PDSIMPC Pearson Correlation 
. 
273 
-. 
230 
. 
248 
. 
159 
. 
578 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
477 
. 
552 
. 
519 
. 
682 
. 
134 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSSYNOC Pearson Correlation 
. 
267 
-. 
322 
. 
474 
. 
473 
. 
188 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
487 
. 
398 
. 
197 
. 
199 
. 
656 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSSYSEC Pearson Correlation 
. 
302 
-. 
231 
. 
471 
. 
692` 
. 
334 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
430 
. 
550 
. 
200 
. 
039 
. 
419 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSSYRC Pearson Correlation 
. 
558 
-. 
442 
. 
462 
. 
705* 
. 
261 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
118 
. 
234 
. 
211 
. 
034 
. 
532 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSDURC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
328 
. 
276 
. 
675* 
. 
760* 
. 
616 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
388 
. 
472 
. 
046 
. 
017 
. 
104 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSDELC Pearson Correlation a a a a a 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. N 9 9 9 9 8 
PDSDIAGC Pearson Correlation 
. 
328 
-. 
442 
. 
124 
. 
147 
. 
162 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
388 
. 
234 
. 
750 
. 
707 
. 
701 
N 9 9 9 9 8 
ý" 
311 
Correlations 
IESAVC PDSREXNC PDSREXSC PDSAVNC PDSAVSC 
AGE Pearson Correlation 
. 
203 
-. 
061 
. 
032 
. 
260 
. 
166 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
630 
. 
877 
. 
936 
. 
500 
. 
669 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
GENDER Pearson Correlation 
. 
423 
. 
224 
. 
414 
. 
574 
. 
444 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
296 
. 
563 
. 
268 
. 
106 
. 
231 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
SESSIONS Pearson Correlation 
-. 
285 
. 
654 
. 
417 
. 
389 
. 
284 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
493 
. 
056 
. 
264 
. 
300 
. 
460 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
PERIOD Pearson Correlation 
-. 
323 
-. 
062 
. 
014 
-. 
017 
. 
210 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
435 
. 
873 
. 
972 
. 
965 
. 
587 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
MBSSM Pearson Correlation 
. 
772* 
-. 
459 
-. 
342 
. 
097 
-. 
139 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
025 
. 
214 
. 
367 
. 
803 
. 
722 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
MBSSB Pearson Correlation 
. 
165 
. 
499 
. 
635 
. 
196 
. 
297 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
695 
. 
171 
. 
066 
. 
614 
. 
437 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
MBSSDIFF Pearson Correlation 
. 
615 
-. 
519 
-. 
460 
. 
025 
-. 
198 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
105 
. 
153 
. 
213 
. 
948 
. 
610 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
HADSDEPC Pearson Correlation 
. 
173 
. 
413 
. 
604 
. 
228 
. 
283 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
682 
. 
269 
. 
085 
. 
555 
. 
460 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
HADSANXC Pearson Correlation 
. 
524 
. 
336 
. 
737* 
. 
534 
. 
642 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
183 
. 
377 
. 
024 
. 
139 
. 
062 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
IESINTRC Pearson Correlation 
. 
426 
-. 
125 
. 
140 
. 
505 
. 
345 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
293 
. 
769 
. 
742 
. 
201 
. 
402 
N 8 8 8 8 8 
IESAVC Pearson Correlation 1.000 
-. 
253 
. 
431 
. 
675 
. 
643 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
546 
. 
286 
. 
066 
. 
086 
N 8 8 8 8 8 
PDSREXNC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
253 1.000 
. 
669* 
. 
051 
. 
109 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
546 
. 
049 
. 
896 
. 
780 
N. 8 9 9 9 9 
PDSREXSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
431 
. 
669* 1.000 
. 
620 
. 
727' 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
286 
. 
049 
. 
075 
. 
026 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
PDSAVNC Pearson Correlation 
. 
675 
. 
051 
. 
620 1.000 
. 
941+ 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
066 
. 
896 
. 
075 
. 
000 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
PDSAVSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
643 
. 
109 
. 
727* 
. 
941 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
086 
. 
780 
. 
026 
. 
000 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
PDSARNC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
177 
. 
750* 
. 
587 
. 
409 
. 
382 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
676 
. 
020 
. 
097 
. 
275 
. 
311 
N 8 9 9 9 
.9 
PDSARSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
258 
. 
276 
. 
664 
. 
756* 
. 
762' 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
538 
. 
473 
. 
051 
. 
018 
. 
017 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
312 
Correlations 
IESAVC PDSREXNC PDSREXSC PDSAVNC PDSAVSC 
PDSIMPC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
155 
. 
423 
. 
132 
. 
043 
-. 
103 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
713 
. 
257 
. 
734 
. 
912 
. 
792 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYNOC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
028 
. 
830 
. 
754* 
. 
507 
. 
499 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
948 
. 
006 
. 
019 
. 
164 
. 
171 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYSEC Pearson Correlation 
. 
536 
. 
308 
. 
843* 
. 
896 
. 
955 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
171 
. 
420 
. 
004 
. 
001 
. 
000 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYRC Pearson Correlation 
. 
529 
. 
559 
. 
939 
. 
746* 
. 
832* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
178 
. 
118 
. 
000 
. 
021 
. 
005 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
PDSDURC Pearson Correlation 
. 
287 
. 
224 
. 
270 
. 
229 
. 
229 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
491 
. 
563 
. 
482 
. 
553 
. 
553 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
PDSDELC Pearson Correlation a a a a a 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
PDSDIAGC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
287 
. 
783* 
. 
445 
. 
287 
. 
222 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
491 
. 
013 
. 
230 
. 
454 
. 
565 
N 8 9 9 9 9 
_nr 
i 
313 
Correlations 
PDSARNC PDSARSC PDSIMPC PDSSYNOC PDSSYSEC 
AGE Pearson Correlation 
-. 
197 
-. 
208 
. 
445 
-. 
068 
. 
029 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
612 
. 
591 
. 
230 
. 
862 
. 
941 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
GENDER Pearson Correlation 
. 
210 
. 
166 
. 
756* 
. 
354 
. 
390 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
588 
. 
670 
. 
018 
. 
351 
. 
299 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
SESSIONS Pearson Correlation 
. 
871 
. 
535 
. 
619 
. 
848 
. 
425 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
002 
. 
137 
. 
075 
. 
004 
. 
255 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PERIOD Pearson Correlation 
-. 
054 
. 
003 
-. 
156 
-. 
059 
. 
117 
Sig.. (2-tailed) 
. 
891 
. 
993 
. 
688 
. 
880 
. 
765 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
MBSSM Pearson Correlation 
-. 
255 
-. 
065 
-. 
186 
-. 
300 
-. 
177 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
508 
. 
869 
. 
633 
. 
433 
. 
648 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
MBSSB Pearson Correlation 
. 
034 
-. 
031 
. 
273 
. 
267 
. 
302 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
930 
. 
937 
. 
477 
. 
487 
. 
430 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
MBSSDIFF Pearson Correlation 
-. 
220 
-. 
044 
-. 
230 
-. 
322 
-. 
231 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
570 
. 
910 
. 
552 
. 
398 
. 
550 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
HADSDEPC Pearson Correlation 
. 
449 
. 
541 
. 
248 
. 
474 
. 
471 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
226 
. 
132 
. 
519 
. 
197 
. 
200 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
HADSANXC Pearson Correlation 
. 
361 
. 
533 
. 
159 
. 
473 
. 
692* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
340 
. 
139 
. 
682 
. 
199 
. 
039 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
IESINTRC Pearson Correlation 
. 
188 
. 
331 
. 
578 
. 
188 
. 
334 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
655 
. 
423 
. 
134 
. 
656 
. 
419 
N 8 8 8 8 8 
IESAVC Pearson Correlation 
-. 
177 
. 
258 
-. 
155 
-. 
028 
. 
536 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
676 
. 
538 
. 
713 
. 
948 
. 
171 
N 8 8 8 8 8 
PDSREXNC Pearson Correlation 
. 
750* 
. 
276 
. 
423 
. 
830* 
. 
308 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
020 
. 
473 
. 
257 
. 
006 
. 
420 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSREXSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
587 
. 
664 
. 
132 
. 
754* 
. 
843 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
097 
. 
051 
. 
734 
. 
019 
. 
004 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSAVNC Pearson Correlation 
. 
409 
. 
756* 
. 
043 
. 
507 
. 
896 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
275 
. 
018 
. 
912 
. 
164 
. 
001 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSAVSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
382 
. 
762* 
-. 
103 
. 
499 
. 
955* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
311 
. 
017 
. 
792 
. 
171 
. 
000 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSARNC Pearson Correlation 1.000 
. 
728* 
. 
337 
. 
964 
. 
580 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
026 
. 
375 
. 
000 
. 
101 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSARSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
728* 1.000 
-. 
063 
. 
712* 
. 
889* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
026 
. 
873 
. 
031 
. 
001 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
QýýP 
314 
Correlations 
PDSARNC PDSARSC PDSIMPC PDSSYNOC PDSSYSEC 
PDSIMPC Pearson Correlation 
. 
337 
-. 
063 1.000 
. 
367 
-. 
043 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
375 
. 
873 
. 
331 
. 
912 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYNOC Pearson Correlation 
. 
964 
. 
712* 
. 
367 1.000 
. 
678* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
031 
. 
331 
. 
045 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYSEC Pearson Correlation 
. 
580 
. 
889 
-. 
043 
. 
678* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
101 
. 
001 
. 
912 
. 
045 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYRC Pearson Correlation 
. 
603 
. 
699* 
. 
189 
. 
751 * 
. 
896* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
086 
. 
036 
. 
626 
. 
020 
. 
001 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSDURC Pearson Correlation 
. 
367 
. 
308 
. 
189 
. 
354 
. 
287 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
331 
. 
420 
. 
626 
. 
351 
. 
454 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSDELC Pearson Correlation a a a a a 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. N 9 9 9 9 9 
PDSDIAGC Pearson Correlation 
. 
812 
. 
332 
. 
661 
. 
840 
. 
333 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
008 
. 
383 
. 
052 
. 
005 
. 
381 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
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Correlations 
PDSSYRC PDSDURC PDSDELC PDSDIAGC 
AGE Pearson Correlation 
. 
000 
. 
079 
.a . 
192 
Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
. 
839 
. 
620 
N 9 9 9 g 
GENDER Pearson Correlation 
. 
500 
. 
250 a 
. 
500 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
170 
. 
516 
. 
170 
N 9 9 9 g 
SESSIONS Pearson Correlation 
. 
468 
. 
117 a 
. 
936 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
204 
. 
764 
. 
000 
N 9 9 9 9 
PERIOD Pearson Correlation 
. 
022 
. 
212 a 
-. 
012 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
955 
. 
584 
. 
975 
N 9 9 9 9 
MBSSM Pearson Correlation 
-. 
346 
. 
223 a 
-. 
424 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
362 
. 
564 
. 
255 
N 9 9 9 9 
MBSSB Pearson Correlation 
. 
558 
-. 
328 a 
. 
328 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
118 
. 
388 
. 
388 
N 9 9 9 9 
MBSSDIFF Pearson Correlation 
-. 
442 
. 
276 a 
-. 
442 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
234 
. 
472 
. 
234 
N 9 9 9 9 
HADSDEPC Pearson Correlation 
. 
462 
. 
675* a 
. 
124 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
211 
. 
046 
. 
750 
N 9 9 9 9 
HADSANXC Pearson Correlation 
. 
705* 
. 
760* a 
. 
147 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
034 
. 
017 
. 
707 
N 9 9 9 9 
IESINTRC Pearson Correlation 
. 
261 
. 
616 a 
. 
162 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
532 
. 
104 
. 
701 
N 8 8 8 8 
IESAVC Pearson Correlation 
. 
529 
. 
287 a 
-. 
287 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
178 
. 
491 
. 
491 
N 8 8 8 8 
PDSREXNC Pearson Correlation 
. 
559 
. 
224 a 
. 
783* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
118 
. 
563 
. 
013 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSREXSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
939 
. 
270 a 
. 
445 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
482 
. 
230 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSAVNC Pearson Correlation 
. 
746* 
. 
229 a 
. 
287 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
021 
. 
553 
. 
454 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSAVSC Pearson Correlation " 
. 
832 
. 
229 a 
. 
222 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
005 
. 
553 
. 
565 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSARNC Pearson Correlation 
. 
603 
. 
367 a 
. 
812 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
086 
. 
331 
. 
008 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSARSC Pearson Correlation 
. 
699* 
. 
308 a 
. 
332 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
036 
. 
420 
. 
383 
N 9 9 9 9 
r_ 
316 
Correlations 
PDSSYRC PDSDURC PDSDELC PDSDIAGC 
PDSIMPC Pearson Correlation 
. 
189 
. 
189 a 
. 
661 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
626 
. 
626 
. 
052 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYNOC Pearson Correlation 
. 
751* 
. 
354 a 
. 
840* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
020 
. 
351 
. 
005 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYSEC Pearson Correlation 
. 
89 
. 
287 a 
. 
333 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
001 
. 
454 
. 
381 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSSYRC Pearson Correlation 1.000 
. 
250 a 
. 
500 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
516 
. 
170 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSDURC Pearson Correlation 
. 
250 1.000 a 
. 
125 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
516 
. 
749 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSDELC Pearson Correlation a a a a 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
N 9 9 9 9 
PDSD1AGC Pearson Correlation 
. 
500 
. 
125 a 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
170 
. 
749 
. 
N 9 9 9 9 
'`. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
"`. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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Correlations 
HADSDEPA HADSANXA IESINTRA IESAVA MBSSB 
HADSDEPA Pearson Correlation 1.000 
. 
585 
. 
461 
-. 
081 
-. 
459 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
098 
. 
212 
. 
836 
. 
214 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
HADSANXA Pearson Correlation 
. 
585 1.000 
. 
127 
. 
310 
-. 
386 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
098 
. 
744 
. 
416 
. 
305 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
IESINTRA Pearson Correlation 
. 
461 
. 
127 1.000 
. 
270 
-. 
772* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
212 
. 
744 
. 
482 
. 
015 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
IESAVA Pearson Correlation 
-. 
081 
. 
310 
. 
270 1.000 
-. 
020 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
836 
. 
416 
. 
482 
. 
960 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
MBSSB Pearson Correlation 
-. 
459 
-. 
386 772` 
-. 
020 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
214 
. 
305 
. 
015 
. 
960 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 13: SPSS output of partial correlation coefficients, controlling 
for gender 
--- 
PARTIALCORRELATIONCOEFFICIENTS 
--- 
Controlling for.. GENDER 
0 
MBSSB HADSDEPA HADSANXA IESINTRA 
MBSSB 1.0000 
-. 
3118 
-. 
2873 
-. 
8126 
0) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
496 P= 
. 
532 P= 
. 
026 
HADSDEPA 
-. 
3118 1.0000 
. 
5199 
. 
5068 
( 5) ( 0) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
496 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
232 P= 
. 
246 
HA. DSANXA 
-. 
2873 
. 
5199 1.0000 
. 
0916 
5) ( 5) ( 0) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
532 P= 
. 
232 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
845 
IESINTRA 
-. 
8126 
. 
5068 
. 
0916 1.0000 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 0) 
P= 
. 
026 P= 
. 
246 P= 
. 
845 P= 
. 
IESAVA 
-. 
0201 
. 
0000 
. 
3940 
. 
2226 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
966 P=1.000 P= 
. 
382 P= 
. 
631 
HADSDEPC 
-. 
2577 
. 
1644 
. 
0592 
-. 
0195 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
577 P= 
. 
725 P= 
. 
900 P= 
. 
967 
HADSANXC 
-. 
2201 
. 
3260 
. 
6265 
-. 
1677 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
635 P= 
. 
475 P= 
. 
132 P= 
. 
719 
IESINTRC 
-. 
8914 
. 
2918 
. 
2485 
. 
6883 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
007 P= 
. 
525 P= 
. 
591 P= 
. 
087 
IESAVC 
-. 
0037 
-. 
1441 
. 
5831 
-. 
1514 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
994 P= 
. 
758 P= 
. 
169 P= 
. 
746 
PDSREXNC 
. 
4344 
-. 
2107 
-. 
2893 
-. 
6275 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
330 P= 
. 
650 P= 
. 
529 P= 
. 
131 
(Coefficient / (D. F. ) / 2-tailed Significance) 
It 
. 
11 is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
IESAVA HADSDEPC 
-. 
0201 
-. 
2577 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
966 P= 
. 
577 
. 
0000 
. 
1644 
5) ( 5) 
P=1.000 P= 
. 
725 
. 
3940 
. 
0592 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
382 P= 
. 
900 
. 
2226 
-. 
0195 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
631 P= 
. 
967 
1.0000 
-. 
5949 
0) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
159 
-. 
5949 1.0000 
5) ( 0) 
P= 
. 
159 P= 
. 
-. 
2949 
. 
7833 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
521 P= 
. 
037 
-. 
1236 
. 
5943 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
792 P= 
. 
159 
. 
6012 
. 
1100 
" 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
153 P= 
. 
814 
-. 
5717 
. 
3455 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
180 P= 
. 
448 
319 
--- 
PARTIALCORRELATIONCOEFFICIENTS 
Controlling for.. GENDER 
MBSSB HADSDEPA HADSANXA IESINTRA IESAVA HADSDEPC 
PDSREXSC 
. 
3880 
. 
0631 
. 
2634 
- 
. 
5415 
-. 
0761 
. 
5010 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
390 P= 
. 
893 P= 
. 
568 P= 
. 
209 P= 
. 
871 P= 
. 
252 
PDSAVNC 
-. 
1750 
. 
4183 
. 
6532 
. 
2133 
. 
6415 
. 
0783 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
707 P= 
. 
350 P= 
. 
112 P= 
. 
646 P= 
. 
120 P= 
. 
868 
PDSAVSC 
-. 
0852 
. 
5138 
. 
7775 
. 
0866 
. 
5529 
. 
0977 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
856 P= 
. 
238 P= 
. 
040 P= 
. 
854 P= 
. 
198 P= 
. 
835 
PDSARNC 
-. 
1336 
. 
1458 
- 
. 
0281 
- 
. 
0271 
-. 
2827 
. 
4148 ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
775 P= 
. 
755 P= 
. 
952 P= 
. 
954 P= 
. 
539 P= 
. 
355 
PDSARSC 
-. 
3239 
. 
4363 
. 
3515 
. 
2948 
. 
1783 
. 
4782 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
479 P= 
. 
328 P= 
. 
439 P= 
. 
521 P= 
. 
702 P= 
. 
278 
PDSIMPC 
-. 
1494 
- 
. 
3727 
- 
. 
7541 
. 
0486 
-. 
6742 
. 
1003 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
749 P= 
. 
410 P= 
. 
050 P= 
. 
918 P= 
. 
097 P= 
. 
831 
PDSSYNOC 
. 
0593 
. 
0945 
. 
0125 
- 
. 
2250 
-. 
2565 
. 
4048 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
899 P= 
. 
840 P= 
. 
979 P= 
. 
628 P= 
. 
579 P= 
. 
368 
PDSSYSEC 
-. 
0763 
. 
4451 
. 
5989 
. 
0321 
. 
3410 
. 
3375 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
871 P= 
. 
317 P= 
. 
155 P= 
. 
945 P= 
. 
454 P= 
. 
459 
PDSSYRC 
. 
1737 
. 
0619 
. 
4540 
- 
. 
3831 
. 
1960 
. 
2831 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
710 P= 
. 
895 P= 
. 
306 P= 
. 
396 P= 
. 
674 P= 
. 
538 
PDSDELC 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
(Coefficient / (D. F. ) / 2-tailed Significance) 
11 
." 
is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
0 
320 
---PARTIALC0RRELAT10NC0EFFICIENTS--- 
I 
Controlling for.. GENDER 
MBSSB HADSDEPA HADSANXA IESINTRA 
PDSDIAGC 
. 
1494 
. 
0000 
-. 
2828 
-. 
1943 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
749 P=1.000 P= 
. 
539 P= 
. 
676 
PDSDURC 
-. 
4910 
. 
2381 
. 
4991 
. 
0000 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
263 P= 
. 
607 P= 
. 
254 P=1.000 
(Coefficient / (D. F. ) / 2-tailed Significance) 
It 
." 
is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
IESAVA HADSDEPC 
-. 
3371 
. 
0000 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
460 P=1.000 
-. 
4616 
. 
7689 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
297 P= 
. 
043 
321 
---P ARTIAL CORRE LATIO NCOEF FICIEN TS 
--- 
Controlling for.. GENDER 
HADSANXC IESINTRC IESAVC PDSREXNC PDSREXSC PDSAVNC 
MBSSB 
-. 
2201 
-. 
8914 
-. 
0037 
. 
4344 
. 
3880 
-. 
1750 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
635 P= 
. 
007 P= 
. 
994 P= 
. 
330 P= 
. 
390 P= 
. 
707 
HADSDEPA 
. 
3260 
. 
2918 
-. 
1441 
-. 
2107 
. 
0631 
. 
4183 ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
475 P= 
. 
525 P= 
. 
758 P= 
. 
650 P= 
. 
893 P= 
. 
350 
HADSANXA 
. 
6265 
. 
2485 
. 
5831 
-. 
2893 
. 
2634 
. 
6532 ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
132 P= 
. 
591 P= 
. 
169 P= 
. 
529 P= 
. 
568 P= 
. 
112 
IESINTRA 
-. 
1677 
. 
6883 
-. 
1514 
-. 
6275 
-. 
5415 
. 
2133 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
719 P= 
. 
087 P= 
. 
746 P= 
. 
131 P= 
. 
209 P= 
. 
646 
IESAVA 
-. 
2949 
-. 
1236 
. 
6012 
-. 
5717 
-. 
0761 
. 
6415 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
521 P= 
. 
792 P= 
. 
153 P= 
. 
180 P= 
. 
871 P= 
. 
120 
HADSDEPC 
. 
7833 
. 
5943 
. 
1100 
. 
3455 
. 
5010 
. 
0783 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
037 P= 
. 
159 P= 
. 
814 P= 
. 
448 P= 
. 
252 P= 
. 
868 
HADSANXC 1.0000 
. 
4586 
. 
4264 
. 
2231 
. 
6109 
. 
3595 
0) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
301 P= 
. 
340 P= 
. 
631 P= 
. 
145 P= 
. 
428 
IESINTRC 
. 
4586 1.0000 
. 
1829 
-. 
3922 
-. 
1833 
. 
1741 
( 5) ( 0) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
301 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
695 P= 
. 
384 P= 
. 
694 P= 
. 
709 
IESAVC 
. 
4264 
. 
1829 1.0000 
-. 
3676 
. 
3371 
. 
5842 
5) ( 5) ( 0) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
340 P= 
. 
695 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
417 P= 
. 
460 P= 
. 
168 
PDSREXNC 
. 
2231 
-. 
3922 
-. 
3676 1.0000 
. 
6611 
-. 
1182 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 0) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
631 P= 
. 
384 P= 
. 
417 P= 
. 
P='. 106 P= 
. 
801 
(Coefficient / (D. F. ) / 2-tailed Significan ce) 
is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
I 
322 
0 
---PARTIAL 
Controlling for.. 
HADSANXC 
PDSREXSC 
. 
6109 
5) 
P= 
. 
145 
PDSAVNC 
. 
3595 
( 5) 
P= 
. 
428 
PDSAVSC 
. 
4829 
5) 
P= 
. 
272 
PDSARNC 
. 
2960 
5) 
P= 
. 
519 
PDSARSC 
. 
4691 
5) 
P= 
. 
288 
PDSIMPC 
- 
. 
3453 
5) 
P= 
. 
448 
PDSSYNOC 
. 
3479 
5) 
P= 
. 
444 
PDSSYSEC 
. 
5630 
5) 
P= 
. 
188 
PDSSYRC 
. 
5353 
5) 
P= 
. 
216 
PDSDELC 
CORRELATION 
GENDER 
IESINTRC IESAVC 
-. 
1833 
. 
3371 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
694 P= 
. 
460 
. 
1741 
. 
5842 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
709 P= 
. 
168 
. 
0936 
. 
5736 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
842 P= 
. 
178 
. 
0776 
- 
. 
2858 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
869 P= 
. 
534 
. 
3910 
. 
2406 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
386 P= 
. 
603 
. 
0496 
- 
. 
7794 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
916 P= 
. 
039 
- 
. 
0754 
- 
. 
1878 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
872 P= 
. 
687 
. 
1509 
. 
4669 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
747 P= 
. 
291 
- 
. 
1317 
. 
4168 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
778 P= 
. 
352 
C0EFFICIENTS 
--- 
PDSREXNC 
. 
6611 
( 5) 
P= 
. 
106 
-. 
1182 
5) 
P= 
. 
801 
-. 
0576 
5) 
P= 
. 
902 
PDSREXSC 
1.0000 
0) 
P= 
. 
. 
5372 
5) 
P= 
. 
214 
. 
6013 
5) 
P= 
. 
153 
PDSAVNC 
. 
5372 
5) 
P= 
. 
214 
1.0000 
0) 
P= 
. 
. 
9655 
5) 
P= 
. 
000 
. 
7374 
( 5) 
P= 
. 
059 
. 
2101 
5) 
P= 
. 
651 
. 
4038 
( 5) 
P= 
. 
369 
. 
8195 
5) 
P= 
. 
024 
. 
1934 
5) 
P= 
. 
678 
. 
5365 
5) 
P= 
. 
214 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
(Coefficient / (D. F. ) / 2-tailed Significance) 
" is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
323 
. 
6075 
5) 
P= 
. 
148 
. 
6303 
5) 
P= 
. 
129 
-. 
3528 
5) 
P= 
. 
438 
. 
7519 
5) 
P= 
. 
051 
. 
7713 
5) 
P= 
. 
042 
. 
9025 
5) 
P= 
. 
005 
( 5) 
P=ý. 
. 
3546 
5) 
P= 
. 
435 
. 
8251 
5) 
P= 
. 
022 
-. 
7319 
5) 
P= 
. 
061 
. 
3875 
5) 
P= 
. 
390 
. 
9319 
5) 
P= 
. 
002 
. 
7294 
5) 
P= 
. 
063 
( 5) 
P= 
. 
---PARTIALC0RRELAT10NCOEFFICIENTS 
--- 
Controlling for.. GENDER 
I 
HADSANXC IESINTRC IESAVC PDSREXNC 
PDSDIAGC 
-. 
1151 
-. 
3469 
-. 
6235 
. 
8076 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
806 P= 
. 
446 P= 
. 
135 P= 
. 
028 
PDSDURC 
. 
9037 
. 
6243 
. 
1878 
. 
2212 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
005 P= 
. 
134 P= 
. 
687 P= 
. 
634 
(Coefficient / (D. F. ) / 2-tailed Significance) 
It 
." 
is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
PDSREXSC PDSAVNC 
. 
3528 
. 
0000 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
438 P=1.000 
. 
3479 
. 
1336 
5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
445 P= 
. 
775 
324 
---PAR TIAL CORRE LATION COEF FICIE NTS 
Controlling for.. GENDER 
PDSAVSC PDSARNC PDSARSC PDSIMPC PDSSYNOC PDSSYSEC 
MBSSB 
-. 
0852 
-. 
1336 
-. 
3239 
-. 
1494 
. 
0593 
- 
. 
0763 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
856 P= 
. 
775 P= 
. 
479 P= 
. 
749 P= 
. 
899 P= 
. 
871 
HADSDEPA 
. 
5138 
. 
1458 
. 
4363 
-. 
3727 
. 
0945 
. 
4451 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
238 P= 
. 
755 P= 
. 
328 P= 
. 
410 P= 
. 
840 P= 
. 
317 
HADSANXA 
. 
7775 
-. 
0281 
. 
3515 
-. 
7541 
. 
0125 
. 
5989 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
040 P= 
. 
952 P= 
. 
439 P= 
. 
050 P= 
. 
979 P= 
. 
155 
IESINTRA 
. 
0866 
-. 
0271 
. 
2948 
. 
0486 
-. 
2250 
. 
0321 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
854 P= 
. 
954 P= 
. 
521 P= 
. 
918 P= 
. 
628 P= 
. 
945 
IESAVA 
. 
5529 
-. 
2827 
. 
1783 
-. 
6742 
-. 
2565 
. 
3410 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
198 P= 
. 
539 P= 
. 
702 P= 
. 
097 P= 
. 
579 P= 
. 
454 
HADSDEPC 
. 
0977 
. 
4148 
. 
4782 
. 
1003 
. 
4048 
. 
3375 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
835 P= 
. 
355 P= 
. 
278 P= 
. 
831 P= 
. 
368 P= 
. 
459 
HADSANXC 
. 
4829 
. 
2960 
. 
4691 
-. 
3453 
. 
3479 
. 
5630 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
272 P= 
. 
519 P= 
. 
288 P= 
. 
448 P= 
. 
444 P= 
. 
188 
IESINTRC 
. 
0936 
. 
0776 
. 
3910 
. 
0496 
-. 
0754 
. 
1509 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
842 P= 
. 
869 P= 
. 
386 P= 
. 
916 P= 
. 
872 P= 
. 
747 
IESAVC 
. 
5736 
-. 
2858 
. 
2406 
-. 
7794 
-. 
1878 
. 
4669 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
178 P= 
. 
534 P= 
. 
603 P= 
. 
039 P= 
. 
687 P= 
. 
291 
PDSREXNC 
-. 
0576 
. 
7374 
. 
2101 
. 
4038 
. 
8195 
. 
1934 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
902 P= 
. 
059 P= 
. 
651 P= 
. 
369 P= 
. 
024 P= 
. 
678 
(Coefficient / (D. F. ) / 2-tailed Significance) 
". " is pri nted if a coefficient cannot be computed 
I 
325 
---PAR TIAL CORRE LATION COEF FI CIEN TS 
Controlling for.. GENDER 
PDSAVSC PDSARNC PDSARSC PDSIMPC PDS SYNOC PDSSYSEC 
PDSREXSC 
. 
6013 
. 
6075 
. 
6303 
-. 
3528 
. 
7519 
. 
7713 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
153 P= 
. 
148 P= 
. 
129 P= 
. 
438 P= 
. 
051 P= 
. 
042 
PDSAVNC 
. 
9655 
. 
3546 
. 
8251 
-. 
7319 
. 
3875 
. 
9319 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
000 P= 
. 
435 P= 
. 
022 P= 
. 
061 P= 
. 
390 P= 
. 
002 
PDSAVSC 1.0000 
. 
3222 
. 
7574 
-. 
8022 
. 
3854 
. 
9399 
( 0) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
481 P= 
. 
049 P= 
. 
030 P= 
. 
393 P= 
. 
002 
PDSARNC 
. 
3222 1.0000 
. 
7271 
. 
2795 
. 
9742 
. 
5708 
( 5) ( 0) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
481 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
064 P= 
. 
544 P= 
. 
000 P= 
. 
181 
PDSARSC 
. 
7574 
. 
7271 1.0000 
-. 
3035 
. 
7030 
. 
9059 
( 5) ( 5) ( 0) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
049 P= 
. 
064 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
508 P= 
. 
078 P= 
. 
005 
PDSIMPC 
-. 
8022 
. 
2795 
-. 
3035 1.0000 
. 
1654 
-. 
6146 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 0) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
030 P= 
. 
544 P= 
. 
508 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
723 P= 
. 
142 
PDSSYNOC 
. 
3854 
. 
9742 
. 
7030 
. 
1654 1 
. 
0000 
. 
6278 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 0) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
393 P= 
. 
000 P= 
. 
078 P= 
. 
723 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
131 
PDSSYSEC 
. 
9399 
. 
5708 
. 
9059 
-. 
6146 
. 
6278 1.0000 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 0) 
P= 
. 
002 P= 
. 
181 P= 
. 
005 P= 
. 
142 P= 
. 
131 P= 
. 
PDSSYRC 
. 
7624 
. 
6731 
. 
7201 
-. 
4152 
. 
7832 
. 
8676 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
046 P= 
. 
097 P= 
. 
068 P= 
. 
354 P= 
. 
037 P= 
. 
011 
PDSDELC 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
P= 
. 
P= 
." 
P= 
. 
(Coefficient / (D. F. ) / 2-tailed Significanc e) 
". " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
I 
326 
---P ART IALC0RRELAT10NC0EFFICIENTS --- 
Controlling for.. GENDER 
d 
PDSAVSC PDSARNC PDSARSC PDSIMPC 
PDSDIAGC 
. 
0000 
. 
8385 
. 
3035 
. 
5000 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P=1.000 P= 
. 
018 P= 
. 
508 P= 
. 
253 
PDSDURC 
. 
2278 
. 
3572 
. 
3562 
. 
0000 
.. 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
6-23 P= 
. 
432 P= 
. 
433 P=1.000 
(Coefficient / (D. F. ) / 2-tailed Significance) 
is printed if a coefficient cannot be ccuted 
PDSSYNOC 
. 
8272 
5) 
P= 
. 
022 
. 
3323 
5) 
P= 
. 
467 
PDSSYSEC 
. 
1891 
5) 
P= 
. 
685 
. 
3280 
5) 
P= 
. 
473 
327 
---PAR TIAL COR RE LATION COEFFICIENTS 
Controlling for.. GENDER 
PDSSYRC PDSDELC PDSDIAGC PDSDURC 
MBSSB 
. 
1737 
. 
1494 
-. 
4910 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
710 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
749 P= 
. 
263 
HADSDEPA 
. 
0619 
. 
0000 
. 
2361 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
895 P= 
. 
P=1.000 P= 
. 
607 
HADSANXA 
. 
4540 
-. 
2828 
. 
4991 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
306 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
539 P= 
. 
254 
IESINTRA 
-. 
3831 
-. 
1943 
. 
0000 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
396 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
676 P=1.000 
IESAVA 
. 
1960 
-. 
3371 
-. 
4616 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
674 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
460 P= 
. 
297 
HADSDEPC 
. 
2831 
. 
0000 
. 
7689 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
538 P= 
. 
P=1.000 P= 
. 
043 
HADSANXC 
. 
5353 
-. 
1151 
. 
9037 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
216 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
806 P= 
. 
005 
IESINTRC 
-. 
1317 
-. 
3469 
. 
6243 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
778 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
446 P= 
. 
134 
IESAVC 
. 
4168 
-. 
6235 
. 
1878 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
352 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
135 P= 
. 
687 
PDSREXNC 
. 
5365 
. 
8076 
. 
2212 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
214 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
028 P= 
. 
634 
(Coefficient / (D. F. ) / 2-tailed Significanc e) 
11 
." 
is printed if a coeffi cient cannot be computed 
328 
---PAR TIAL COR RE LATION COEFFICIENTS 
Controlling for.. GENDER 
PDSSYRC PDSDELC PDSDIAGC PDSDURC 
PDSREXSC 
. 
9025 
. 
3528 
. 
3479 
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
005 P= 
. 
P= 
. 
438 P= 
. 
445 
PDSAVNC 
. 
7294 
. 
0000 
. 
1336 
5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 5) 
P= 
. 
063 P= 
. 
P=1.000 P= 
. 
775 
PDSAVSC 
. 
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Appendix 14: Request for transcribed material. 
Dear Colleague 
Would you like to put your old process reports to another good use ? 
I am conducting research into Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and the 
findings so far suggest some interesting implications for those of us working in 
the field of trauma. For the second stage of the study, I am particularly 
interested in how clients speak about their experience of having PTSD. 
I am looking for transcribed sections of audio-taped counselling sessions with 
clients with PTSD, for qualitative analysis. These transcriptions can be of any 
duration, and must be anonymised, i. e.: have names and any other identifiers 
changed. Process reports that you have completed as part of your MSc or 
Post-MSc training would be ideal for this purpose. I do not need the tapes 
themselves, only the transcriptions. 
As a token of my appreciation, I shall send a £20 book token for every 
transcription that I use and I would be pleased to acknowledge your 
contribution in my research report should you wish. All other transcriptions 
will, of course, be returned. Let me assure you that your transcriptions will be 
treated with the greatest respect and that all findings will be completely 
anonymised. 
Naturally, I should be happy to discuss this with you if you would like further 
information. In the meantime, thank you for taking the trouble to consider 
helping me with this project. 
Yours sincerely, 
Jacqui Farrants, CPsychol. 
Chartered Counselling Psychologist 
Tel: 
Email: 
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Appendix 15: Transcription notation. 
Square brackets mark overlap between utterances, eg: 
T: Yeah, [sure 
C: [when you're tired or something 
Numbers in brackets indicate pauses of 3 seconds or over, timed to the nearest tenth 
of a second, eg: 
C: Um (5.7) these last few weeks have just been pure hell really 
A full stop in brackets indicates a pause which has not been timed, eg: 
C: The door's () don't know 
Underlining indicates that words are uttered with added emphasis, eg: 
C: it can't have been me 
Small circles around utterances indicate that words are uttered in a lower voice 
than the surrounding utterances, eg: 
C. whatever, um you hear on the telephone or something, 'oh so and so's died 
Square brackets indicate that some transcript has been deliberately omitted. 
Material in square brackets is clarificatory information, eg: 
C: um, [name of doctor] said this. He was quite happy for it to all to happen 
The word inaudible in round brackets indicates an utterance or section of speech 
which was unclear at the point of transcription, eg: 
C. but why it should come out now (inaudible) I just don't know 
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